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COUNT ?IVg
WAR GRII^:ES AND CRIMES AGAI-IST HUMANITY:
ATROCITIES AND OFFENSES COI^'^ITTED AOAINST
CIVILIAN POPULATIONS
The Indlotment alleges that the aefendants WEIZSAECKSR,
STEENG-RACHT, KEPPLER, BOHLE, WOSRMANN, RITTER, ERDMANNSDOHFF,
V^ESENMAYER, LAMICiRS, STUCICART, DARRE, MEI3SNER, DIETRICH,
BERGER, SCHi.LLi.NBERG, SCHWERIN-KRCSIGK, RASGHE, KEHRL ana
PUHL, from March 1938 to May 1945, committed war crimes and
crimes against humanity, in that they participated in atro
cities and offenses, including murder, extermination,-
enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, killing of hostages,
torture, persecutions en political, racial and religious
grounds, and other inhumane and criminal acts against German
nationals and. members of the civilian populations of coun
tries and territories under belligerent occupation of, or
otherwise controlled by Germany, and in the plunder of nublio
and "oriva.te "property, wanton destruction of cities, tovns '^ nd
villages, anc' devastation not Justified by military neoea^lty.
It Is alleged that the Thir-^ Reloh embarhed uoon a svs-
tematio program of genocide, a.imed at the destruction of
nations and ethnic groups within the (German sphere of influ
ence, in part by murdrrous extermination, and in part by elim
ination and suppression of national characteristics, with intent
to strengthen the German nation and the so-called "aryan" race
at the expense of such other nations and groups, by imposing
Nazi and German characteristics upon individuals selected.
therefrom, ^nd by the extermination of. "undeeir^ble reoial
elements*^ —th^^t portions of the civilian porulations of
ocou"nie(3 coantriep, erpeoially in "^olend and the occupied
Sastern territories, vjere compelled, by force, to evacuate
their homesteads, which were sequestered and confiscated by
the Reich, and their properties, real and personal, were
treated as revenue of the Reich and the so-called ^♦ethnio
Germans*' v\;ere resettled in such lands, —that German racial
registers were established and legislation enacted defining
these classes of "ethnic Germans" and other nationals of
occupied territories and the puppet and satellite governments
eligible for Germanizetion, —that subsequent acquisition,
in some instances of German citizenship, was compelled, and
individuals vjho were forced to accept such citizenship or
upon whom such citizenship was conferred by decree, became
»
amenable to military conscription, service in the armed
forces, and other obligations of citizenship, --that failure
to fulfill these obligations resulted in imprisonment or
death, and the forced Germanization constituted the basis for
such punishment, —that those classes of persons deemed
ineligible and those individuals who refused Geimanization
were deported to forced labor, confined in concentration camns,
and in many instances liquidated, —that in the occu led terri
tories the use of judicial mechanisms was a powerful weapon
for the suppression and extermination of all opponents of
the Nazi occupation and for the persecution and extermination
of "races," ^-special Police tribunals and other summary courts
were created in Germany ard ih the occupied territories, and
sufejeoted civilians of .these occupied countries to criminal
abu^e, and denial of judicial and penal process, —that
special legislation was enacte<^ •provi'-''Ing sum^iary trial "by
these special courts ano invoking the c^eath oenalty or '
Imprisonment in concentration camps for all members of the
civilian population of the ocouoieci territories suspected
of opposing any of the policies of the German oocu-Dation
f authorities, — that persons who committed offenses against
the Reich or the German forces in the occupied territories
were handed over to the police and. taken secretly to Germany
for trial and punishment, without notification to t^elr
relatives of the diaposition of the case, — that certain
classes of civilians in the occupied territories, deemed •
politically, racially, or religiously undesirable, if sus
pected of having committed a crime, were d.eprlved of all
legal remedy and turned over to the Gestapo for summary
treatment, all for the purpose of creating a reign of Judi
cial terror in the occupied countries in order to suppress
all resistance and exterminate undesirable elements, — that
in the Reich program of "pacification" of t^e occuoled iBrrl-
4 torles, through terrorism, the arrest, imprisonment, deporta
tion and murder of so-called hostages was ef-^^ected, and tews,
alleged Communists, "asocials," an'"' other innocent members of
^ the civilian population not connected with any acts against
the occupying power, wer-; taken as hostages and, without t^e
benefit of investigation or trial, were summarily deported,
^ hanged or shot, — that they wer executed or deported at
arbitrarily established ratios for attacks by persons unknown
on German Installations and German personnel in the occupied
territories, — that through recruitment drives in the occupied
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territories and puppet and satellite governinents, SS- units
were organized ano SS recruits obtained, often by com'oulqion,
from among prisoners of war and the nationals of t>^ose coun
tries and assigned to the Waffen SS military divisions, t^e
administretion ,pf the SS concentration camo system, and s"oe-
cia.lly-constituted penal battalions, -— that t.^ese units
f. engaged In the commission of atrocities and o-f-^enses ag^»inst
the civilian populations of occupied and satellite countries,
— that anti-Jev/is^ activities with eac^ a^ggression were
r extended to the incorporated, occupied, or ot^er-ise con-
fe
trolled G-erman dominated countries, — that Austrian,
Gzechoslovakian, Polish and. other nationals of Jevjlsh evtrac-
k
tion, were deprived of their civil rights an'' their property
confisoe>.ted, tens of thousands thrown into concentration
camps and tortured., and many of t.hem murdered, — that these
measures were followed by barbarous mass killings of people
of Jewish extraction a.nd other foreign nationals in the occu
pied. territories, in which hundreds of thousands of men,
women and children were exterminated, — that the early pro-
^ gram for driving out the Jews as pauper emigres was supplanted
in 1942 by a program for the evacuation of eleven million
* European Jews to camps in Eastern Europe, for ultimate exterm
ination, — that they were to be transported to these areas
' in .huge labor ga.ngs, and there the weak w^ere to be hnied
iiTiiediately and the able-bodied worked to death, and thus
f- millions of people of Jewish extraction from Austria,
Czechoslova.kia, Poland, ^'rance, .Belgium, the Netherlands,
Denmark, Norway, Hungary, Bulgaria, Yucoslavia; Rumania, the
Baltic btates, t^e Soviet Union, Greece, Italy, and also from
Germany were deported to the Eastern extermination areas and
murdered..
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In addition to these general charges, the Indictment
alleges the comn-ission of certain specific acts connected
with the general program which, it is alleged, were com
mitted by various of the defendants as "rinci-oals, aiders,
coooerators or abettors, "^hese we wi'^l deal with later.
Persecution of the Jews. No chapters in the history of the
world are more blac'-^ and bloodstained than those which por
tray the fate of the Jews of Germany, and of all EuroiDe which
came within the vsphere of ^erma.n dominatir^n. The storv of
all dictators is a selection of some nation, some class, some
id.eology u ^on whose shoulders all the woes, ali.eged an'' real,
may be lo'^ged. Invariably those «?elected are less able to
combat the propaganda of hate, 'promises of tetter con'^ihions
are never alone sufficient to arouse the masses to the neces
sary emotional pitch which will make them the willinar subjects
> ,
of the dictator s will. Not only must they become reoeotive
to such ic eas and themselves feel the flames of hate tovrards
someone or soi.e class, but the .ropaganda and incitement nust
ever '-/low t):e fli-mes higher, whiter and hotter.
It makes little difference whether the subject of 'nass
^ate be a political party, re.G^ , religion, class or another
nation. T^g technique is the same, the results are identical,
an-' the hgte thus engendered inevitably brings on -resistance
an" in the end ruin u ^on those who start and partioi-oate in
it.
Hitler mad.e the ;^ewish persecution one o:^ the -primary
sub,^ects of ^"is policy to gain and retain cower. As the
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years went by the more intensely did he and his adherents
throw fuel upon the fire„ It was never permitted to die
down. It infected the high sind the low; it made itself
felt in the minds and hearts of men who should and did Imow
better. It would, of course, be a mistake to say that every
Gei'man became a convert to this doctrine. *l'he record is
p clear that many did not, but unfortunately the^^ were compa
ratively few and the5.r voices were not heard or heeded.
Some who knew better and who were not swept away by propa-
A
r ganda, were alive to the possibilities of increasing their
f
own fortunes and enhancing their position by taking advan
tage of this horrible persecution, and calmly and callously
I
gave lip service to these pogroms and sought to enrich
themselves from the misfortunes of its victims.
The persecution of Jews went on steadily from step
to step and finally to death in foul form. The Jews of
Germany were first deprived of the rights of citizenship.
They were then deprived of the ri^t to teach, to practice
professions, to obtain education, to engage in ousiness
f enterprises; they were forbidden to marry, except among
themselves and those of their own religion; they were sub
ject to arrest and confinement in concentration ca'rps, to
^ beatings, mutilation and torture; their property v/as confis
cated; they v/ere herded into ghettos; they were forced to
emigrate and to buy leave to do so; they were deported to
the East v/here they worked to exhaustion and death; they
became slave laborers and finally, over six million v/ere
murdered•
As country after country fell under German occupation
or control, or was forcedto do the v/ill of the Third xieich,
its Jewish citizens became subject to the same measures
of horror. It's a record of shame and degradation to every
German and to the German nation. These crimes were planned
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by Germans, ordered by Germans, committed by Germane, under
e government vhioh the German r^eonle v^illingly chose and
which, to a large degree, they enthusiastically supported, —at
least as long ap it was crowned with success.
The property of which the Third Eeich robbed the Jews
was used, and was planned to be used, for the purpose of
rearmament and aggression, VJhen the rearmament program and
the other financial measures had practically bankrupted the
Third Feich, the start of a disastrous inflation was in
sight and Goering, at a conference, stated:
"Physical Ta^ks. The assignment 'is to
raise the level of armament from a current index
of 100" to one of 300.
*'This. goal is confronted by almost insuperable
obstacles because already now there is a scarcity
of labor, because factory capacity is fully utilized,
because the tasks of last summer exhausted our re
serves of foreign currency, and because the financial
situation of the Feich is serious and even npw shows
a deficit. In s^ite of this, the problem must be
solved . . .
'"Finances. "Very critical situation of the
Feich Exchequer. Felief initially through the
billion (milliards) imposed on lewry, and through
profits accruing to the Feich in the aryanization
of Jewish enterprises,"
A mad race ensued in which people of every class of
German society joined: Farmers, bankers, big and little
business-men eagerly sought to pick up Jewish rronerty at a
fraction of its value. The German people looked on with
general complacence uoon all of these measures which finally
ended in the deportation of the victims and their being
herded into the camps of death. There is no excuse or justi
fication for any man who took a conscious or consenting part
in the measures which constituted these abominable and
atrocious crimes, and it is immaterial whether they originated
or executed them, or merely implemented them, justified them
to the world or gave aid and comfort to their perpetrators.
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The very Immensity ot t^is maps murder sta^e-ers the
imagination anf' ten^s to blunt a rea''iza.tion o'^ its hnrror.
But we can gain some Idea, of it from the fact thpt from the
one camp of -Auschwitz over thirty-three tons of ffold from the
teeth of the victims an*^ rings from their fi'erers were sent
to the Reichsbank.
Foreign Office Knowledge of the Fate of the Jews in the Bast.
Viith typical G-erman thoroughness, not only wss the campaign
of murder 'and. extermination of ^ews in Poland and hugsia car
ried on, but detailed reports were made of these horrible
measures. "^he Foreign Office regularly received reports of
the x:^insatzgrup!.>en operations in the occupied, territories.
Many of these were initialled by WPIZSAE0K2R and VOSRMAN^I.
They .revealed the cle ring of entire areas of the ^ewish Pop
ulation by mass murder, and the bloody butchery of the ho^p-
less .and innocent, the shooting of hostages in numbers wholly
disproportionate to the alleged offenses against G-erman armed
forces; the murder of captured -"^ussian '^f'^icirls and g reign
of terrorism carried on with calculated farocity, all told in
the crisp, unimaginative la,nguage of military reports.
All this is d8=^o.ribed in detail in the .Judgment ren
dered in Case IX (Tye United States vs. Chlendorf et al), and
it is unnecessary to repeat them again. It suf'^'ices to say
that many hundreds of thousands of Innocent people were mur
dered iMthout reason or excuse, without trial or opportunity
to establish their intiocenoe, and beyond Question the Jewish
population i as the particular object of these murder campaigns.
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The prosecution, however, does not contend that the
defendants implemented or initiated the crimes committed by
the -i^insatzgrupDen but that they had •knowledge of t^em and
they made no objections to t^eir com. ission. Here the Foreign
Office had no Jurisdiction or power to intervene, were"
in the most oart c-rried on in an area w^^ic^ was «tilT under
the lurisdiction of the "ehrmac^t. How a decent man could
continue to hold office under a regime whic^ carried'^ut.
planned and wholesale barbarities of t'-^is hind ig di-p-fiou^t
to understand, but there is no evidence of particioati'^n on
theoart of the defendants WcZRlviAHH and t-Riz3A:^CKRR.
^*hat is of imp.ortance in this case, howf-ver, is that
the facts disclosed by the reoord.s of these crimes, disposes
of toe claim of ignorance of fina.l solution, and of the our-
•pose of the deportation of the Jews to the East. Knowing as
they did what happened to the Jews when they c^me under the
control of the SS, Gestapo and Police, we find ourselves
unable to believe that these defendants had any ifd.ea that
these deportations ended in anything but the death of t^ese
deportees through exhaustion from overwork, starvation or mis
treatment, and by mass murder. The defendants are not men
onlv oT'^inary intelligence and understanding. They are edu
cated and trained to offici^'l life and exnerienced in the
evaluation of policy, the motives and acts of oarties,
officialdom, and of nations, and wholl'"" accustomed to r^a.d
between the lines of restrained, or spparontlv innocuous isn-
gua.ge, and from it extract the meaning lying behind t^e words.
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i lil'liiii II I I inlV>fiT*r.Tt-*jfcj.T iiw'1-i-i 11• • •- .
The defenaant Wi.I3SA-C-v£:R'S statement that he thought
Auschwitz was merely a can.p where laborers were internea, we
believe tells only part of what he knew, ana what he '^aa good,
reason to beHeve. He had access to what was publicly broa.a-
cast by the outside world, of what.was going on there. He was
kept informed by his contacts with the '^ehrmacht ana the
opposition, and with the'office of -^^dmiral '^anaris, ana '-^e
knew wha.t: happened to the Jews of Polanc, of the laltic
States, and of the occuoied territories of Hussia. -•n"'e.qs ^e
thought t^at ravening wolves had oVernig^t become meek lambs,
he must have realized what t^e end would be.
It is possible, but we think unli^^elv, that he was not
informed of the exquisite techniques of murder developed in
V'is camp, but that he knew t^e deported were marked for
slave labor a.nd d.eath we h.*=ve no doubt. I'his is clearly indi-
Gated by the testimony of his own son, Karl von '"eizsaecker,
and by t.he testimony of a number of other of his own wit
nesses, and particularly a^monp those of '-"is Foreign 0:efiQe
associates who with him claim that they were members of the
und.erground mov.ment ag'^inst the Hitler regime. ¥e may men
tion Schlabrendorff, Bruns, von Htzdorf and von Bargen.
Karl von WeizSc'.ecker testified as follows •
Durint; the war did you also talk to your
f"the^ about the deportation of Jews an''"" other atro
cities?
"A. Yes, partly we talked about it gener^ally
an^ partly we discussed specific cases.
Did you and your fa.thar know t^-en that
the Jews were being killed.?
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"A, Of coarse, one knew that, '^ he big diffi
culty was that it was known that such t>^ings were
happening but that one did not know w^ere an^'' how
it happened *
i-'id your father never consider helping"
the Jews by open contradiction, that is, by protes
ting publicly against Hitler's anti-Semitic policy?
"A. b'ell, we discussed that, too, and i can
tell you exactly what my fr"ther's opinion was on
that point, xie said, 'If one fid that one would
become a martyr but one would certs.inly not help
the ^ews by doing it.'"
An exarnple of what happened to t'^e Jews is o-raphlcally
portrayed In the testimony of Jeanette k'olfe. Her husband
vras sent to Buchenwald, never agein to be heard Of >^er
ohi"!-ren, t^.e son was shot in t^^e concentration cemo Htutthof;
her third daughter v/as sent to Hs-vensbruc^ an^ vpnle^ed;
secon^' •'auchter has survived but with shattered health; her
adopted a mere child, v/as of a shipment of
2,000 children who, in 1941^, were loaded in open trucks in
weather 40^ below zero, never again to be heard of- In
Auschwitz her brother, his v/ife, one dsuchter, two sons-in-
law, anr f eir three children, nine cousins, one uncle and
one aunt, were exterminated.. Mrs. %*olfe'o husband was first
sent to a concentration camp after the Gj-yatal ''eek pogrom
in 19L8, and she herself, with l,^^5f- other Jev/s from
Dortmunc; area, v/as deported to the J^ast in the beginning of
1942, anf with «Jews from Latvia, Poland ,Hungary, 97.eohoslova"'''la
and ilelov ""'useia, was sent to a concentrsticn camp at Riga.
The food t'-ere was barely sufficient to maintain life, but
not enough to enable the victims to work. If the sufferers
I
became too week for labor, they were sent awpp'- In "Ascension"
squads, together with the old and the chii'^ren, T^p men were
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worifed to oeath in the stone quarries; t>»e women were s^orn
of their hair which was clipoed from t^eir ^eac^s an(^ ship-oefl
away to be made, alleget^ly, into ropes.
'•'••he witness •t'hilip Auerbach, a Jewish-German .chemist,
fled from G-ermany to Belgium in IG-M, but when that country
was overrun, fled to ranee. On its fall he was captured and
sent, by the G-estapo, to Berlin, thence to va.ri'^us concentra
tion ca.iips, anc finally, in 1943, to -"-u.schwitz. He testified
thet it was comaion knowledge that th'^se who were tra.nsported
there, would oe sent to the "ovens." ^his was known as early
as 1941 in Berlin. He did not become a victim because of his
chemical knowledge, but was branded with the number 188869
and put to work in t>"e camp combatting vermin and deloueing
the buildings in the camp. This camp was used largely for
foreign Jews, and the Hunga^rians commenced to arrive toward
t^e end of 1943 and early 1944; of over 50,000 Jews 'Reported
from GT:»eece, less than 100 survived; transports came from
4
i'Va.nce, -elgium, Holland and other countries, wherever, to
use his own language, the "G-erman boot" was planted; on arri-.
val the question was asked, "•vhich of you osnnot w^ork?";
those v/ho said they could not were iimTiediately thrown, like
Crttle, into trucks and hauled away to the gas chambers;
that an S3 Oberfuehrer took little children and dashed tv^eir
brains out against the walls of the station, ^he victims'
clothes wer^ sent t® the VOMI; the gold fillings in the
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teeth of the dead were extracted anc' sent to t^e Reichgbank;
' ever thirtj'-three tons of gold teeth and rings in four j^ears;
those fit for vjork were employed as long as they lasted in
the Buna ^Corhs of the I. C3-. Farhen anrt in the armament works.
"%e workers left the camp at 5:00 in the morning an^ returned
at 6:00 in the evening carrying t^eir c^eaf^, who ha<? dief^ of
exhaustion or been shot; once every four weeks ther'^ was a
^election among the viorkers on a purely arbitrary basis and
^ the selectees extermlnatecl; that on arrival at thp osrap all
Jews were compelled to disrobe and, as they cassed the guards,
^ were directed to go to the right or to the left; left meant
to the ovens and right meant to the slave labor camos.
It la unnecessary to go further into detail. It suf
fices to say that nearly 6,000,000 European Jews were thus
extermlnatec",
ye have stated that the Foreign Office played an impor
tant part in these horrors. Through it the arrangements were
made whereby the Vichy 0-overnmcnt of France and the govern
^ ments of Hungary, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Humanla and Croatia
consented to the deportation of Jews id those territories.
Consent was not necessary in occupied France, the Low
^ Countries, Poland, the Baltic ^tatcs, Denmark and the occu
pied Russian territories. fhere the Jews werr merely seized,
and sent to their deaths. Hut even here the Foreign ffioe
played an essential part. Among its duties was to Ignore,
or attempt to quiet or give evasive and often false answers
f
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to the protests or Inquiries of other powers. All those
who implemented, aided, assisted or consciously partici
pated in these things bear part of the responsibility for
the criminal programo
WEIZSA^CKER, WOERimNN AND STIiSNGRAGKT
The defendant ERNST VON TiTEIZSAECKER, after service in
the German Na;vy, entered the Foreign Office in 1920 and was
thereafter transferred to the Consulate at Basel,Switzerland,
and thereafter to the t'erman legation at Copenhagen where he
served until 1927 when he was transferred to. Berlin as Senior
Legation Councillor, and remained there until the summer of
19.'^1. Ke was then appointed Minister to Norway and rj^mainod
there until the summer of 19.'*':^ when he was appointed vinister
to Switzerland, which post he held until the sprinc
Prom " '^^ ay 19until March 1938 he was director of the politi
cal division of the Foreign Office, and in Anril of that year
was appointed ^tate Secretary, w^i ch post he held until epproX'?
imate^y May 1, 1943,-when he was appointed Ambassador to the
Vatican, where ho served until the collapse.
The defendant ERNST v;cERMANN entered the Foreign Office
in 1919, served as Secretary of Legation at the G-erman
Embassy in i'aris from 1920 to 1923; was Councillor of Lega
tion at Vienna from 1925 to 1929; was called back
to the Foreign Office as Councillor of Legation First
Class, and served as head of the International Law
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Division of the Legal Department until 19"6, when he heoame
head of the European Section in the Politio8.1 Department.
He served there until he wa.s appointed Councillor of Embassy
Minister First Class — in London, where he s-rvp'^ until
1938, when Ribbentrop appointed, him Ministerial Director with
the title of Undersecretary of State an'^ head of the Politi
cal Department. He served in that capacity until 1943 when
he was named Ambassador in Nanking, China,
The defendant CUSTAV ADOLF STEENC-PACHT VON MOYLAND, in
1936, was appointed Agricultural Attache with the G-erma-n
li'mbassy in London, und.or Ribbentrop, who was then Ambassador,
In September 1938 he was transferred, to Scrlin and appointed
Legation Secretary and promoted to Le-ga-tion Councillor in
April 1939. In the middle of May 1940, Ribbentrop entrusted
him with the technical direction of his local headquarters,
and he thus became a member of the Foreign Minister's per
sonal staff. In 1941 he became Ribbentrop's Chief Adjutant
and served in that capacity until May 1943, when he was
appointed State Secretary.
We now proceed to analyse the evidence in this c^se to
determine whet .part, if any at all, the defrndants WEIZSASCKER^
UCERMANN, ejrid STEENCRACHT had in this program.
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That the Foreign Offiee had interest in this progra-m
of liquidating the ews of Europe is conclusively shown by
the documentary eviaenoe. That Ribbentrop, Luther (Undersec
retary of State in charge of department Deutschland), Abetz
(S-erman -^mbassaaor to aris), Rademacher (of Luther's "Depart
ment), an*? Wagner (of Inlanc? H of the Foreign Office), as
well as divers Q-erms-n diplomatic representatives, particu
larly in the satellite states, were deeply involved, is like
wise clear. This is particularly true with respect to Luther
ajid Rademacher^
It is insisted, on behalf of VOH WEIZSAECKSR, that
although Luther was normally suborainated to the State Secre
tary, and in many activities should, have been subordinated or
at lea.st have obtained the approval -of the Undersecretary of
State in charge of the Political -division, he was in fact a
creature of Ribbentrop's, and acted under his direct instruc
tions, bypassing his nominal superiors in many important mat
ters, and these defendants were, in many instsjices, kept in
ignorf'nce of the -proposed action and either never learned of
them or only after they h.ad been completed, Ribbentrop and
Luther arc dead, and Rademacher was not called, a.s a witness,
either by the defense or the prosecution, which is quite
understandable as his position was such that he could not
testify v/ithout incriminating himself, and if called by the
defense his natural tendency to avoid responsibility and cast
it upon others -- a tendency which the Tribunal has noted in
many instances of this c^ase — may well have impelled the
defense to refrain from calling him.
The Tribunal is compelled, therefore, to unravel this
tangled skein without the testimony of some of the principal
actors. ^*e are not unmindful of the temptation to a defen
dant to evade responsibility, place it on others, and deny
his own knowledge and participation. There has been a not
able reluctajice to testify about, and a lack of memory on
the part of the-defendants, with regard to matters which we
find difficult to believe could have left no impression on
their minOs or memories, and an insistence that they could
not testify unless the prosecution faced them with documents
concerning the matter in question. Such a disposition
deprives their testimony of much of its weight and we are
therefore obliged to approach w^itb caution denials of know
ledge of matters which, in the ordinary course of business,
should and would have come to their attention.
In October and November the British and American
Ambassadors approached the defend.ants ¥EIZ3AECKSR and
I'vOERMaNN, asking that Rublee, the American Ohairman of the
International Relief Committee, be permitted to travel to
Berlin to confer on plans for the emigration of refugees from
Germany . IwEIZSAECKER was directed by Ribbentrop, on 21
October, not to answer the J^ritish inquiries; but he had
already informed the British Embassy, on 18 October, that in
his opinion, the plan was futile; that it was by no means
clear which countries were prepared to accept Jews and the
committee's efforts had proved to be sterile and his belief
that it was its intention to prove its worth by entering into
discussions v/ith. Grrmajtiy which would result in the establish
ment of the fpct that Germany, for obvious reasons, was
unwilling to provide Jews with foreign currency and thus the
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ultimate object would be reached, namely, to crove that it
was a§,ain the German obstinacy which was responsible for the
misery of the Jews; that merely for the act of making Germany
the scapegoat he was unable to recommend Rublee's plan, but
V
that he would pass the memorandum on to the competent office.
In this memorandum he states that his answer to the American
Ambassador was more placatory, but of the same tenor.
As stated, he was directed by Ribbentrop to make no
reply to the British memorandum, British and Americans,
from time to time, attempted to renew the matter, but
WEIZSA3CKSR and WOERMANN put them off with vague promises. '
The defendants claim that finally, through their exclusive
efforts, Rublee was permitted to visit Berlin and engaged in
various conferences.
There can be no question whatsoever that here neither
WEIZSAECKER nor WOERMANN were in a position to control the
matter, "^eir superior had given express orders as to the
nature of the conversation they might conduct with the for
eign representatives in question, ^hey derived, t^feir powers
only from and through him, and. they merely repeated his deci
sion. They did not execute or implement a policy of wrong
doing.
WannsGw Conference and the Part Played by the Foreign Office.
The mass deportation of Jews to the East, which resulted in
the extermination of many millions of them, found its expres
sion in the celebrated Wannsee Conference of 20 January 194^.
The Foreign Office played an important part in these negotia
tions and in the actions thereafter taken to implrment and.
assist the program. WEIZSAECKER or WOERMANN neither origi
nated. it, gave it enthusiastic support, nor in t^eir hearts
approved of it. The question is whether they knew of the
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proi^ram anc' whether in 9ny p.ubstantial manner they
abcttea or Implemented it. That both Ribbentrop ?.n^ Luther
did, there can be no possible question.
On 8 December 1941, a. memorgndum wap oropared by
Luther's Department "Deutsohland" in preparation for a con
ference with heydrich to set up the wishes and ideas of
Foreign Office concerning the "Total Solution" of the Jewish
question in Furope, I'he document does not show on its face
that it was su^omltted to WEIZSASCKFR or WOERIMW and ordinar^
ily this woud indicate that it was not.
But on 4 December 1941 Luther prepared a memorandum
which wrs submitted to WEIZSAECKER and initlplled by him
regarding a proposal or suggestion made by Poroie-n Minister
Popoff of Bulgaria, on or about the 26th of J^ov.^mber of that
year, regarding Bulgaria's attitude toward deportation of
Bulgarian Jews, in which he suggested that the opportunity
rendered by the war must be utilized to settle finally the
Jewish question In Europe, and that the most practicable
method would be that all European states introduce G'erman
legislation on Jews and agree that Jews, regardless oftheir
nationality, should be subject to the mcasureb -...xen
country of roaidcnce, while their property would be at --vo
"disposal" of tbe final solution; that a half-way consistent
enactment of the German laws for.^^ws in European countries
would break the back of '-.ll elements hostile to Germany, and
particularly in Hungary; that whether the political situa
tion, in View of the inner resistance of Hungary, Italy and
Spain, ws already ripe for such a solution could not be
judged from the viewpoint of Department Deutsohland, and
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suggested that an agreement be reached between European
powers allied by the Anti-Comintern ^act that Jews of the
nationality of these countries are to fall under Jewish mea
sures of the country of their residence, an.^ that Jews of
Norway, Luxembourg, Serbian and Hussian nationality, includ
ing those of the former Baltic ^tates, would automatically
fall under the settlement.
WEIZSAECKER considered the matter very urgent, and,
accorcing to his own testimony, likewise submitted it to the
Iwgal division for opinion.
*
On 23 December 1941 Albrecht of the Legal -division
(which was indubitably subordinate to WEIZSA^CKER) submitted
a memorandum which bears the legend, " Submitted to the ^tate
Secretary," and which refers to some of thv? issues raised, by
the Luther memorandum Just mentioned. It is to be remembered
that the ^ivannsee Conference took place on 20 January 1942,
legal opinion expressed two possibilities:
(1) '• '^hat the states which pursued Jpwls^ policies
similar to those of Germany agree on new bilnt-
eral treaties not to use the rights ensuing
from the existing trade and residence tr'^atics
for the benefit of their Jewish citizens.
(2) That the states in question also arrange a collec
tive treaty, providing that their Jewish citizens
in the territory of the other " parties
should be subject to their legislation on Jrws
without regard to existing regulations a.nd. trea
ties, but concluded th'-'t the suggestion of
Department Deutsc.hlr.nd to propose a collective
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treaty between the signatories of the Anti-
Comintern Pact might meet with the obstacle
that Italy, Spain and Hungary would not agree
at that time to be tied down by such an
approach to the Jewish question, and there
fore that the collective treaty must, for
the time being, be confined to tho sm'^ller
circle of such states as Slovalfia, Rumania,
Bulgaria, and possibly Croatia.
The opinion emphasizes the fact that a collective
treaty confining these states would not be an easy matter to
accomplish, largely because of difficulties w^ich bad arisen
primarily from economic conditions, and because the extent .
of the assets of Jewish citizens of the individual potential
parties to the collective treaty existing in the territories
of other treaty partners was bound to bo quite different, and
the potential partners would fear to suffer loss by denounc
ing, protection of the assets of their ^cwish citizens because
it might not be balanced by the assets of "^ewish citizens
resid.ing in their own territories, "^ecause of these diffi
culties the legal department thought that the question could
be bettor solved by bilateral treaties. It is to be observed,
that this solution of bilateral treaties of agreement was the
one which was actua.lly employed.
The defendant WEIZSAECKER suggests that the legal
department, "oresumably at his insistence, ^sought to delay
these deportations. If so, it was not only inept but its
opinion is couched in language which is hardly reconcilable
to the objectives sought. ¥hqn one who seeks to kill a pro
ject gives one solution which it states is presently
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impractical, and recommends another solution having the same
end and that solution is the one accepted, it is difficult to
see how such a technique is one of sabotage or delay. It is
true that the opinion warns against G-erman action or that of
satellite countries against Jews who are citizens of coun
tries not parties to the agreement;'nevertheless the only
effect of this warning was to avoid foreign politic^^l diffi
culties which were patently inherent.
It is not without interest to note Luther's draft of
the ideas-and wishes of the Fort?ign Office, dated 8 December
1941. They are:
(1) Deportation to the East of all J^ws residing in
the Reich, including those living in Croatia,
Slovakia and Rumania.
(2) Deportation of all Oerman Jews living in occu
pied territories, who had lost their citizen
ship and were then stateless, in accordance
with the Reich Citizenship Law,
(3) Deportation of all Serbian Jews.
(4) Deportation of the Jews handed over to Germany
by the Hungarian government.
(5) A declaration to the Rumanian, ^lovakian,
Croatian, Bulgarian, and Hungarian governments
of G-erman readiness to deport to the East Jews
living in those countries.
(6) Influencing the Bulgarian and Hunge.rlan govern
ments to issue laws similar to the Nurnberg
Laws.
('7) To exert influence on the rGmaining European
gbvernments to issue laws conceriling JewSj and,
(8) Xhe execution of these ne asures as hitherto
in "voluntary cooperation" with the Gestapo.
Ihls program was adopted, and the puppet and satellite states,
In some instances reluctantly, entered into bilateral agree- ^
ments permitting Germany to deport their Jewish citizens to
the East, Foreign Office exerted its influence and pres
sure to achieve these agreements.
On SO January 1942 the Wannsce Conference on the final
^ solution of the Jewish problem was held and, in addition to
Heydrioh, the defendant 3TUCKART, representing the Ministry
^ of Interior, Luther, representing the Foreign Office, and
Kritzinger, representing the Reich Chancellory, were present.
There also were representatives af the Government Generol,
the Reich Ministry of Justice, Commissioner of the Four ^ear
Plan, and the Ministry for the ^ocupird Eastern Territories.
Heydrioh addressed the meeting, reported his appointment by
Goering to serve as "Commissioner for the Rreparatlon of the
Final Solution of the European Jewish Problem," and. stated
that the problem of the conference was to clear up the fund?
mental problems; that the primary responsibility for the
^ administrp.tive handling of the final solution rested, in
Hlmmlcr, the Security Police and the SD, regardless of geo-
^ graphic boundaries. He reviewed the previous steps talcen
against the --ews and said that the early progrnm had emlgra-
^ tlon for its object, notvjithst^^nding certain inherent dis
advantages such as financial difficulties, lack of shlppli^g
space, emigration taxes, limitations of emigration and the
Xike — that, nevertheless, over JGOjOOO Jews had thus be^n
eliminated from Germany, and 147,000 from Austria,
and ?0,000 from the
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Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, — that the financing of
this emigration was accomplished by requiring Jews or Jewish
political organizations to meet the bill and to provide, from
abroad the necessary foreign exchange and thnt the "gift's"
from foreign Jews up to 30 October 1941 amounted to approxi
mately $9,500,000, but the war had put a stop to this and
that the emigration program was to be replaced by the evacua
tion of the Jews to the ^ast in accord.ance with Hitler's
authorization, — that these ^^ctions wer: to be regarded only
as a temporary substitute; that in the final solution of" the
•European Jewish problem, approximately 11,000,000 Jews were
involved, of whom only 131,800 were in original Reich Terri
tory, 43,700 in Austria, and 74,200 in t^^e Protectorate of
Bohemia and Moravia,- — that under the proper direction the
Jews should now be brought to the East in the course of the
final solution to be used as labor, and th^t in utilizing
them in big gangs and. w ith s epor" tion of the sexes, — that a
great part would fall out through natural diminution and the
remainder finally able to survive must be given treatment
accordingly because if permitted to go free they would be a
germ cell of new Jewish development; that it was proposed
that the Porolgn 'Office should confer with competent special-
•k
ists of the Security Police and SD in handling the final solu
tion in the r^uropean areas occupied and influenced by
Germany; that in Slovakia and Croatia the problem was no
longer difficult, and ^umanla had likewise pppointed a Com
missioner for Jewish affairs, but,in Hungary, it would be
necessary, in the near future, to force upon that government
acceptance of an advisor on Jewish problems. He discussed
the question with regard to Italy and France.
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Luther sai(^ there woulc^ "be some aifficulties In the
Northern countries ^.nd suggester' that the ev-'^cuption there
be postponea for the time being, but thnt the Forelem Office
s'^ w no /'.ifficulties for the southeast ana west of Europe,
The conference then proceeaed to aiscuss the treatment
of Mischlings, i.e., persons who were of mixea blooa., A
first degree Mischling was one who had two Jewish grandpar
ents, ^ second degree Mischling w?.s one hs.ving only one
Jewish grandparent. A first degree Mischling was considered
a Jew -subject to all of the mecasures onscted by the Third
Reich if he bc3pnged to a Jewish religious community then or
after the enactment of the Nurnberg Laws, or if he was mar
ried to a Jewish person at the time or after the enactment of
the Laws, or if he was the offspring of a marriage of s Jew
after the'enactment of those laws, or if he was an offspring
of a Jew and born out of wedlock after ?1 Jul^^ 19?6. Heydrlch
stated that a first degree Mischling w^is to be treated as a
Jew, so f"r as the fin^l solution was concerned, unless ho was
married to a person of Germon blood and had issue or had been
excepted or was accepted by the highest authorities of Party
and State. Nevertheless, these first degree ^'^Ischllngs wore
to be sterilized (which sterilizations would tnke place on a
voluntary basis) in order to prevent offspring.
A second degree Mischling was to be treated as a person
of German blood unless he was a bastard of parents both
Mischlings, or if hie appearance was unfavorable, i.e.,
looked like a Jew or if he hsd a bad police and political
record, showing theit he felt a.nd conducted himself like a Jew,
-267-
Hoffmann of the SS expressed the opinion that extensive
use must bo made of sterilization, since the Mischlinp;, .when
confronted with the choice of evacuation or sterilization,
would prefer the latter.
The defendant STUCKART stated that the -practical execu
tion discussed' for settling mixed marriages and the Hischling
problem would, entail an endless administrative tssk an^ recom
mended that compulsory sterilization be undertaken,
Buehler of the C^overnment G-eneral welcomed the initia
tion of the final solution for his district becsusc the
transport problem played no important part and the Jews had
to be removed and of approximately two an"^ nnc-half million
Jews there, the ma.lority were unfit for work.
A second conference on the final solution was held on
6 March 1942. This was attended by -^ademacher of Department
Deutschland of the Foreign Office, and ^eldscher of the
Ministry of the Interior, and Boley of the Reich Chancellory.
Also present were representatives of the.Goebbels' Minitry,
the Ministry of Justice, Ministry for the Eastern Territories,
the <arty Chancellory, the G-overnment G-eneral, Commissioner ,
for the Four ^ear Plan, and the ^^oce and Settlement Main
Office (RiiSHA).
Much of the meeting was taken uo with the question of
sterilization a.nd the dissolution mixed marriages.
STUCKART'S representative, Feldscher, stated thst STUCKART'S
recommendation for sterilization W'^ s intended only for tirst
degree Mischlings, It was agreed that sterilization' by law
was
expressly or explicitly was untenable and it/proposed, to make
legal provisions "to regulate the living conditions of Misch
lings, but doubt was expressed as to whether this would suf
fice as a legal basis.
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IIt was further agreed that even if sterilizations
were practicable, which, by reason of the expense, the
shortage of doctors and hospital beds seemed impossible,
to permit these sterilized Mischlings to remain in the
Reich Was to raise constant administrative problems and
that compulsory sterilizations would not solve the
Mischling problem nor bring about administrative relief
but rather increase the difficulties, and that should
Hitler, nevertheless, for political reasons, consider
general compulsory sterilization suitable, first degree
Mischlings, even after sterilizations, must be brought
in one place in a special city similar to the present
treatment of the old Jews today ('^heresienstadt),
Following this conference, Rademacher, on 11 June
1942, submitted a resume' of the results of the confer
ence of 20 January 1942 and that of 6 March to the defen
dant WEIZSASCKER via Luther, G-aus and WOERMANN, evidently
transmitting also the letter of Schlegelberger, acting
Minister of Justice, who concurred in STUCKART'S idea
with regard to sterilizations and was against the depor
tation of half-Jews, and a copy of STUCKART'S letter of
16 March 1942 in which he point'^out both political and
social objections to deporting half-Jews and again referred
to the suggestion he made, that Mischlings of the first
degree not ^alread.y sterile be sterilized.
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On 21 August 1942 Luther,reported to Hlhhentrop, giving
a review of the anti-Jewish measures and the proposals for
final solution. It stated that Hitler intended to evacuate
all Jews from Europe and that this intention was known to him
as early as August 1940. It continued with the detailed
statement of the steps which had been taken in other coun
tries such as ^rance, Netherlands and -Belgium, the orotests
made by foreign powers, including the United States, with
regard to the measures in France; it mentioned the Wannsee
Conference of 2Q January 1942, and stated "State Secretary
WEIZSAECKER had been informed on the conference" but that
Ribbentrop had not because Heydrich had intended to call a
later conference which was never held because of his appoint
ment as Reich Protector of Bohemia and. Moravia and his later
death — that Heydrich had agreed that in all questions con
cerning questions outside Germany the Foreign Office must be
first consulted. It recited the inquiries made of Slovakia,
Croatia and Rumania with regard to their Jewish nationals liv
ing in Germany, and that this was done upon agreement with
"WEIZSAECKiLR, the State Secretary, ^and UOERI^ANM, the Undersec
retary of State, before the Instructions were dispatched to
the German Embassies in those countries. It related the con
sent given by Rumania, Croatia and Slovakia,and that the RSHA
had been informed that Jewish nationals of those countries
could be deported and that the director of the political divi
sion and other divisions in the Foreign Office had co-signed the
dispatches;that the Legation at Pressburg had been instructed by
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the State Secretary VON WEt^SAEdJKER hrid WOERMANN, the Under
secretary of State, to ash the Slovak gpvernment to make
20,000 youhg, strong, Slovak Jews from Slovakia available for
deportation to the £iast and the favorable results from this
request which followed; that thereafter Himmler proposed that
the rest of the Slovakian Jews be deported to the East and
Slovakia freed of them, and the German Legation was provided
with proper instructions, the draft of which was signed by
WEIZSAECKER and after dispatch was submitted to the Ribbentrop
bureau and to TOERMANN; that difficulties had arisen because
the Slovakian Episcopacy had raised objections, but that
Minister President Tuka desired the removals continued and
asked for support through diplomatic pressure from the Reich,
and the Ambassador had been instructed to state to President
"^iso that the exclusion of the .*^5,000 Jews was a surprise to
Germany and more so since the cooperation of Slovakia, up to
that time, in the Jewish problem, had been highly appreciated
by Germany; that this instruction had been co-signed by
WOERMANN and WEIZSASCKER.
Luther reviews the situation in Croatia and the diffi
culties had with the Italians over the removal of L^oatian
Jews in their military area and that %'EIZSAECKER had ordered
the matter held up until inquiry could be made of the Embassy
in Rome,
He discusses the suggestion made by Popoff of Bulgaria
to Hipoentrop for the evacuation of Bulgarian Jews and other
Jews in Bulgaria, and the fact that WEIZSAECKER had asked for
the opinion of the legal division with respect to this matter;
that the ^erman Legation in Sofia had been instructed that if
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the question of deportation came from the Bulgarian sif^e a.s
to whether Germany was rea(3y to deport Bulgarian Jews to the
East, that it should be answered, in the affirmative but as
to the time it sliould be ajaswered evasively;' that "this w«^s
co-signed, by WEIZSASCKER and WOERMANN — that the Legation
had exchanged notes with the Bulgarian Ck)vernment and ordered
it to be prepared to sign an agreement as to the evacuation,
rie reviewed the situation in Hungary and. stated that the sta
tus of Hungarian legislation at that time did not promise a
sufficient success. He related the steps which had been
taken in Humania and the difficulties which had arisen there,
Throughout this document he refers to telegrams and
/
communications originating in his department and we have
carefully checked these references to ascertain as fa.r as
possible their accuracy. Both WERKANN and ^aEIZSA^GKER
strenuously assert tha.t they never saw this report and that
the statements therein contained regarding t^eir cooperation
therewith are not true.
In rebuttal the Prosecution offered Exhibit .'^ 601, which
is a copy of the report, and has various markings in brown
pencil which, according to previous evidence, was the color
prescribed by Ribbentrop to be used, by .^EIZSAECKER. ifhen
faced with this the defendant filed a surrebuttal affidavit
that this rule did not prevent these various colors being
used for other persons' purposes by other people, and. he had
come across many documents underlined or marked in colors,
including brown, which did not originate with the official to
v/hom the color had been assigned, and states that to the best
of his recollection Luther did not bring this evhtbit
}li-s atteation. His statement regarding the brown pencil is
contradicted by the affidavit of H^ns Schroeder.
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We believe that the defendant Is in error in his state
ment that he never saw this document, an(^ we have been able
to trace out many of the documents to which he refers in this
exhibit. It is admitted that it was prepared by Luther for
the purpose of Justifying his activities to Ribbentrop, and
it is unlikely that a document prepared with such evident
care would be submitted, and that reference^ would be made to
conferences and agreements with specified persons unless it
was substantially accurate, '^he hazards of making such state
ments if not true would be such as to make even as reckless a
person as Luther hesitate,
'»ifO£RMANN insists 4;hnt Document 169 demonstrates that he
had no knowledge of the Wannsee Conference. It discloses
that on 10 February 1942 Rademacher informed Bielfeld of the
Political j^ivision that the i%dagasoar Plan had been abandoned,
and that Hitler planned to deport the Jews to the East, where
upon WOERMNN inquired into the source from which the state
ment was d.erived.
On 24 February Rademacher wrote Luther, his chief,
requesting him to inform WOSRMANN of the conference had with
Heydrioh, These documents establish that up to 24 February
WOERMANN had not known, or at least seen, the minutes of the
Wannsee Conference, and it is also clear thsJt he was to be
informed of, it by Luther, and in view of what he himself
terms the "importance of the decision," it is highly .unlikely
that if Luther did not voluntarily give full details he would
have, taken the necessary steps to ascertain precrisely what
hac taken placed The question involved an entire change of
policy and involved foreign political problems of first
importance, WOERMANN had -the right to know precisely what
was involved and to examine the minutes, and there can be no
doubt that IvEIZSAECKER would have given the necessary order
that they be produced had Luther refused to do so. Unless we
are to believe that an Undersecretary of State was unable to
fulfill intelligently the functions of his office, we must
assume that his request for information was complied with and
that he actually obtained it. .Both WEIZSAECKER and WERMANN
were advised and knew of the slaughter of the Jews by the
Einsatzgruppen in Roland, the Baltic States, and in the East,
and we do not believe that they thought these Jews had been
killed in action in connection with the fighting there, or
that several hundred thousand Jews thus murdered were killed
by reason bf either military operation or because of partici
pation in partisan fighting. No man of even ordinary intelli
gence could have thought sn.
On 7 March 1942 Rademacher wrote a memorandum on the
conference of March 6th which, as he states, was to clarify
the general directives of the Wannsee Conference of 80 January
in which he describes that the proposal to sterilize the
70,000 first degree Misohlings had been found impracticable
because of war conditions and, therefore, it had been sug-
I
gested to postpone this action until after the war and, in
the meantime, to assemble these unfortunate oeople in a
single city either in G-ermany or the Government G-ener^l and
also that a simplified procedure for the deportation of
German Mlsphlings had been agreed upon. This was submitted
to WOERMANN,
Klingenfuss of the Foreign Office submitted a memoran
dum of the conference of 27 October 1942 .which he had attended.
wherein it is said that in view of the experience and know
ledge gained in the field of sterilizations and the develop
ment of a simpler form and shorter procedare, it is agreed
upon that first-degree Misohlings should be sterilized on a
"voluntary basis" as a prerequisite to their remaining in the
Reich: that they would have the choice of deportation, a
severe measure in comparison with sterilization, and for this
reason sterilization was to be considered a gracious fevor.
On 31 May 1938 WSIZSAECKER wrote the Ministry of Econ
omics, The Prosecution insists thpt WEIZSAECKER took part in
an attempt to subject Jews of foreign nationality to the
effects of the R gistratlon and Utilization Decree of 86
April 19^8 and those supplementary thereto. We think the
contrary is true. Rewrote the Ministry of Economics regard
ing protests made and to be apprehended from a number of for
eign nations, saying:
"In the meantime further inquiries here of
foreign representatives have confirmed us in the
opinion that indlscriminatory implementation of
the decree and its provisions in the case of
foreign nationals would have serious political
consequences disproportionate to any advantages
gained, especieilly if Jewish property subject to
compulsory registration should be used for the
G-erman economy in accordance with Article 7 of
the decree in question. The anti-G-erman propa
ganda campaign abroad which has been caused by
the decree would increase in vehemence and any
stratlon of property belonging to Jews
living abroad would bring grist to the mill of
those responsible for the campaign.
- Diplnmatic relations might tecorae strained,,
export might suffer even more, counter measures
against German oroperty abroad might perhaps be
taken in consequence, -^bove all, the oosalbllity
would hpve to be reckoned with that Britain,
America, and France particularly, in view of the
trade and. settlement agreements concluded with
those countries, will not submit without voicing
their objections to the treatment of their
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nationals of Jewish race in accordance with ^erman
laws contrary to those agreements,
"I can see no reason why foreign Jews should
be exempted completely from the orovisions of tbe
decree dated 26 April 1968, especially since the
decree stipulates^in principle that foreign Jews,
too, should, be subject to registration. I should,
however, like to make the following suggestions
designed to mitigate the effect of the probable
repercussions abroad:
n* *With rega.rd to the use to be made later
of property liable to registration belonging to
foreign nationals, I suggest that no use be made
in principle of property belonging to foreigners
living abroad or in Germany."
This is not the language of a man who supported or
implemented a measure with which, by the way, he had no part
in drafting or enacting. It clearly evidences not only dis—
a^'proval but is a carefully worded attack designed to point
out the dangers in it and his suggestion, or even an insis
tence, that in the field for which the Foreign Office was
competent it should not be applied.
It is to be noted, however, that its recommendations
are really limited to those foreign Jewish nationals of coun
tries which were likely to object, which we will discuss
later.
On 12 November 1938 C^oering called a conference to
w^ich WEIZSA^OKER was invited, but which WOSRMANN attoided in
his place. Exhibit 1441 constitutes the minutes of this con
ference. It arises out of the Crystal Neek riots in which
Jewish stores were smashed and looted, synagogues burned,
Jews beaten, murdered, or thrown into concentration camps.
These riots were organized by the Party. The conference dis
closed that there was an Intention to rob the Jews of their
property rights and there is even mention here of the final
solution" in the event of wa^J* with foreign powers.
/
/
There can he no question that H'OiLRblANN fully understood
what had been done and what was proposed and that he. informed
WEIZSAECKER about it. Nevertheless, so far as his part.in
the conference is concerned, it is likewise clear that he
insisted that any action against ^ews of foreign nations was
a matter about which the Foreign Office must be consulted and
this, notwithstanding Goering's reluctance. Neiti^er his
position nor that of WEXZSAECKSR was of such a character that
it could influence or control Goering or the other cabinet
officials who were present. It is true that he reported to
•'^ ibbentrop by telephone the results of the meeting and that
he had thus announced the position of the Foreign Office, and
also that "our starting point is that foreign nations are
only to be taken into consideration if the prevailing inter—
ests of the Reich compel us to do so."
Assuredly, this is not a stand which discloses any
decent, moral concepts, or any sympathy for the persecuted,
but,so far as his,acts or advice is concerned, he spoke in
behalf of those Jews over which his Ministry had .Jurisdic
tion.
On 25 January 1959 ^'Jlehl of the Foreie-n Office prepared
a memorandum which was sent to all Foreign Missions and Con
sulates. It stages that the purpose of the 1958 legislation
was to ascertain the influence of Jewry through sn accurate
survey of the number of Jewish enterprises, the amount of
Jewish property, and to prevent Jews from increasing their pro
perty within the German economy, and to confisc=^te property
Jewish hands; that the setting up of registers and the threat
of public characterization of them as Jews had, as an aim, to
cause the Jews to dispose of their enterprises in a speedy way;
that by April 1938 the registrations showed that 155,750 Jews
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G-erman nationality owned property valued at 7,000,000,000 "R}4;
9,567 foreign Jews owned property valued at 415,000,000
ana e,:'69 stateless Jews owned oroperty valued at 73,500,000
RI^, and by these measures the expansion of the economic ^ife
of the Jews was prevented, and their elimination from economic
life initiated.
He then described the second group of measures insti
gated by the decree of 19 November 1938 which Increased the
number of activities forbidden to Jews. As to "'^oreign Jews,
his report recited that the Ministry of Economics had, on 30
December 1938, directed Reich a£:encies to refrain provision
ally from foreclosures of retail business's and craftsmen's
workshops if owned by Jewish foreign nationals, but that an
inventory of these businesses should, be ordered and when car
ried out the Ministry of Economics would give further orders
as to how the cases were to be dealt with; that all ^erman
stateless Jew® were required to deposit their securities and
forbidden to sell them without approval of the German Ministry
of Economics; that Jewish sellers, instead of receiving the
payments fixed in the selling agreement, would be order-d to
receive Reich debentures, and that German economic life would
be oomnletcly dejudafled in the year 1939,
"The report concludes with the statement that the oro—
tepts of foreign countries with respect to the Jewish nation
als had not been met by a general assurance that their nation
als would not be sub.leoted to discriminatory treatment, but,
nevertheless, promises-had been made that individual cases
would be examined in the light of existing treaties.
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llilii iVifilillliliii' II •
On 25 --"'•anuary 19.?9 Schaumberp* of the ^oreie:n Office, a
c'e'^ense witness, preparet^ a monograph entitled "The Jewish
QrUestion as a Factor in German Foreign Policy in IPr^S." This
was distributed to all German diplomatic and consular repre
sentatives and discussed, among other things, the typical
hysteria of i'J'azi Germany towards the Jews, It states that
the influence of Jewry on Austrian economy bad become so
great under the Schuschnigg regime that immediate measures
t had to be taken to exclude the Jews from the economy and
utilize Jewish roperty in the Interest of the community;
that the reprisal acts adopted because of the von Rath murder
^ so accelerated this process that Jewish shops,with the exoep-.
tion of foreign businesses, had disappeared from the streets
completely, and that limitations of the Jewish wholesale and
manufacturing trades and of houses and real estate in the
hands of the Jews would reach a point where, in a conceivable
time, there would rlo longer be any talk of Jewish property
in Germany; that Germany was interested in the dispersal of
Jewry; the calculation that as a consequence boycott groups
and anti-German centers would be formed all over the world
, disregards the fact, already apparent, that the influx of
^ Jews in all parts of the world invokes the opposition of the
native population and thereby forms the best propsganda for
the Gorman Jewish policy; that there is a visible increase in
anti-Semitism and that it must be the task of the German for-
^ eign policy to increase this wave; that expectations have
been confirmed that the criticism of anti-Jewish measures
would only be temporary and. would swing over the other way
the moment the population learned of the Jewish danger, and
that therefore the poorer and more burdensome the Jewish
immigrant is to the country absorbing him, the stronger the
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country will react; that the object of this action should
be the future international solution of the Jewish question
dictated not by false compassion for the united religious
Jev/ish minority, but by the full consciousness of all people
of the danger which it represents to the racial composition
of the nations. It further suggests the advisability and
necessity of increasing this anti-Semitic feeling through
out the vijorld.
On 31 January 1939 Hitler spoke to the Keichstag, the
defendants WOERMN, MEISSHER, SCHVi/ERIN-KROSIGK, KEIPLER and
DIETRICH being present. Hitler there said;
"I believe that this proDlem will De solved,
the sooner the better, for -^urope cannot rest again
before the Jewish problem has been eliminated.
"If international finance Jev/ry in and out
side Europe should succeed in plunging the peoples
of Europe into another v/orld war, then the result
will not be the BolsheVization of the world and
a victory for world Jewry, but the annihilation of
the Jewish race in Europe."
Those are not idle words, nor, in view of the brutal tac
tics which he had already adopted against opponents, both real
and fancied, could any of his listeners or readers have any
reason to deem them to be mere rhetorical froth. He made
similar public announcements during the subsequent years.
On 30 October 1940 the Foreign Office received a memoran-
»
dum relating to the forced evacuation of the Jews from Raden
and the Saar, 7,400 in number, to Southern France. J-he vic
tims were given only one half to two hours notice. They were
allowed to take personal belongings up to 50 kilograms in
weight, and money varyinp- from 10 to 100 RM per person. Old
people in homes for the aged v/ere included, even where it
was necessary to have them carried to the trains in stretchers.
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It was the then intention to have them shipped to ''^ adpgapcpr.
•/JOERVANN received a cony of these reports, as did ^^EIZSAECKSR,
Ihe French objected an'^ informe<^ G-ermany that they *
could not receive these refugees because of lacV of food and
a.cco'Tj. ooa.tions. I^ie -Armistice ^o.'Ti'''is9ion further renorted
that the G-erman authorities in Lorraine had given tha French
speaking inhabitants the choice of departine* for unoccuiDied
France or being tff'ansferred to ?oland., and t^ese pennle had
been falsely informed that this was in compliance with an
agreement between the Vicljy and '^erman ^ov-ernments. "^he For
eign Offioe was also advised of G-eneral Stuelpnagel's request
for* directions as to what answer should be given the ^^rench.
On 21 November 1940 hademacher of •'-'epartment peutschland.
of the Foreign *^ffice wrote his chief, Luther, that in his
opinion Abetz, the G-erman -^.nbassador to the Vichy Government,
should, -e instructed to tell the ^'rench to settle the matter
quietly and not mention it again in !fiesbaden (site of the
Arrfiistice Commission), and that the G-erman Comroission should,
tell the French that the matter would be settled in Paris.
On 22 November Hibbentrop's office gave instructions
via •''•21ZSAECKER and *vOSRM.4NN that the note of the French
should be treated, in a dilatory manner, and saying further,
"these persons are not to be readmitted, under any circum
stances." Luther, on 25 November, asked. Kramarz, of Politi
cal Division 1, to instruct Hencko td inform General
Steulpnagcl of Hibbentrop's decision, and that the operation
was carried out with the approval of hitler.
On the same date, by WEIZSaECKLR'S order, '.vOEHIl.^N
prepared a memorandum for -t^ibbentrop's use in a conference
which the latter expected to hold with Laval of the Vichy
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Goverament. It ^ealt with a number of suggestions, inclu'^ing
tbe transfer of the two French departments from the commana
of the ^lilitary Commandei "'iis^.&rus^els to the yilitary Comman-
rer in France, objections to the transfer of the site of the
Vichy o-Qvernment from Vichy to Versailles or ^aris, and t'^ e
matter of the deportation of the Jews from ^^aden and t^e Saar
to Southern France. With regard to this latter question,
WObRFIAKN says:
"Since the return of the Jews to ^aden cannot
take place, this question also fhouli^ not be ^Is-
oussed. In any cose, here L^val sbouia be Informed
that further transports of this nature a.re not to
be expected, which case,-however, the Heiohs-
fuehrer 53 is first to be consulted.
'•'EIZSASCKIR'S explanation is th=t when he Viea.rd of t>ie
transporta.tion of these Jews to France he flnst "^a.d t e feel
ing that theV might have a more lenient fate than f^ey would
have received, in Germany, and then t^e reoorts came in about
abuses they suffered in camos in the Pyrenees; that wv.en he
first heard about the transport to the East he th-uvht they
would be better off there than in the Pyrenees because if
they were used for labor they would be treated decently, but
it finally turned out that the Jews would, have been better
off in Prance anyhow and that with the modest means of
Foreign Office Influerloe within the scope of diplomatic pos
sibilities, he was not absolutely able to determine were the
lesser evil was and where he could best Interv
''OEPlAAI\NiS defense is that these measures were taken
without his knowledge and the decision that these unfortunate
people would not be permitted to return to 'ermany
alrra<?.y. been f'eclt^ec' by his guperlore»
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It is clear from the evidence that this brutal action
was initiated by the local G-auleiters, not only without the
knowledge of the Foreign O^ffioe, but without the knowledge of
the Ministry of the Interior. No criminality, t^eretore, can
be charged against the defendants WEIZSA'ICKSR and 70SRMANN so
far as the initiation of this deportation is concerned, "^he
I decision to refuse the French demand, that they be returned
was Ribbentrop'B.
Having neither originated nor implemented this crime,
they should be and are AC'^ UITTiCD with respect to it,
The defendant WrJIZSA^CKHR has referred to Exhibit 1688
as evidencing his efforts to sabotage, or at least minimize,
the effect of the anti-Jewish measures proposed in France,
•This correspondence started, in August 1940 by a communication
from Abetz, G-erman ambassador to the Vichy Government, in
which he requested ap^oroval to certain proposed anti—Jewish
, measures, which were:
(1) A ban on the re-immigration of Jews into the
occupied territory;
(2) Registration of all Jews in the occupied por
tions of France;
(5) Marking Jewish places of business; and,
(4) Appointing of trustees for Jewish enterprises.
He ends with the statement:
"These measures can be explained by reason of
the fact that they lie within the interest of
security for the occupying forces and are to be
executed, by the French authorities,"
Luther asked the SS for an opinion and Heydrich
expressed no objection other than thp.t the measures should be
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carried out by the Security Police in conjunction with the
French. " Luther then wrote -"-betz and expressed c doubt as
to whether or not the opposite of the desired effect might
not result unless ideological preparations first "•"ooh Dlace,
and that it would be desirable that the intended measures be
first carried out by the Vichy Government w^ich would then
haT^e to bear the responsibility in the event of failure.
On 9 October Schleier of the Embassy reported that the
Military Oomraander in France had issued the necessary regula
tions which applied to all Jews of whatever nationality, but
that the field offices had been directed to exempt American
Jews, and that a number of foreign nations had inquired as to
the effect upon their nationals. Schleier asked for immed.iate
instructions and especially as to how foreign Jews in the
diplomatic and consular offices were to be treated. On 12
December Rademacher, in a memorandum, stated that inquiry ha.d
been made of Abetz as to whether all these measures would
affect foreign Jewish diplomatic representatives and that the
latter had. replied that if Jews belong to the diplomatic corns
they were exempt, but if they were employees of diplomatic
representatives the contrary was true, and that the Sta'^e
•Secretary VEIZSAECXER, at a conference in the Foreign Of-Pice
Directors' was in agreement with this ruliner, particu
larly since the diplomatic representatives concerned were
accredited to France and not to the German Reich.
Almost immediately thereafter (19 December 1940),
Riboentrop made a decision that the American notes of protest
against rffeasure's. affeeting- Jewaibf •
if again submitted.
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should be answered by stating that the measures were a'^ooted
for reasons of security, and disapprove the G-erman Field Com
mander's Instructions to exempt American 'Jews from tbe apnli-
cation of the ordinances, and stated:
"It would be a mistake to reject the orotests
of frien<?ly na,tions, such as Spain and Hungary,
anr" to show weakness, on the other han(?, towards
America."
It is somewhat difficult to understand h'SIZSAlCKIR'3
claim that in this instance he had a'^ooted an attitude favor
ing the Jews,
What then did h'HIZSAliCKhR'S concurrence inAbetz'e sug
gestion actually amount to? Without ouestinn, unless Germany
in 1940 desired or intended, to run t^'e ^rlsk of p final
break of relations with the United States, it was bound to
accord to American diplomatic representatives the immunity to
which, under international law, they were entitled, ^t that
time, at least, is would have been catastrophic from the
German political standpoint. ...i^IZSAlCK^R'S position is
merely a concurrence in the obvious. But it is to be noted
that he did not either recognize or recomiend that It should
be extended 'to ^ewlsh employees of Anerlcan diplomptlo repre
sentatives. ^t is a decision w-^lch was, at best, exceedingly
doubtful.. Ee concurred in limiting d.ipl'^matiG immunity to
Jewish members of the diplomatic coros. In addition, he
offered, as Justification a pure sophistry, namely, thst V-ese
diplomats were accredited to France and not +^0 Germany.
It has never been claimed by the defense that Germany
had annexed France or any part of it, other t^an Alsace—
LorrAlne. It merely had military nossession of part of the
country; the Reich had never suggested that t^e nresence of
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foreign diplomats, in occupied ?r?nce was improper, nor had .it
asked for their r<^call. The German embassy received and
answered Inquiries made by t^ese (diplomats with respect to
the treatment of their own ^Jewish nationals. If these (docu
ments prove'anything, then it was the fact that at the time
the defendant '/viilZSAhCiCER was not attempting to help or miti
gate the conditions of the Jews, so far as foreign nationals
were concernet?, but he was engaged in aggraveting their lot.
his then intentions been those which he now claims, an(3
hacd he felt that any appeal to Rlbbentrop on humanitarian
grounds was useless, the way was open to him to h?ve used
the very avenue of approach to which, he comolains, he wa.e
sffi often compelled, namel^r, to cell at'^ention to the fnot
that the proposed action was contrary to the Hague Convention
that it was extremel?'" doubtful whether Germany had the right
to abrogate the usual immunities to which the employees of
diplomatic representatives were entitled, and a.lso to Point
out the foreign political repercussions which would arise if
they were not exempted from the proposed measures. He did
nothing.
As early as 27 April 1937 the defendant VON ":::iZSASCKEH
laid down rules for the future handling of the •'Palestine ques
tion:
'1. A splittlng-up of world Jewry Is to be
p2;»^f0pr0d to the establishment of a
State in Palestine.
^2. If German foreign policy should become
actively concerned with this Question,
direct pressure on t^e British mandatory
power would., at least for the present,
seem inadvisable.
"These rules, however, did not^orevent the
^'orelgn Office from informing the (domestic German
*
. ...tj
aeiencies of its attitude, so thot in measures nf
domestic policy for ^ewis^" emigrption, considera
tion "s'^ould be riven to the ffct that Jewish emi
gration to Palestine should not be encouraged at
all cos1:s, but rather that their emigration to
any other place in the world is to be preferred.
* * *. " : t' - %
and that
# •«'G-erman authorities stationed abroad are
to be given instructions concerning the attitude
to be adopted by them towa.rds the Palestine ques-
•t*^ n IItio ,
With respect to Luther's alleged independence of action,
the defendant V:LIZSALC.v:i-R testified that at the end of August
1942 ^iboentrop ordered Luther that in the event of further
steps concerning the d.eportatlon of Jews and similar matters,
it should, be brought to the attention of State Secretary
WRIZSAx^ClCLRj that up to that time the rule bed not been •
enforced. Ke further says that in t^^is dreadful and tragic
Jewish question he had to let many things "pass t>^rough my
^ands UDon instruction from higher agencies that were oblec-
tionp.ble to me. I a-^ralt that."
On 11 August 1942 Luther prepared a me.morandum w^ioh
was -distributed to "'EIZSA/.CKJR, and ERD'^ ANN^DOR^F
relative to the discussions he had had with the Hune*.^rian
Minister regarding the treatment of Hungarian Jews in France,
an" the Minister's protest against this Action,
On 6 October 1942 Luther again reported a conference
with the Hungarian Minister about Hungarian Jews in the terri
tories occupied by Ogrman troops, hiungarian Jews in the Reich,
and the evfcuation of all Jews from Hungary Itself, ^-la was
sent to Ribbentrop via XLIZSApCK;.R and was distributed to and.
initialled by VOLRi^iANK,
On 14 October 1942 WKIZSAi^GKLR himself received the
Hungarian Minister and dlsouseed the Jewish problem with hi.m
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ann reminc^ed him of Ribjentrop s comment thpt the recent air
rai<^ s on ^^adapest were evidence that the Jews there contri-^^
buted to spreading panic and that the G-erman I^inister at
Budapest would have carried out his instructions regarding
the ^ewish oroblem before the Hungarian Minister arrived
there. ^ copy of this went to "^OSRMANN and at the bottom
appears a note to make sure that the G-erman Minister called
on the Hungarian foreign Minister as per his instructions
prior to •^ztoja.y's arrival.
On 9 March 1942 Eichmann of the SS v/rote the Foreign
Office that it was intended to deport to Auschwitz 1,000
French and stateless •'^ ews who had been arrested in France in
1941, asking if there was any objection.
On 11 March the S3 again wrote the Foreign Office that
it was • esired to include 5,000 more Jews from France. On
the same c.ay Luther wiredL the German Embassy in -^aris, for
warding the reciuest and asking for comment, and ^aris replied
"No objection."
On 20 March Rademaoher, by order, informed the SS that
the Foreign Office had no objections to these Jews
being '-•Reporter. %ls was initialled by WOERiyU^N and
kXIZSAECKER, and contains the letter's comment; "To be
selected by the police."
There remains no shadow of '^oubt that both ^^OjiRMANN and
VrfXXZSAEGK-.R were informed of this nefarious plan and that it
received their official approval, -^here is nothine- in the
record to show that they questioned its propriety, objected
to or protested against it or availed themselves of the
opportunity to suggest to Rib:entrop that even from the view
point of German foreign policy its execution would
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be a catastrophic mistake in that it woul(?. not only alienate
public sentiment in France, but would arouse a wave of horror
ano resentment throughout the world. i^'either claims that
there f-as any legal justification for this c'eportation or
suggests it was other than a flagrant violation of Interna
tional law and of the provisions of the ^ague Convention.
•fOZ]Rl^:ANN' S excuse is that he was not able to do any
thing and that his oo-signature meant t>^at ^-^e saw no valid
no lAtical r ea'='on vrhich could be urged against it and that the
reason that the Foreign Office communication was signed by
the ^ta^e Secretary and. by two other State Secretaries, inclu
ding himself, was that it was an Impor't'ant matter. However,
his own witness, hehraann, an old civil servant in tVie Forelen
Office, called as an expert on •foreign Office practice, does
not Dear him out. He testified, somewhat reluctantly, that
w '^.en a Foreign Office official initia.lled a draft he thereby
outwardly approved it, even though he may have had mental
reservations as to its propriety,
,
'%e defendant WOERi'^ ANN knew that there were cogent rea
sons of a political nature why the measure should be dis
approved; he knew that it was in violation of every principle
of international law and in direct contradiction of the Hae-ue
Conventi-^n.
bElZSA-;CKliR asserts that this occurred at a time of
repeated attemp^-ed attacks on members of the WeVirmaoht and
Hitler had ordered frequent shootings of hostages in France;
that these Jews were already Interned and were in danger,
and one could very easily come to the conclusion that t^e
deportations to t'-e East mierht Involve less '^'anger to them
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than remaining where they were; that the name Auschwitz c'id
not mean anything to anybody at that time. He '^oes not state
that this Was, in fact, his reason for not ob.lectirg, but
that it was probably his reason. He further asserts that the
Foreign Office did not instigate or execute these measures
and its point of view or opinion could not prevent them. Ihe
latter contention, however, is hardly tenable, in view of the
fact thot Hichmann of the SS made specific inquiries as to
whether the Foreign Office had objections,
tvhile we are ready and anxious to accord to every defen
dant the benefit of any reasonable doubt, to v^^-ich he may be
entitled, it is difficult to find any such doubt here, even
though we assume that neither defendant, at that hime, had
knowledge that Auschwitz was a death camp. Nevertheless they
knew and were well informed of the fate of any Jew who came
Into the tender hands of the SS and ^estspo; they ^new -rfhat
had been the fate of the Jews of Poland and the Baltic States
an'' Russia; they knew what had been the horrible fete of
G-erman ^ews.
While admitting that many things Pessed over his desk
and received his initials of ppproval as to which ^e harbored,
mentel reservations and objections, he states he remained, in
office for two reasons: first, that he might t ereby continue
to be, at least a cohesive factor in the underground opposi
tion to Hitler by occupying en important listening post,
maintaining members of the oppoBitlon in strategic PositlcJns,
distributing information between opposition groups in the
Vehrm^cht, t.he ve rious governmental repertments, and in civil
life; and, second, that he might be in a position to initiste
or aid in attempts to nea-otlate peace. "^e believe him, but
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this, while it nipy arn^ shoulf^ he cnnsl'^.ered In mitigation,
cannot constitute a defense tQ charges of War Crimes or
Crimes against Humanity. One cannot give consent to or
Implement the commission of murder because by so i^oing he
hopes eventually to be able to rid society of the chief
murderer, Ihe first is a crime of imminent actuality while
the second is but a future hope.
When the SS Inquired whether the Foreign Office
! had any objections, it was the defendant's duty to point them
out. That is the function of a Political Department and a
State secretary of a Foreign Office, It is not performed
^ by saying or doing nothing. Even the defendant's witness,
Schlabrendorff, himself an active leader in the resistance
movement, and a participant in the plot of 20 July 1944,
testified that being a member of that movement t^id not Justify
one in becoming a party to the program of the murder of
Jews. As to these and like Instances, we find the defen
dants WEXZSAECKER and WOERMANN GUILTY.
On 28 August 1942 a conference was held m the Office
of the RSHA at which were outlined the plans for the im-
I mediate evacuation of Jews from occupied and foreign coun
tries to Auschwitz, in which it was said that only stateless
Jews could be deported for the time being, in view of foreign
protests, and that with regard to the foreign Jews, negotia
tions were still in progress with the Foreign office and
had not yet been concluded; that under no circumstances was
it desirable to repatriate foreign Jews to their country
and the request of Switzerland for the return of Swiss Jews
could not be granted.
It Was not criminal for the defendants WEIZ3AECKER or
WOERMANN to have been present at or to have received minutes
c
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of t'-is meeting. But on 24 September 1942 Luther wrote
T^SIZSA^CiLR that Hibbentroo ha^ given instructions tn hurry
as much as oossiole t^e evacuation of Jews from the various
countries of ^-urope and that orders had been eriven to contact
the governments of Bulgaria, Hungary and Henmarh, w^ith the
object of starting the evacuation from those countries; that
with rfspect to Italy, Ribbentrop had reserved this for him
self and it would be discussed either between Hitler and
Mussolini or between Ribbentrop and Giano.
Luther stated:
"All steps tphen by us will be submitted to
you at the time for your approval."
A copy of this communication went to VORHMANN.
On 20 ^ctober 1942 WK'iZSAbCKjjft wrote to Ribbentrop,
with copy to h^OSRI^lANN an^ to Luther, that he had a^Ved the
Hungarian Minister, on his return from Hungary, to report on
what the people of Buc^apest thought of the G-erman oro^-osals
concerning the treatment of Jews. He also reportea on t^e
same date t'e result of a conversation which he had with
the Hungarian Minister in which he stated!
"The way Hungary treated tbe problem
has, so f'r,^not been in accorc'^nce with our
principles,"
On 6 October Luther reportea to Ribbentrop, through.
WLXZSA-.CLLR (It was initialled by him), regarding a confer
ence which he haa had. with the ^^ungarian Minister, in w.. ich
he haa informed Sztojay that nungary was either to take oack
its Jews or permit Germany to aeport them to the East, that
the latter had, in an attempt to avoid the matter, inquired
whether Italy had agreed to like measures an^ was assured
that it had; that Luther then brought up the matter
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of a settlement of the Jev/ish j^roblem in Hungary v/hich the
Hungarian Minister attempted to avoid by the same technique.
It was tbis memorandum v;hich led to ViiEIZSAECTCER'S conference
heretofore mentioned.
The actual deportation of Hungarian Jews did not com
mence until the late spring of 1944 and ViEIZSAECKEK took his
post as Ambassador to the Vatican in May 1943, so he had no
further connection with the Hungarian-Jewish question. ^*hile
there can be no doubt that his conference with the Hungarian
Minister in fall of 1942 was designed to^implement Jewish
persecution and deportation, it v/as abortive and the
Hungarians could not be induced or compelled to adopt the
German anti-Jewish campaign vintil, in 1944, the German troops
marched in, VEFSENMYER took up his duties as German Minister
and tienii-otentiary, overthrew the ivalxay Caoinet, put in
German puppets who cooperated in the concentration of and
deportation of the Jews.
•EIZSA'^C-^EE'S connection wit^ t^ese deportations is so
slight and insignificant that we ACQRIT him with respect
thereto.
Holland and Belgium. That both hEIZSAEGHEK and Vi/OEIlMANN had
knov^ledge of tie deportation and subsequent death of Dutch
Jews deported to the rLeicii is beyond doubt. do we find
that either took any action or made any objection to the use
lessly cruel procedure. Sweden, as the Protecting Power for
Holland, called attention to the fact that of 600 Dutch Jews
deported from Amsterdam to Mauthausen, 400 had died and it
appeared from the list that deaths occurred on specified days
tnat tne prisoners in question were nearly all younger
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men; that the Swedish legation had repeatedly applied to the
Foreign Office for permission to visit Dutch Jews in the
camps which applications had "been refused.
Luther, in writing to the HSKA, recommended ti-at when
deaths occurred it should never appear that they occurred on
fixed days. It is significant th^t WOERMANN, in reporting to
t-;EISSAEC?:ER and Ribhentrop regarding the report eriven to him
by Minister Bene at the Hague, stated:
"As to results of the slaying of a MA man
bv an unidentified Jewish assassin, 400 Jews
I, . .have been brought from the Netherlands to
/ Oermany to 'work here,'" (The quotation marks
-• are iiOERMANN ' S) •.
On 28 June 1942 Eichmann of the SS wrote Rsdemacher of
the "-'oreign Office that provisions had been made to run daily
^ trains, with a capacity of 1,000 persons each, starting in the
middle of July, in order to deport to Auschwitz 40,000 Je:«;s
from occupied French territory, 400,000 from the Netherlands,
and 10,000 from -:'elgium. I^his was to Include able-bodied
Jews not living in mixed marriages or not citizens of the
Brltis?- Empire, the United States, ^^^exlco, tv^e enemy states
of Central South America, or of neutral and .allied states.
" He requested that note be made of the proposals and asking if
there w-^r-r any objections against the matter on the part of
R the Foreign Office.
On 28 June Luther wired the Embassy in Paris, the
Foreign Office representative at Brussels and Bene, transmit-.
ting the i^ichmann message a,nd_ requesting an earl, reply.
i This was subnltted to WEIZSA^CKER and dCERi-eANN and Section
POL II before d.ispatch.
On 2 July Abetz replied that there was no ob.jpotion pro-
vidlng the measure was carried out in such a manner as to add
to the anti-Semitic sentiment, but that it should
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Lbe first applied to foreign ^ews and to French Jews onlj^ if
there were not sufficient foreign Jews to fill the quota. On
( I
10 July Luther wired ^betz it was not possible to give prior
ity in eoortation to foreign '^ews; that further orders relat
ing to expulsion of foreign Jews were oent^ing; that t^e evacu
ation proposed was to be carried out vjithout <^6lay.
On or about the IJth of July, Bene, at the Hague,
reported that the first two trains, each contpining 1,080
Jews, had left, and that the R3HA had sugp-ested that tvie
deported Jews should be deprived of DutdK nationality in
order to avoid intervention by Sweden, the Protective Power,
— that as a result of a conference held that day, the Reich
GoJi.t.issioner was prepared to issue a decree depriving Dutch
Jews of Dutch nationality on the ground that all Jews are
enemies of '^ ermany and if no objections were raised by the
Foreign i^ffioe this deprivation of Dutch nationality would
then apply to all Jews of Dutch nationality and not only to
those who had. been d.eported, and Aesked for the Foreign Office
opinion.
On 80 July Rademacher submitted a memorandum to
V.'LIZSALCKLR and WOLRMNN with the request for Instructi-^ns,
suggesting thet Bene' s proposal seemed, too fer-reaching, but
the D-III of Department Deutschland considered it ^edrable
tviat Dutch legislation concerning Jews be a'^ justed to tViat of
the Reich so that Immediately all Dutch Jews resident abroad,
or who had transferred residence sbroad, would lose
their nationality as ^ad German Jews under the ssme clrcum-
etances through the Citizenship Law of S5 November 1941,
On 89 July Luther submitted 'to '^SIZSALGICLR and ^^OERl'i/VNN
a draft of a letter to iilchmann that the Foreign Office had
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no objeotion, in principle, to the deportation, but in view
of thd psycholo0'ical effect, requested that first stateless
Jews be ceported, thus including a large number of foreign
Jews w" o had emigrated to the West, of whom there were neprly
£5,000 in the Netherlands, and that for the same reasons
-orus^s would first select only Polish, G?ech, ^us'^lan and
other Jews, but that Jews of hungarian and Rumanian nation—
' alities could be deported but thbir property must be secured
in each case.
^ D-III prepared a second memorandum conccrnlne- Bene 's
proposal that aH Dutch Jews be deprived of Dutch natlonfllity,
stating t^at it was irrelevant whether Jews ^ad left t^^e
country voluntarily or by deportation, and t>^.at w^ere Jews
wer deported to Eastern territories not lncorpora"^ed into
the Reich, the Protective Power was as little competent as
to those areas and territories as it was in the i^'etherlands
— that frequent !ly it could not be determined whether resi
dence outside the country was due to voluntary emigration or
deportation and, on principle, no information whatsoever
would be given to the outside world by the police regarding
*' persons who had been deported to iiiastern territories, and
thus visits to the camps, etc., were absolu+^ely prohibited;
» that the deportations from the Netherlands were proceeding
without incident, and the Christian Jews were being interned
temporarily in Holland itself.
WEIZSAECKER submitted this memorandum to the legal divi
sion for .opinion, w'^ i ch was render" d on 51 Julv 194£, and
called attention to the fsct that Sv/eden was still "f^scoe-nized
as the Protective Power for t^e Netherlands because If
her functions were withdrawn, the Dutch a.uthorities
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in Dutch colonies wouia cesse to ••:'Ccognize Switzerland as
Protective ^ovjer for G-ermans residing in those places. He
pointed out that Sweden's authority related to the G-erman
Reich and the occupied territories, and not to Holland dir
ectly, and therefore the Foreign Office had repeatedly sug
gested that, in case internment measur's were taken against
Dutch citizens, they should be undertaken in Holland, in order
9
. to prevent the Swedish delegation from requesting permission
to visit the internees; that if Jews were deported from
Holland it could be assumed that international Jewish circles
I would endeavor to persuade Bweden to intervene on behalf of
these Jews and Germany could not reject such attempts on the
V ground that the Jews had been deprived of Dutch oltizenshin
by German authority; therefore the regulations suggested by
B^ne would not achieve their purpose.
The opinion called attention to the fact that after
several hundred Dutch Jews had been taken to Mauthausen the
Police had turned down Sweden's request to inspect the camp
but had currently forwarded death oertificptes to the rela
tives of those Jews in the Netherlands, from which it could
i , be seen that "gradually" all had died; th,at if the deoorta-
1 tion of Dutch Jews was to be carried out, it would be neces-
U sary to determine whether the police should continue to fur
nish interested parties with material from wioh they could
^ authentically determine the result of the measures taken,
that as long as Jewish internees were present in Mauthausen,
the Swe'^ ish delegation made renewed requests to visit the
camp whenever further death certificates arrived, and If
the deportation, of Dutch Jews was unavoidable, it would be
expedient if the police would not allow any information to
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leak out with regard to the wbereabouts or, In po«!«ible
oases of death — and It would be oresumably -ooscible to turn
down Sweden's request to visit the oamp but in tViat event it
would be impossible to avoid the risk that .Germans in "Dutch
colonies might experience worse treatment because of the mea
sures "aken against Dutch Jews.
referred this matter, on 1 August, to
Department Deutschland for final opinion, and on 10 August
it reported to v;x.ISSA:.CiCmR-and that it adhered, to
the oroposals which had been mad.e on 20 July, whereupon
VvRIZS^i^Chi^R recommended that cene be asked if the matter was
still of importance and that the Ptasons stated by him at the
time were not sufficient for the measures planned, and there
fore they could be -foregone altogether if no new motives v^ere
available.
It may we H he, and we think if likely, that
MjlZSAICK^R'S request for the legality of the ooeration was
designed to hamper and, if possible, to orevcnt t^ese deporta
tion measures, at least so far as Jews of Dutch nationality
were concerned. It is significant, however, that no sugges
tion is made as to the illegality or impropriety of the depor
tation of foreign ^ews living in Holland and that the opinion
of the legal department suggests the means whereby, if depor
tations were carried out, Sweden, as the Protective Power,
would be unable to exercise its functions. No explanation is
offered by the defendants hlilZSAiCCKAR or WOPRF-ANN as to why
these offensive suggestions were not eliminated from the legal
division's opinion.
Nevertheless, the opinion served to orevcnt the pro
posed decree from being enacted, so we therefore hold that
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neither '.'ElSSA^CKxiiR nor TOijRKANN can be held criminally lia
ble with respect to this incident.
On 17 December 194S the Swedish I^inister enf^eayored to
open a conversation with h'DlZSAllCKi^R on the matter of
Sweden's willingness to accept Norwegian «^ews; and wp.s
informed by him that he would not enter into any official
discussion on the subject; and if the ^edish Minister was
commissioned by his government to transmit this information,
v."i:iIZS.-.i:jCKAR would, predict failure from the outset,
technically "^weden had no legal right to intervene, and
undoubtedly itrjlZSA^CKbR'S prediction of failure in the event
it did so was accurate. Here he owed no official duty to do
other than he did. We must, therefore, exonerate him with
respect thereto.
I'riiZSAxjCKijR and 'JOhRI^iANN in France, On 15 September 1941
Rpd.emacher reported to '.CZIZSAICKLZR, with request for direc
tions, the request of the bv,Tedla^ Legation in France, acting
as G-ermany's Protecting Power, for the issuance of •Dasaocrts,
j
olioe certificates, birth, marriage and dea.th certificates
and other identification oapers for German Jews interned In
unoccunled France so that the individuals involved could emi
grate abroad. Radema.cher states that in agreement with the
Ministry of the Interior and the Chief of the Security Police,
it was determined that the emigration was undesirable as it
vjould thereby d.ecrease the already small chare e, in view of
foreign immigration quotas, to get passage abroad for Reich
Jews; that Department Deutsohland intended to request the
Swedish Legg^-^ion, as representative to *lermany, to refrain
from accepting more applications of German Jevjs living in
unoccupied France,
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On 19 September 1941 he reported that in accordance
with directions he had consulted Albrecht concerning this
matter, Virho proposed that no decision be taken at the time
but that it be treated dilatorily and then resubmitted in
four weeks because in the meantime it vjas likely that Grerman
Consulates would be installed in the wnoxe ol irance, in
vrhich case Svjeden's functions as the trotective tower w^uld
become ineffectual.
kll this occurre'^ before t^e a-^option of a definite
program of deportation of Jews to the East and the Reich was
still toying with the idea of forcing, all Reich Jev;s to emi
grate. Ihe discrimination here is only between Jews of
German nationality residing in Germany and Jevv^s of German
nationality residing in trance. We find no criminality in
this transaction.
On 30 October 1941 Schleier of the Embassy in taris
req^iested directions from the Foreign Office regarding the
disposition to be made of foreign Jews v;ho had been arrested
by the military commanders in x^rance in connection vJith
alleged participation in uornmonist and de -^aaliisi: plots xor
the assassination oi' wehruiacht members, r^e states tnat for
eign consulates bad req^''estod the Embassy to assist in ] aving
their Jewish nationals so arrested, freed,
REIZSAECREii, on 1 November, answered, statins that
there vi/ere no objections against the arrest of Jews of
European nationality and no diplomatic complications were
expected, but tie arrest of Jews of American nationality
created a dangerous situation and it must be expected with
certainty that the North American government, as well as
those of the Spanish-American states v/ould make these
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arrests the object of diploraatio intervention, and if
G-ernany refused to release Jev.'s of ""Bierican nationality, it
yras to be expected that the governi.ents affeotQ<-^ v;ould take
retaliatory neasures agoinst ^"-eich citizens , ana thereby
Gor; any could get the o'orst of it; that it v^as intended to
instruct the -embassy in laris to request the reilitary corx.an-
der and the d:_ief of the SD to release •'haericen ^ev/s provided
they were not liable to crininal prosecution.
Ribbentrop approved this suggestion, VJlZSi-i.20KW. fur-
ther stated that it should be considered as a Liatter of pre-
caution, ^nd it night be v/ell, to expel all de^. '^s vho were
•anerican citizens fron occupied territories in order to elin-
^ inate friction, 'do this Ribbentrop. said ''Ro.'" It was, of
course, as nuch a breach of international law to arrest ^ews
of European nationality as it was those of •'huericcin nation-
•. lity, and the reasons •i./hich gave for exen;pting
anerican iTevjs from unlawful arrest are not based on any high
f moral plane. Koyrever, we are interested in vjhat he advised
and not the reasons he gave, and we do not overlook th^e fact
^ that he v^as not addressing his recomnendations to a nan who
had any conception of international or other morals. *"'e do
not believe in this instance *r3l2SAjCEl® w^as subject to any
criticism. He prob..bly v-ient as far as he thought i/vas practl-
cr.ble,
19 May 1942 TojilPii.l'N, on orders from hlZSAiilGKiiE to
settle with ^Jepartment -^eutsohland the question of whether
American and Hritlsh Jev/s in trance should be exempted from
anti-Jewish neasures v/hioh v-zere being taken there, reported
that he had come to the conclusion that they should not be
given any preferential treatment, and called attention to the
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fact that Bene had reported that in Holland all foreign Jews,
had been exempted; that he thought it expedient that a uni
form policy should be followed in all occupied countries. E©
recommended that Abetz be requested to give his opinion as to
the possibility of Inducing t^ French government to' issue a
simultaneous, adequate decree for both unoccupied and occupied
France. It is quite apparent from this document that WOERtlANK
was making no attempt to accord to British and American Jews
tho rights to which they were entitled under International
Lavj •
Italy, On 24 July 1942 Luther prepared notes for a report on
the deportation of Jews. This was submitted to VffilZS/LECKER,
who initialled it, Luther states that Ambassador Abetz had
expressed disappointment that all foreign Jews had not been
evacuated from France, and that, if this could not be done at
once, at least the Italians should be induced to call their
Jews back from France, or at least agree to their evacmtion
i to the East. Luther suggested that the Italian government be
approached on the subject,
On 27 November VffilZSAECKER and \?^OERMANN co-si.gned with
Luther a telegrams sent to the Embassy at Rome directing that
the suggestion be made to the Italian government that, if it
could not consent to the application to its own Jews in
^ Prance of the measures proposed, it withdraw them from that
country by the end of that year. The instruction was carried
« out and the matter was tai® n up on several occasions with the
Italian government.
Luther had complained that the attitude of the Italians
tovmrd the Jewish question was entirely unsatisfactory.
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and that it interfered abroad on behalf of Italian Jews;
that a clear solution of this problem must be had because
it vjas impossible that, in Germany and areas controlled by
it, the Italian attitude should be followed or permitted,
and suggested a strong note be sent to Italy on the subject.
Thereafter Ribbentrop instructed the German Ambassador
in Rome to inform Foreign Minister Ciano that as a special
favor Italian Jevi/s could remain in German controlled terri
tories only until 31 March 1943, after vhich Germany reserved
the right of free action a^-ainst all Jews In Reich occupied
territories, and Italian Jev;s could not be excepted.
Luther ordered the Paris Embassy to instruct the mili
tary commander In France that in negotiating with the
Italian commander to state that cooperation was absolutely
necessary, and that Germany was surprised to learn from the
Vichy Government that the Italian Armistice Commission had
made protests against the order. Both l/VEIZSAECKER and V/OER-
MANN saw and initialled these instructions before they were
dispat ched,
In February 1943 the Foreign Office instructed its
Ambassador at Rome to endeavor to persuade the Italian
government not to recognize as lull-fledged Italian citi
zens those Jews who had obtained citizenship after a certain
deadline; that the Italians should revoke citizenship granted
to Jews \h 0 were not residing in territories.under Italian
sovereignty at the time of Italy^s entrance Into the war.
This was submitted to and initialled by before dis
patch. It is quite apparent from the documents that Italy,
while free v/ith promises, failed to fulfill them.
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V^hile it is nlear that "both XhlZSAhCKER and
participated in this mat"^er, the recor<? dees liot disclose
that their efforts Bver reached fruition, or that the crime
was consumniated. Under these circumstances they must be and
are exonerated.
Croatia, In October 1941 Rfeidemacher requested UEIZSAECKEH
to decide whether Slovaklan and Croatian Jews could be
included in the deportations to the East, and sta'^cd t^a"^, in
his opinion, no objections would be raised hr cause t^e
Slovakian and Croatian states >-'ad tv^emselves te>en measures
of extremely severe nature against Jews, but it wps suerarested
that, as a matter of diplomatic courtesy, the governments In
.question should be informed and strong suggestions made t^at
they recall their Jewish nationals from Germany or that they
permit Germany to deport them to the East;
Ui^jlZSA^CKiuR'and '•OEhJ^ilNU initialled this, and the lega
tions in Pressburg, Agram and. Bucharest were so advised. It
is clear that "..i^IZS--iiL.CK^R at least must have ap-jroved
Re^demacher'E suggestion. However, there could be no crime in
giving those countries an opportunity to repatriate their
Jews .and a failure to have done so would have been criminal.
Here, therefore, ''j:jIZSA-.CK_^H and UCE:R:/iANM did precisely w^at
should have been done, namely, left some o'^eniner for tViese
Jews to e scape deportation to the East.
•Exhibit 1715 an-^ the docum-^nts following relate to
German efforts to deport all Croatian "^ews and recite the
difficulties encountered by the unwillinerness of ti-e It.^tlians
to cooperate. Kasche, German Vlnister, and the <3=5 proposed
to arre'^t Jev^s even in "territories occupied by Italian t^-ooos
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but '.^jiilZarxECKER insisted on waltinK until the G-erman Ambassa
dor in Borne could be heard from. The matter was delayed over
a considerable period and the -i-talians played a double me of
agreeing in Borne that their troops would cooperate but, in
the field, failing to give such cooperation*
After a long lapse some, but not complete, success was
achieved but we find nothing in the record to Indicate t^.at
mjXZS.-w-jC*ujB or aided the campaign and., in f^ct,
there arc strong ind.ioaticns that tend to shovj the oppositei
^is Was a matter in which not only Hlmmler and the gg, but
also Rlbbentrop and Hitler, took a direct interest and Partj
Inasmuch as bZIZSAECKBR and 'j^OiiRI'fiANN did. not substantial.ly
participate in the matter they should be and are c-^roneratdd
with respect thereto.
Serbia. V.hlle hEIZSAECIGi-R and AOERI^ANM were informed q-p t^ie
proposals to shoot all male Serbian Jews and to assemble the
women, old peoole and children in loca 1 concentr='tion camps
and the desire nf uenzler and the defendant VE£gEI":AXER to
make a quick, draconic disposition of tho'^erbian Jews, it is
certain that ..i..IZSA£iGKBH endeavored to keep clear of this mat
ter. He declared that because of the Hitler Order the
Foreign Office was competent to deal with the deportation of
Serbian 'Jews to other countries, but that neither Benzler nor
the Foreign Office had any competency to take an active part
in the manner In which the competent military and internal
authorities "'"ackled the JevJlsh problem within tho' boardories
of Serbia; that t^oBe agencies received t'^eir ln<struotlons
from other sources rather than the Foreign Office, be so
advised Benzler.
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To this Luther (^isagree(?, cplling attention •'^ o the
fact that he ha.(? been authorized by Ribhentrop to diccuss
matter with heydrich, but by t^is time it appeared t^«t tVie
military authorities in Serbia had shot the Jews in ouestion
and thus the matter had been settled, and ^OIZSA^CKLR said he
w,as no longer interested in issuing any directions to Benzler.
Under these facts neither w£ilZSA_iCXLR nor can be
held guilty of :.articipation in t^e crimes in question, and
as to them they should be and are exonerated.
Bulgaria. The evidence does not disclose that ^f£IZS.^C7.SR or
WOEiUyBiliw took any part in the d.eportations from BuI^^bei^,,
other than Luther's report which contains the sta ement that
♦
the legation at Sofia was instructed by a note signed by
'VEIZS--iLCii^R, TvOxaRHANN and ERD1>JINNSDCRFF that "if the question
is put from the Bulgarian side as to whether Germany is ready
to deport '^ews from Bulgaria to the ^ast, the question Khoul.d
be answered in th- ?f irmativc; but in respect to t^e time of
deporta'-ion, it should be answered evasively."
The measures against Bulgaria's tc-vjs actual"!y took place
dur:.n&- STSErG-RACBT'S incumbency as State S«cT"eterv, "^fhiie he
was informed of the infamous things proposed and done, and
while it is evident that Bulgaria's actions were in a measure
encouraged by the Legation at Sofia, acting under orders, the
record, is not sufficiently clear a.nd it is not likely that
STiji:..^^GrUCHT ..articipatod in the matter.
•^ibbentrop's direct intervention in matters of t^ig
kind, occurred so often that we cannot say with. rea.sonable
certainty that the actions of the Legation at Sofia can be
charged to STEENGRACHT rather than to orders given by
Ribbentrop. There are also indieations that the German Minis
ter at Sofia endeavored to divert or at least delay the mat
ter by suggesting that everything that could be done had been
done and that in due course Bulgaria vjould take the action
desired by the KSHA.
In this respect STEENGRACHT should be and is exonerated.
Rumania, Y/ith regard to the measures against Rumanian Jev^s,
* it does not appear that, with the exception of a note to
Rumania, which Vi/EXZSAECKER initialled and approved, giving it
an opportunity to repatriate its Jewish nationals or to per
mit them to be deported to the East, he or WOERMA.NN took any
part in the Rumanian deportations although, of course, they
were informed of its progress.
Exhibit 1781, however, clearly establishes that
miZSAEGKER and YiOERMANN knew of the murder of Rumanian Jews
on arrival in the East.
On 19 August 1942 Rintelen of Ribbentrop*s office wired
the Foreign Office and reported that evacuation transports
from Rumania would be started on 10 September and the Jews
would be removed to the Lublin Ghetto where those fit for
work v/ould be allocated for that purpose, and the remainder
given "special treatment," and that arrangements had been
made for the Jews to lose their nationality upon crossing the
Rumanian border -- that negotiations with the Rumanian For
eign Office had been under way for some time and could be
considered entirely favorable. He ends by asking approval
to carry out the deportation.
/
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This was a special telegram, and it is our opinion and
we so find that it came to VffilZSAECKEK^S attention as, accord
ing to practice, the distribution of such telegrams was
determined by his office.
1
"Special treatment," in the phraseology of the Third
Reich, meant death.
On 20 August 1942 Klingenfuss of the Foreign Office
wrote Eichmann of the RSHA that, follov/ing protests from var
ious Rumanian representatives in Germany against the inclusion
of Rumanian Jews in the deportations, discussions had been had
between the German Legation and the Rumanian government which
resulted in the Rumanian Minister of Foreign Affairs giving
assurances that he would informRumanian authorities not only
in the Protectorate, but generally, that his government would
permit the Reich to submit Rumanian Jews to these measures,
and consequently the Foreign Office had no doubt that the
deportation which, to some extent, had been interrupted,
would be resumed and Rumanian Jews in the Reich and in Occu
pied Territories would be included in these anti-Jewi^ mea
sures •
This was submitted, before dispatch, to the political
division and it is a reasonable inference that both WOERJVIANN
and his chief, V/EIZSAECKER, were informed of this development,
STEENGiiiiCRT
Late in 1945 or early in 1944 STEENGivACHT organized, at
Ribbentrop*s request, an "Office for Anti-Jewish Action
Abroad," and in April a conference of specialists for the
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Je' irh au^Ftion held at ^'^rummhuebel j at vhich "^r. "' ix,
ficiba'pacor ""chleier, von Thacden, Pallenriefin of the *"3^ and
many others ^rioke. At the clore of the ppeechea the follov'-
ing reaaeata v-?ere niade of the re'^reF entativea of the miFPiona:
(1) To FQ-opreFS all propaganda, even if csmouflsged
aa anti-JewiPh, liable to alo"''- do^'n or handicap
the German executive meapurep;
(?) To make ^•rerarptionF for « comprehend ion among
ell nptiona of the ejecntive mea'-urep agpinst
Jewry;
(3) To make reneatec re~ortd Fpout the pod^ibility
of carrying out more aevere mearure? againrt Jev-ry
in the vorioua countries by uaing diplomatic
mean?; and, finally
(4) That 8F to the detaila of the atate of the execu
tive mea^ure*^, in variour countiie'* , •'•-hich are to
♦
be k^-'t •"ecret, it har been decided not to enter
them in the minutea of the meeting.
On 25 July 1944 •'^'chleier of the Foreign Office reported
that an extensive card index, com'^riaing 40,000 namea of Jevs
of all time^ and all countrier, had been made available for
the anti-Jewish campaign abroad "fo aa to aerve our purnoaes,"
and that the^e inde^ carda of the moat important living Jews
of all countries would be avoii^bie and that the Information
Bureau^ woult^ shortly be in a ^o^-ition to deal "ith inquiries
as to the origin and kinfolk of Je '^-s- or ^eraona au^rected to
be JewF,
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STEJiNGliACHT Insists that this whole scheme was a wild
idea of iiibbentrop's and that nothing of substance ever
arose from it, and explains the card index as oeing a
mechanism to prevent persons v^rho were not Jews from being
charged as such, Vife.cannot accept either explanation.
The record discloses that the Office for Anti-Jewish Action
Auroad embarked upon and conducted these f-unctions. It was
organized by and was subordinated to STEENGIJ CET, ilis
.explanation of the Jev^ish card index is v/ithout merit. It
did not purpoift to De a list of all Jev/s and assurealy it
was not a list of non-Jews, It is perfectly clear that
its proposed use was to identify Jews and their kinfolk in
order to c^^rrv ort the p'trposes of t>ie office Ti^hlch he
organized.
On 1 June 1944 STE: NG-xAUHT received a memor^indum
regarding the major action of deportation against the Jews
of Budapest \7hose deportation up to that time had been
delayed and defeated because of Admiral Horthy^s attitude,
in which it was said that this would arouse greater atten
tion abroad and cause violent reactioni that Germany*s
enemies would cry out and talk of manhunts and by the use
• •
of atrocity reports try to stir up hatred at home and in
neutral countries. It was therefore sugested that tj ese
untoward events could be averted by creating external ^.ro-
vocations and reasons s^cn as ti±e. discovery oi explosives
in Jewish homes and synagogv^es, the unearthing of sabotage
organizations, revolutionary plots, attacks on the police,
and illegal transactions aimed at undermJ.ninn- the
Hungarian monetary systems, which could then become the
occasion for the great raid.
-310'
STEENaRACHT requested that VEESENMAYER be Informed of
these situations and his opinion obtained. This vjas done.
On 6 June VEESEM'i/^YER reported that this important
Budapest action had been fixed and the date arranged; that he
thought the propagandistic preparatory measures v;ould be
futile since it v/as 'f?ell known that for v/eeks already Jewish
community houses and synagogues had been under close observa
tion and that Jewish property had either been confiscated or
blocked, and that the Jews themselves were very much restricted
in moving about.
That the proposed deportation finally took place is
vi/ell knowm. There was nothing in STEEITGRACHT *S action to
show disapproval or any attempt to stop, hamper or mitigate
any operation. He consciously participated in the program.
The activities w hich he displayed in the Krummhuebel
anti-Jewish propaganda mission indicate a state of feeling
and intention which does not coincide with his present pro
testations, Although he did not originate the measures, he
used his official position to Implement them and carry them
out, and we find him GUILTY with respect to the Hungarian
deportation progrn m.
On 4 October 1943 STEEMGKACHT reported on an interview
he had had v/ith the Swedish Envoy concerning Sv/eden's willing
ness to receive the children of Danish Jews, The Swedish
Envoy stated that he had learned from his government that the
action against the Jews in Denmark had started and that large
scale actions vifere being carried out In which children were
bound to be Included, and the Swedish government v/as
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prepared to accept these little children; that t^'ls sugges
tion vfas made in order to limit, as far as pps^lble, the
psychological repercussions to toe ppprehendcd in vien of the
close connccticiis lx1n:ccn Sweden and i^enmark.
STUlNCrhACHT stated that Sweden wav=; not properly author
ized to take care of -^anish interests and the Swedish Envoy
replied, that thoy made no such clcim but that the step Tiuas
taken in order to exclude everything which might possibly
have a psychological effect on the public. STEENGHACKT states
that ho then sharply criticized the £H;edish press and said
that he could not imagine what further reactions could be ^
possible in Sweden after the newspapers had taken such an
unheard-of tone, an attitude which might force Germany to
answer in an unmistakable manner.
STJErCilACHT'S explanation is that this was the only
m.-thod av-iiablc to bring this matter to Rlbbentrop's atten
tion and that his purpose was to inform the Foreign Hlnlstor
of Swedish public opinion and its possible cf"Poct on Gi.rraan-
Swedish r-lati-ns. If h^d been the fact, it is diffi
cult to undcrstanr why some word or hint would not h-vc been
included to t'^ e effect that it might be to Germany's interest
to accede to -^edcn's desires anc to improve such rolati^ns,
even t^.ough -^v.cdcn wore not the Protecting Power. Germany at
that time was dependent on ^cdon for most important raw
materials, and, too, her military position w^s markedly on
the- decline.
'Jo find it impossible to accord to this communication
the objects which STEENGHACHT claims. The communicntion con-
tahns not the slightest semblance of sympathy for or any
desire to accede to ^edcn*s wishes, or a suggestion that
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sounr'.,forci.2:n policy should load to a serious consideration
of it-,
ST2ENGRACHT took office on 5 May 1943, and he testifies
that Hihhentroo had told him his tasks included throe thino-s:
(1) ^hat he must handle contacts with the diplomats
in Derlin;
(2) Tliat he must, in time, discipline the Foreign
Office; and,
(3) That he must protect with ruthless energy the com
petency of the Foreign Office against all agencies
Ho says he told Rlbbentrop that he presumed that in
political a.spects ho would have a voice, which Rlbbentrop
rejected, saying that that had been the old battle with
WEIZS.-^hG.CHR, who always tried to interfere in politics, which
wcrt oxc3.usively the concern of Hitler and himself, and that
the Foreign Office ajid 3EHENG-RACKT as its State Secretary would
simply c-rry out such orders as might be rocelvcd.
On 29 Aoril 1943 von ^haddon of Inland II prenarcd a
raomorandum rcgar''ing the deportation of "^cws from the South
east, and Particularly in Salonika, which was aoorovod by
STEEHOrACHT on 8 May. The memorandum states t^ at on April
1943 Inatructiwis wore issued to the German J-egnti^ns at Homo,
Ankara, --aPi'id, bt.rn, Budapest, Sofia, and Lisbon, to inform
the respective governments there of the extension of general
measures a"a.inst the Jews in the Salonlk*^ zone, and suggcst-
I
ing that they be recalled by 15 June.
Hu recites the attempts mndo by the Italians to prevent
these measures being taken against Jews of Italian citizenship,
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and those who had lost their citizenship, but who were
attempting to be repatriated as Italians, and Italy demanded
that it be left to Italian authorities to ascertain Italian
citizenship; that Inland II considered it inadmissable to
comply with the Italian request unless political reasons
should necessitate it; that tne rdnns and i:5\.'edes v^ere also
trying to help some Jews in their endeavor to leave the
lerman sphere of power by .granting t^-em citizenship, and the
Swedes h^d been notified that by the end of March recently
acquired citizensiip would no longer be recognized, there
fore, compliance vjith the Italian request would establish a
precedent to v/t. ich other states might refer.
Inland II therefore proposed that the Italians be
informed that the question of wiether Jews who were pre
sently in possession of Italian citizenship would, of
course, be left to Italian authorities, but that, as a
matter of principle and to avoid setting a precedent,
•those Jews could not be granted exemptions from the gen
eral measures against the Jews who at present did not
possess Italian citizensnip, even an c^^ses wnere peti
tions for restoration of citizenship -were pending.
in defense, states that this is one of *
t^-e first reports rendered to him and he assumes f'^at at
that time he based his action upon the decisions thereto
fore m.ade, and that it was only euoseqiiently, as he
became better informed., that he attempted to take measures
to alleviate this and similar situations.
This question is best resolved, however, by examining
his subsequent attitude and acts.
The record contains correspondence running from early
May 1945 to the end of May 1944. A proposal lad been m.ade
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that Rumania permit the emigration of 70,000 Jewish chilriren
up to the age of eight to -Palestine, ^^arshal Antonescu
asserted that he had "been informed at the Fuehrer Headquar
ter? that G-ermany agreed, in principle, to this emigration.
Killinger, German Minister atBuch^rest, requested a definite
decision. Inland II stated that permitting this emigration
would be contrary to the policy strictly adhered to, i.e.,
not to permit Jews to emigrate from any state under German
control or those of her allies; that the political department
considered such emigration objectionable in view of the
Arabian policy and therefore Inland II suggested that
Ribbentrop instruct Killinger to point out that no fundamen
tal approval had ever been given, and that it v/as merely
intended to investigate whether this emigration of Jewish
children could be approved.
The matter was also submitted to Eichmann of the RBHA
who answered that this emigration of •Jewish children must be
opposed on principle, but if, in solte of his views, the emi
gration of 5,000 Jews (children) from the nocupied Eastern
territories was to be permitted, they should be exchanged, for
Germans interned abroad at the rate of four to one — that
Germany did not v:ant 20,000 old people, but those capable of
reproduction and under forty years of age, and that these
negotiations must be concluded quickly since the time was
approaching when, as a result "of our Jewish measures," the
emigration of 5,000 Jewish children from the Eastern terri
tories would be technically impossible.
Eichmann'B words "technically impossible" meant but one
thing; that 1he unfortunate little ones shortly would
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be dead. In the latter part of May 1943, Swiss Minister
Feldscher submitted to the head of the Legal Department,
Albrecht, the hope of the British Government that Germany
might agree to the emigration of 5,000 Jev/ish people, 85^
children and adults, from Poland, Lithuania and Latvia to
Palestine, and inquired about Germany's attitude on the emi
gration of Jewish children from Germany-, Denmark, and the
Occupied Territories of Ililland, Belgium, Greece and Serbia.
Wagner of Inland II stated this was obviously part of
the plan reported in the press to allow 30,000 to 50,000
Jevi/ish children to emigrate to Palestine, "thus saving them
from the extermination with vjhich they are allegedly threat
ened"; he further states that the Bulgarian government had
given approval, for humanitarian reasons since refusal seemed
impossible, but had informed the Gorman Legation that it
intended to comply with the German wish that Jewish emigra
tion be not permitted and v^iould frustrate the Jewish emigra
tion by creating technical difficulties. He further refers
to the Rumanian situation and to Eimmler's statement that
Germany could not agree to the emigration of Jewish children
from the Gorman sphere of power and from friendly states
gs young, interned Germans be permitted to return to
Germany at an exchange figure not yet arrived at, but sug
gested the ratio of one Jew to four Gorraans; that the legal
department w6uld be pleased if the British inquiry could be
used to resume discussions about returning interned Germans
•from Palestine and Australia, and to arrange for the safe
conduct from the neutral territories, such as the Portugese
colonies, Argentina, etc., and perhaps for the return of
Ethnic and Reich Germans from Paraguay and Uruguay.
-316-
Vvagner proceeds to state that Inland II is of the opin
ion that tne etiilgration ol Jevi^ cirixldren is out oi'the
question and, in view ol Germany's ii.rab?-an policy, apxrovsl
of tbeir transfer to Palestine could not he .o-iven, and sug
gests that a counter inquiry be propounded to the "•ritlsh as
to whether its government, would allov/ interned Germans to
return under safe conduct in return for exchange of Jewish
children, and if exchange negotiations occurred Germany would,
at least formally, express the wish that the emigrating
I
Jev/ish children be sent not to Palestine but elsev/here; that
the British inquiries be answered by all of the Tripartite
States in the same manner.
Von Thadden, on 1 June, prepared a note for an oral
report on ^riiiinger' s wire that representatives of the Inter
national Red Cross had asked iintonescu vjheiher the Rumanian
Government would supj,.ort tae emigi-ation or Jews from
Transnistria on ued Cross ships; that ^ntonescu disapproved
of the concentration of Jew? t>^ere and obsolutelv wanted to
get rid of them, but replied that it wou.M be a new situation
for him if the emigration would not be in Rumanian s'-'ips but
those supplied by the Red Cross.
Inland II suggested that Killinger be asked to urge
, Rumania to prevent the emigration even if the fied Cross sup
plied the necessary space and that the v/llllngness of
Germany to take the unwanted Jews off Rumanian hands and put
them to work in the East should he expressed.
On 27 June 1943 Sonnlelther of Ribbentrop's Office for
warded to Inland II via STEFilGRACHT Ribbentrop's request that
the question of emigration of Jewish children to Argentina,
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together with other pen?ilng questions of emigration of Jews
from Germany's sphere of power, -be investigated and that sug
gestions be made to Ribbentrop about the further handling of
the matter. •
On 25 June von Thadden prepared a memorandum v;hich was
signed by vvagner, which ccntained a proposal, worthy of
Hachiavelli, "whereby the emigration be prevented by imposing
impossible conditions, viz., that i^nplcnd agree to take the
Jews into England instead of Palestine, a hd such willingness
should be evidenced by a resolution of the House of Commons;
that it .v/as to be expected that the British v/ould not accept
the demands, in v:hich case the responsibility should lie on
her Shoulders, and if, contrary to expectations,she should
comply, this suggestion should be made available for propa-
gandistic uses and would give Germany an opportunity to sug
gest that Jews be exchanged for interned Germans.
Inland II prepared a proposed ansv;er to the Sv/iss Lega
tion, carrying out this idea and asked for comment. The
political department approved Wagner's suggestion regarding
%
the propagandistic value of the proj.osed reply to the Swiss
"Legation, but one of its divisions suggested that the phrase
"in accordance with democratic, parliamentary practice" con
tained in the reply be omitted, as its presence would betray
Germany's purpose to utilize the matter for propaganda.
Minister Ruehle of the press and Propaganda Section of
the Foreign Office offered the comment that the matter must
be treated very carefully so that the propaganda offices of
Germany's enemies would not be given any opportunity of mak
ing the German proposal look like a brutal attempt to black
mail or a cynical maneuver by vi/hich it was attempting to obtain
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indemnification for further measures against Jews under
German rule,'and that it must De taken into consideration
that many anti-Semites abroad are having o-nsiderable misgiv
ings about harsh treatment of the Jqws, ant^ ^^hether it would
not be wise to refrain from insisting that the Jews be taken
into England, but only that they should not be transferred to
F'".lestine or any other Arabian territory, and, finally, that a
more favorable impression would be given abroad if the demand
for a resolution by the House of Commons v/as abandoned in
favor of a guarantee by the British Government.
On 10 July Albrecht of the Legal Division pointed out
that the British should be obliged not only to grant these
Jews an entrance permit into England, but grant them perma
nent residence, and that it v;ould not do to demand the pas
sage of a resolution by the House of Commons because the Bri
tish Government would point out that the Home Department, and
not the House of Commons, was authorized to deal with the mat-
^ tor, as it Yjould then appear that Germany, in order to make
the plan fall, had made the request knowing It could not be
^ complied with according to English law, and thus the propa-
gandlstic effect which the Germans desired to achieve would
be jeopardized.
On 21 July von Thadden prepared a note vjhich v/as signed
^ by Wagner and v;ent to Ribbentrop via STEENGRACHT in
which the entire situation was reviewed and the views of the
^ various divisions of the Foreign Office noted, and the tech
nique of handling the matter prescribed. There is also the
statement that "although one must count on the British Govern
ment's refusing to comply with the German demands, the
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Reichsfuehrer SS should be requested to state what barter
objects might, under given circumstances, be required should
they be evacuated to the Eastern territories for the time
being.
On 12 October Wagner submitted another meraorandun
regarding a renewed French inquiry concerning G"erinany's atti
tude regarding the Argentine suggestions to ts^ke over'1,000
Jewish children, comments^on the situation in Rumania and
Bulgaria, and requested the Foreign minister's opinion v/ith
regard to the previous memorandum. This was submitted via
STEEuGRACHT and initialled by him.
On 28 October Vjagner submitted a further inenorandum
which included a proposed ansv/er to i.iiiiiater Peldscher, vi^hich
was the result of a discussion with STEEiiGRj-CIIT, and, finally,
Ribbentrop determined that Feldscher should bo given an oral
reply and not a written one; that, although the British had
not made clear vjhat it v;as prepared to offer in return, the
Reich was not averse to entering into negotiations, but it
could not "lend itself^' to permit the noble and gallant Arabs
to be pushed out of Palestine and, as a condition precedent
to negotiations, the British must agree to take the Jews into
Great Britain add guarantee thera permanent residence there.
STEEi:!GR.iCHT took an active part in the efforts to block
those plans. He wired the Legation at Bucharest to inform
Marshal Antonescu that the emigration of Jev;s to Palestine
would greatly displease the friendly -irabs; that it v;as
expedient for the Rumanian government to conform to the atti
tude of the Reich on the question of the emigration of Jews,
end asked that the permission which had been granted by the
Rumanian Government be rescinded.
.4,
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On 29 March 1944 Y'DH Thadden reports on ^'eiascber's
answer, w^ich was that the chili^ren were to be tsVen to
England but thst an exchange was out of t^e question since
t^e British government was of the opinion Crermans could
only be exchanged against sub.iects of tbe Britis'- Empire, He
commented that the British hac* only declarcf^ t^oir readiness
to accept the'se children without making any statements con-'
corning the length of their stay; therefore, itraust be assumed
that England desired only a temporary acceptance an^ intended
to send them to Palestine later, and it must be concluaed
that Britain had r.Jeotod the ^ermsn offer 9.nd that ^"eldscher
should oe informed orally, among other things, that "^ermany
considers the Jews as asocial elements and since the British
are interested in these asocial elements, the Reich govern
ment could imagine a thirc^ offer in t'^e following manner: an
exchange of Jews against persons not of G-crman nationality
but in w' om Germany is interested, such as Irish nationalists,
Indian 6j -^rabs and Egyptians who were arrested in the British
sphirc of influfncG.
On 2 Mav 1944 Ecldschcr again approached the head of
the legal department concernlne' the cmigrati'^n of 5,0^0 Jpv;-
ish children and stated that t^e British government wants to
receive these Jewish child.rcn viithin the British Empire, out
side of Palestine and the near -^ast. Von lhaddcn comments
that the G.„rTnan government must decide whether they are
ready to give up these children under any circumstances with
out any compensation; that Germany had demanded a reception
in England, in order, should the matter be settled
in a positive way, to promote anti-Semitism in
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iiiHgland as a result of the immigration of the Jews, and the
RSriA had given confidential information that the only place
where 5,000 Jev/ish children consider'd. for emigration can
still be found is the ghetto of Litzmannstadt, but that this
ghetto would soon he liquidated under Himmler's direction.
This memorandum went to Ribocntrop via ST2ENG-RACHT.
How any one reading this correspon^eno© and having
taken part in these confeyences, and particularly being
aware of the passages here .lust referred to could have had
f any doubt tt^at tho Jews, as a race, were being exterfflinatcd,
is beyond our comprehension.
Finally, on May 27, 1944, Ribbentrop ordered that at
present nothing further be done in the Fcldscher matter.
It would be difficult to conceive of more flagrant bad
frith than that which was carried out in these negotiations.
Hcr^ at least is one occasion where Ribbentrop, as Forr^ign
Minister, asked for advice of his Foreign Office; here was
the opportunity for the Foreign 'Office and its State Secre
tary to giVc good advice instead of bad; to point out how the
' improvement in German foreign relations and its rehabilita
tion in the eyes of the world would be possible by at least
permitting children to be saved from extermination. But
every step which the Foreign Office took, every recommonda-
f tion that it made, was directed to blocv- efforts made by
a
leading countries of the world, neutral as well as enemy
« states, to permit little children to come unto them and to
defeat the efforts of the Good Samaritans and. turn tv>eir
offers into Naz^ Propaganda•
-32S'
PTEETJaRJ^CHT war a party to this; he muet bear the
responsibility^ He rhould be and is held auiLTY under Count
Five.
Danish Jews. on 1 October 1943 Beet, Minister and Plenipo
tentiary to Denmark:, telegraphed the Foreign Office, for
immediate tranamittal to Ribbentror, th^t the Danish Pe^ws
v-ould be evacuated and vould be arrested on the nights of
the first and second and ^ent to Germany^ Upon receipt,
this telegram vas delivered to and initialled by STF'UN'^ ORACHT.
^ He had therefore been informed of the project.
His defense takes two courses: first, that Best, in
addition to being Minister to Copenhagen, was also Reich
"•Plenipotentiary, and in that latter capacity he was not
subject to the Foreign Office and his actions against the
Jews were in his capacity as Reich Dlenipotentiary; and,
secondly, that Best himself opposed and endeavored to prevent
the deportation from taking place,
'm
Plenipotentiary powers, vhen attached to those holding
^ dir^lomatic positions, pre not unusual. They indioa-te that
the diplomatic representative has direct power to bind his
government and that his decisions do not require approval by
his department before becoming effective.
The record does not disclose, other than by the claims
f of the defendants involved, that Best had split official
powers and divided loyalties end responsibilities. He was
not a Reich Commissar, th^t is, one w^ho wres the responsible
governing head of the territory, such, for instance, as
Rosenberg in the East or Frank in the Government General,
and he had neither tactical nor operational command over
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the iifchrmacht, but he was theorctloally the highest political
voice in occupied -i^cniTiark.
'/vhethcr to strengthen his own position or cloak himself
against attacks made on his policy, it was he who suggoated
and planned and executed the deportation of the Danish Jews.
He kept the Foreign.'Office and ST^ENG-RACHT advised, and ti-'er-e
is no ob.lcctive proof that hig superior, STEENGRACHT, dis
approved or ob.lected. to the planned ovacuatinn, notT,«rithstand
ing the fact tha.t the foreign political po'ilcy so involved
was unquestionably one as to w^ich and readily avail
able objections, which might 11 have been -''ppr-^^ended ajid
understood by Hitler, Himmlor a.nd Ribbcntrop, clearly
existed. ^at Host's heart was not in his work is evidenced
by the fact that with his knowledge, and. at loa.st tacit con
sent, warnings were given by ^erniran officials, to Dp.nish Gov
ernmental circles, and also to the Juws, and thus the vast
majority of them escaped deportation.
STu^i^KGRAChT'S fault, if any, arises from the fact that
it does not aopear that ho took any stops to prevent whot vras
obviously a flpgrant and a nsupportablo violation of intcrnp-
tional law. However, we are not prepared, to spy, in ^ situa
tion as opaque as this, that he gave pny affirmative suppert
to the program, and it may be the fact that Best was acting
on orders from Hitler and Himmlcr which SEEENGRAGHT could not
overcome. ^his is not so unreasonable as to bo rejected.
Under these circumstances, he mu°t bo given the benefit
of the doubt and. as to this charge wo find that hig e-uilt is
not proven beyond r^ asonflblc doubt and therofor- he must be
and is exonerated..
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3lova.kla. In July 194."^ the defendant VIESiiiNI-^AYER was author
ized, on his next trip to Pressburg, to discuss with $iso
G-ermany's interest in the final solution for the remaining
Slovakian Jews. While STEENGHAGHT saw tv-is document and was
directed by Ribbentrop to inform Minister Ludin about
S proposed trip, it does not appear that he did
anything more than transmit Ribbentrop's message to the German
Minister. He did not originate, implement, execute or other
wise further the deportation of Slovakian Jews and should be
and is exonerated with respect to this incident,
Hungary. STEENGRACHT had nothing to do with VEESEN^^^AYSR'S
appointment as Minister and Reich Plenipotentiary to Hungary,
nor with his early assignment to make inveatigatiens and.
report on the po Htical s ituation there. 0-^ course, he knew
what VEESENMYER'S mission was and he knew of the terrible
mass deportations which took place, but VESSSNHAYER was act
ing partly under Ribbentrop's orders and, except insofar as
STEENGRACHT took an affirmative part in the matter, he should
not be held responsible.
There is, however, at least one instance where this
occurred. On 29 June 1944 VEESENMAYER requested, instructions
as to proposals made by the Swedish, Swiss and American gov
ernments that certain groups of Jews be permitted to emigrate.
The first, covering 400 Jews, was the Swedish request to per
mit thoir emigration either to ^eden or Palestine. There
wa.s e Swiss requ. st involving 10,000 children plus 10,^^
adults to act as escorts, and three other request^! involving
smaller numbers. The American War Refugee Board
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I•requested that Jewish children under ten years oi' age oe
permitted to.emigrate to talestine, Hungary desirea to
accept the American proposal. Inland II recommended that
VEESFM'TAYER request the Hunfrarian government to reply to
the Swiss and Americans that the emigration to lalcstine
could not be agreed to since Palestine was in Arabian
territory and Hungary could not be a party to pushing the
Arabs from their ovm homes. It v;as further suggested that
such a reply v/ould delay the matter for two or three weeks,
and by that time the Jewish action — that is the completion
of the deportations from Hungary — would have been finished
and intervention would thus be useless.
STEENGRACET sav/ and initialled this, yet apparently
made no effort to combat this cruel and unnecessary measure.
The excuse, given from time to time, of Germany*s fear of
displeasing the Arabs, was not made in good faith, Out was
a mere blind behind which the campr.ign ol deportation,
slave labor and. murder could be carried on, Swiss and
Swedish proposals vjerc made in August 1943 and a.e-aln Inldhd
II of the foreign Office made the same recommendation which
was submitted to STEENGRACHT, and then through him trans
mitted to Ribbentrop,
Inland II was subordinated to STEEHGRACHT. Vvhen, v/ith-
out comment or objection, he transmitted this to Ribbentrop,
he thereby adopted these recommendations. He is responsible,
therefore, for its actions which implemented the deporta
tion and extermination of the Hungarian Jews. As to this
matter, he must be and is found GUILTY.
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1catholic Church, That the Nazi reglmo early embarked on a
campaign of persecution of the Catholic Churchy Its dignitar
ies, priests, nuns and communicants. Is established beyond a
doubt. It did not consist of isolated acts,of individual
citizens, but v^as a definite governmental plan. Its purpose
so far as German Catholics were concernod, was to separate
the v/orshippers from the Church and its priests, destroy its
leadership-, to the end that communicants should become sub
servient to Nazi principles and obedient only to 'the commands
of Hitler, as is shown by Hermann's Decree of Juno 1Q40.
In the occupied territories the plan had an additional
feature, namely, that of removing priests and thus depriving
them of any opportunity to give any rullgious comfort and
teaching to the peoples of those countries. A general state
ment of wha.t occurred is to be found in the announcement of
the Pope made in 1945.
"There was the dissolution of Catholic organ
izations 5 the gradual suppression of the flourish
ing Catholic schools, both public and private; the
enforced weaning of youth from-fauilly and Church;
the pressure brought to boar on the conscience of
citizens, and especially of civil servants; the
systematic defamation by means of a clever, closely-
organized propaganda of the Church, the clergy, the
faithful, 'the Church's institutions, teaching and
history; the clos-ing, dissolution, confiscation of
religious houses and other eoclosiastical institu
tions; the complete suppression of th^ Catholic
press and publishing houses.
"w the Holy See itself multiplied its
roprosontations and protests to governing authori
ties in Germany, reminding tlem, in clear and
energetic language, of their duty to respect and
fulfill the obligations of the natural law itself
that wore confirmed by the Concordat -'S-"
A more graphic plcturo Is found in the testimony of
Father Sludzlnski, -a Polish priest, and of Father Thoma,
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llflir Tn^imifti.iir'i.iiiiH.in iMfllMiiiirn ||
a (jerman priest. No attempt was made by the defense to ques-
tioh the accuracy of t^eir testimony.
Father Siudzineki lived and performed his priestly
functions at Bromberg in the Warthegau, On 2 November 1939
he was called to the Regional Council Office where he and
thirty other priests were arrested an'^ taken to the concen
tration camp at Stutthof. No chprges were preferred against
them and they were never told the reason for their arrest.
In April 1940 he was transferred to the concentration
camp Sachsenhausen and in December 1942 to that of Dachau,
At the latter place from 1,500 to 1,600 priests were confined^
of whom 860 or 860 died; during the time he was in
Sachsenhausen 80 to 100 died, partly by reason of brutal
treatment administered by the guards, while some 300 were
exterminated in the gas chambers and the furnaces which were
used for the purpose of extermination.
In 1942, throughout the ten days of the Easter Church
Holy Days, they were sibjeoted to punitive exercises and
those who were physically unable to continue this torture
were beaten and many died. In these c^mps were Roman
Catholic priests not only from G-ermany and. Poland, but from
Prance, Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg, Yugoslavia and
Czechoslavokia.
^^ather Thoma was a ^erman priest who, because he per
mitted several Polish agricultural workers to attend divine
services, was arrested in 1941 and thrown into the Dachau
concentration camp where there were already confined many
Catholic and. Protestant Priests,
Sarly in this -^arty program the Poles deported to, or
working in,, the Reich were permitted to attend religious ser
vices. Later they were only permitted to occupy certain
benches in the church and, finally, not permitted to enter
the church at all. Those Polos wore not voluntary workers
but had,been sent to the Reich and distributed all over the
country.
About 2,500 priests were Interned at Dachau between the
date of T!-o)v.a's ontr-nncG In 1941 and the end of the war,
Apnroiciraatoly 200 died of starvation and the witness ^imsclf
lost 65 pounds In le.ight; 500 "ore wore exterminated in the
gas chambers, and many priests, who bcccamc old and sickly,
were loaded into the "Ascontion" transports and never hoard
from again; 400 more died of diseases, deprivations and mis-
trcntmont. At least 40^ of the priests in the camp lost
their lives. In addition to Poles and Germans, there were
French, Dutch, Belgian, Luxembourgian, Hungarian, Italian,
Swiss, Danish and Yugoslavian priests, ^he Austrian "oriests
were brought there as early as Hnroh]956 and were most atro
ciously cand abominably treated, and so terrified were they
that, vmencvcr an order came from the 33, they would suffer
complct; physical collapse. Hew <^8 told, by a Polish priest
in th. c^inp that vrithin a few weeks of the w^r over 2,000
Polish orios'cs were executed In Poland,
Even if there wore no Hague Convention, wc would have
no question in docl^^rlng thnt the persecution of churches and
clergy constitute a crime against humanity, but Articles 46
and 56 of th.c "lague Convention of 1907, Laws and Conditions
of War on Land, specifically provided:
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"Family honor and the rights and lives of per
sons and private propertj^, as well as religious
convictions and practicos, must be respected. Pri
vate property cannot be confiscated." Art. 46
"The property municipality and that of insti
tutions dedicated to religion, charity, and educa
tion, the arts and scioncos, oven when State Pro
perty, shall be treated as private property.
"All seizures of, destruction or.willful dam
age done to institutions of this character, his
toric monuments, works of arts and science, is
forbidden and should be made the subject of legal
proceedings." Art. 56
Wo hold that crimes against humanity v;ero committed on
{ a largo scale, that they were planned and v/ero a part of the
program adopted as a matter of policy by the Ihird Reigh,
The real question involved is whether, and if so to
vi/hat extent, those defendants were a. party to, aided or r
abetted, or took a consenting part therein, or were connected
in the plans or entorprisos involving their eommission.
on 23 July ^938 Korrl, Minister for Ecclesiastical
Affairs, wrote the Defendant ilEISSilER that Sproll, Archbishop
of Rothcnburg, was the only German Bishop who did not take
part in the plebcscite of 10 April, and that ho had delivered
a scries of "damaging" sermons, by reason of which demonstra
tions were made in front of his Palace and the government of
Wuerttonborg concluded that the Bishop could no lengor remain
in office and desired him to leave the Gau and would see to
it that all personal and official contacts between him and
the State, Party offices and the Armed Forces would bo denied;
that Korrl had taken the matter up with the Foreign Office
which, on 18 May, had directed the Gorman Embassy at
the Vatican to urge the Holy See to persuade
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the Bishop to resign; thnt no answer yet been received
and-the ^ishop had returned to his fplace and, accordingly,
a great demonstrf^tion had been- made ag^iinst him^
In passing it may be remarked that these d.emonstrations
were staged by the hazl Part??- and were greatly resented by
the people of Rothenburg,.
Kerrl further stated th"t,if the Vatican refused to con-^
sent to the Bishop's resignation, he would have to be exiled,
or suffer a complete boycott,
Horac did not react favorably, and the ^arty then organ
ized a mob wh.i.ch ssckcd the Bishop's oalnco and. mistakenly
laid violent hends on Bishop G-robor who, with Bishop Sproll,
was engaged in religious services in the cbrpel. The inhabi
tants of Rothenburg were quite hostile pnd the Crovernor pro
posed. taking measures to prevent any demonstr'^tions of Ipyelty
to the Bishop,
On 15 August ".70BRAA1^N reported to ^^ibbcntrop, via
'jiilZSABGA^R, the results of a conference had with Minister
Kcrrl and others regarding the matter, in which it was unani
mously a,grced to have t.he 0-estapo expel the Bishop from
Wuorttenbcrg if he did not voluntarily withdraw. ^^OERMANN
requested that Ribbcntrop, if he did not agree to this proce
dure, should confer with Kerrl,
On 27 October V.'OERiiANN filed a memorandum reg^irding the
position and functions of the G-crmnn -Embassy to the Vatican,
mentioning the Sproll Case, -nnd said;
"P not yet been decided by what methodthe intolerable situation resulting from the con
tinued existence of the Reich Concordat and of
t.ic hacnder, Concordets, with their stipulations
v/'"j.ch are, to a large extent, unsuitable to
National Sociniist G-crmany, is to be llcviated,.
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This i">robleni will hr.ve to be solved sooner or
later. It will involve important duties for the
G-crnojL Ai.ioassador to the Vatican even though the
Cfconcordats are set aside and an autonomous
G-ermoJi solution is substituted. Had. the Ambassa
dor .tehien part in Mr, von Papen^s negotiations
in connection with the Concordat it is certain
that fewer concessions would have been made."
A£ter the outbreak of the war three Polish Bishops,
including Carcinal Hlond, left Poland, and when the church
requested, that they be permitted to be returned, WOERMANN
informed the G'erman Embassy at ^ome that the authorities
could not possibly permit any of them to return because of
their anti-German attitud.c, or to oermit them again to ful
fill the position of a Bishop.
The G-eriuan Ambassador transmitted this message to th.e
Vatican, which asked for reconsideration.
On 22 October 1939 WEIZSAEGKER wired the Ambassador to
the Vatican thot thc= return of the Cardinal was out of the
question even at a later dpte, nor could the former Nuncio
Cortczi ar;-'.in ua his ch^>ritable*.work or Bishop
"V
RoAkomshy be returned, to his diocese.
On 29 November 1939 VOERMANN submitted, to WEIZSAECKER
a memora.ndum of hn.s conversation with the Nuncio who ha.d
given ihforma.tion regarding atrocities in Poland. ^aOERMANN
advised him not to go to high-r^'^nking G-orman personalities,
who would, not perhaps listen to him as calmly as he, i^OERHANN,
had, and. further informed him that a.s Nuncio he had no offi
cial right to d-iscuss such matters. He further stated that
he had. informed, the Nuncio thst he believed the reports to be
false, which the latter contested by emphasizing his cf'ution
in evalua.ting r- ports, and requested WOERMANN to consult with
WEIZSAEGKSR.
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On 11 December 1939 ^ergen, German Ambassac'or to the
Vs.tican, reported the criticisms being inr>,de of the G'orman
church policy and mentioned the reports of pcrsocuti-^ns of
clergymen in Poland and the prohibitions of the ceremony of
the J-^hass and the difficulties of the churches in Poland,
h'ElZSAIiCKjijR received a copy.
On 6 June 1940 Ribbentrop asked W0ERI4ANN to report and
tborcaftor confer with '-^im on the present sta^'O of Gorman-
Vatican relations. '- '^hc latter reported on 6 jEinu°ry that
secretly "wc" regar'^ the Reich Cnncordpt an^^ t^o Racndv-^r Con
cordat as antiquated; that many of the fundamental principles
are fundamentally opposed, to the basic principles of National
Socialism such as schooling and. other e ducRtlon, and. thn, t the
Laender Concordat, which conformed with the Reich Concordat,
weru incompatible with the '^crraan political structure since
the aonder had lost their sovereignty and both the Reich and
Laender Concordets could no longer be regarded as the legal
norm in d.om.. stlc .po licy, but thr't an explicit declaration of
"our" attitude to them had not as yet been given to the Vati
can; that the re-incorporetcd terrltorlts, such as Danzig,
t^c Sudetc-nland and the "'arthegau were without a Concordat,
and in these areas "wc" were not bound to the Vatican end
"we" d.ocllno an extension of the v-lidlty of the Concordat to
th.esi- "tcrrl tori I. s; th-*^t the ^^ticj^n hr^s submi"''ted the follow
ing complaints: alleged violation of the Concordats, -spo-
clally on the question of ed.uc=^tl'^ n, procedure on the appoint
ment of Bishops and Apostolic Administrators, the case of indl-
vldual Bishops such as Sproll, actions against the ohurchGs
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of Austria, compulsory evacuati'-ns, closurr of church Insti
tutions, arrest of oriosts and membrrs of orders, snd, since
tho occupation of Poland, representations against the arrests
and sentencing of church dignitaries.
Ifli'OERlANN'S final conclusions were that the upshot would
prooaoly be breaking off the Concordat and regul^^ting the
legal position of the Catholic Church in G-ermany, but that as
long as the war continued the time was not ripe; that a cer
tain degree of compromise, at least for the duration of the
^ war, should be made for reasons of foreign policy and that
the radical policy agrinst the church, particulnrly in
V
Austria, should be stopped; th^^t measures against the clergy
in Poland were unavoidable because 1eading members of the
clergy, as well as other leading personalities in the former
Poland, must be eliminated, but that they could be moderated
in form; that the Vatican's contribution must consist in
i changing the attitude of the V.^tican Press and refraining from
encouraging Catholic clergy in Germany in their negative attl-
tude towards National Socialism, banning provocative state
ments by the clergy abroad, and the adoption of » different
tone in the Vatican's statements, especially in connection
with Poland.
On 25 January 1940 WEIZSACCKER wrote Sergen concerning
improving relations with the Vatican and, as his personal
^ opinion, said "No general agreement" could be reached at
present; that this applied in particular to all questions
governed by the Concordats; that proceedings against the
Polish clergy could not be changed in essence, but mi^ht bo
brought to some kind of cono lusion and that the former proce
dure could certainly be improved; that the only present
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was to avoid creating nny points of friction n.n^ grndu-
ally to improve relations by attcnc^lng to certraln in(?lvl{^ual
complaints. He compl^tlnea about the "stinging" tone used by
the Vatican an(? Its members.
On 15 February 1940,VCS-I'1^N reported to •'•^IZSAllCKER
rcgr.rding a conference with the Nuncio, to whom he had given
Information concerning the Bishops of Flock o.nd Leplau
(Wloclawck), and that he told, the Nuncio In a gencrral way
that, In accordance with the wishes of the Security Police '
rnd SD, the fulfillment of his wishes to have the Bishop of
Leslaw restored to his position would meet with difficulties
so long as Cardinal Hlond acted as Archbishop of Poland to
Rome and displayed an attitude hostile to G-ermany,
On harch 4, 1940, WEIZSAECKER reported that the Nuncio
had spoken of the large number of priests In the
Sechsenhauscn concentration c<~rap and his desire to snoak nnd
visit with them and the r. quest th^t he be p-^rmltted to bring
them •pr'^yer books and hold In the camp.
On 3 July 1940 WSIZSAECKER reported that the Nuncio
Inquired as to the reasons for Imprisoning th: Suf'fragon of
Lublin In a concentration camp and asked If be could not be
Interned elsewhere; and also Inquired as to the fate of the
80-yoar-old Bishop of Plock.
•^heee are examples of the complaints of the Catholic
Church and of the actions of the Foreign Office with regard
to them.
^e have referred to the persecution of Bishop Soroll
of Rothenburg, These Incldonts occurred In 1958. The
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Bishop was persecuted on both religious and political grounds.
It is our opinion that the persecution of Catholics, laj^men
and oricsts was a part and in aid of Hitler's program of
aggression, as by persecutions of this kind he expected to be
able to crush all resistance and to unit all G-ermans in an
unwavering and uncritical obedience to his wishes and thereby
enable him to carry out his olanned aggressions freed from
interna.1 resistance.
"j^he only connection which ^^EIZSAECKER and WOERMANN ha^d
with the matter arose from the f^ct thst the Minister of
Ecclesiastical Affairs requested the Foreign Office to ask
the ^atican to influence the Bishop to resign. ^his it did,
but the ^atican quite properly refused so to do, and there
upon a conference was had in the Office of the Minister for
Ecclesiastical Affairs in which WOERMANN took part and
reported that it was the unanimous opinion of those present
that if he did not resign he should be removed from his dio
cese by force, if necessary. This report was signed and ini
tialled by WEIZSAECKER^
It is clear, however, that the Foreign Office were
neither the originators nor were they concerned as actors,
8:iders or abettors in this program. It was faced with a
fait accompli. The persecutir^n, outrageous as it was, was
started and carried out by Party lr«:iders over whom none of
the Foreign Office defendants had any control. In fact, the
whole matter lay outside their official competency, 8nd
was that of the Minister for Ecclesi^sticnl Affairs and the
loc^l authorities. It is only so far as the problem dealt
with relations of G-ermpny with the Vptican that they
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could spep.k. They could not orovide protection for the
Bishop,
It is iipparont that even' those responsible for this
outrage f^lt that they had succeeded in getting themselves in
an inextricable position whcr<. they could not proceed with
their pirn without encountering insurmountable difficulties
aaid where they could not afford to recant. Ihe solution
which was agreed upon> while far from being either good or
wise, was perhaps the only one which, under the circumstances,
was open under Nazi policy; that if the Bishop did not resign
he Was to be requested to leave and, if necessary, removed
from his diocese by force but not placed under arreat*
To this solution WCERMANN ngrred. It would, of course,
have been a preferable and more admirable t>^ing to have con
demned what had taken place and insisto,d that, as a matter of
foreign policy, the Bishop be permitted to remain in his dio
cese, Nevertheless, when wo appreciate the • realities of
the situation and. from what is disclosed, not only by testi
mony of representatives of the Vatican but from contemporan
eous, official documents regarding the actual policy and the
action taken by the defendants of the Foreign Office, we are
convinced that at the time they did t.he best, perhaps the
most, they could to prevent the persecution of the church, its
priests and. its communicants. It is quite true that in one
or more cases WOEPUi^aNN suggested that the Concordats wore no
longer practicable in view of the political sltuqtlon, but
he did not rocommend that they be abrogated but that such
action be postponed. His rooommondation evidently was
APP^o'^cd and the CQncordats rcma.ined in effect, a.lthough
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without question other =»gencies of the Nazi governniGnt uald
little or no attention to their terms, "^hat t^is is the fact
is shown by numerous (documents offered on behalf of the defen^
dant -^^EIZSAECKSR and the affidavit of Father G-ohrmann who,
from 1925 to 1945, wa.s Secretary of the Apostolic Nuncio in
Berlin. This is also shown by the W'OERMANN memorandum of 22
November 1959 and his memorandum of 21 April "1942 which ended
V/ith the words;
"For thes« reasons I consider it necessary
that all such measures directed against the church
be suspended or discontinued until the end of the
war."
See also the memorsJidum of du Moulin of 9 March 1959;
that of ^VEIZSAECKER of 16 August 1941; the memorandum of
%
WOERiyiANN and. Haidlon of 24 May 1959 and 4 March 1940; the
Haidlcn and 'JEIZSAECKER memoranda of 10 December 1940, 17
January 1941 and. 5 February 1941; the Kaidlen memoranda of
11 February and 6 March 1941; the Hoffmann mrmorandum with
WCEHIiANN'S note of 16 September 1942.
^ It is clear that the Foreign Offioe defendants were
not engaged in a program of persecution, but whenever and
c wherever possible they sought to modify, gain as many excep
tions as they could, and mitigate those which could not bo
changed or modified.
""e must not forget that guilt is a personal matter;
that men are to be Judged not by theoretical, but by practi-
ca.1 standards; that we are here to define a standard of con-
<1 duct of responsibility, not only for Grermans as the vanquished
in war, not only with regard to past and present events, but
those which in the future can be reasonably and prouerly
applied to men and officials of every state and nation,,
those of the victors as well as those of the vanquished.
Any othor a,pproach would mn.ke a mockery of intern"law
anc? woulc^ result in wrongs quite as serious an(^ f"tal as
those which Wu'rc sought to be remedied.
"here, as In this case, the defenr'ants cb^rged were not
the originators of the unlawful policy, where they had no
power in themselves to chajige it, wherr they had no pprt in
implementing it or executing it, and were both in orinciplc
and in d.oed p.gainst it, no conclusion of guilt may be orooerly
reached,
^he defendants ¥EIZSAi:CKER and WOERl'MN should be and
are found NOT GUILTY of charges in Count Five relsting to
persecution of the church.
"''hert is no evidence that the defendant STEENGRACHT
participated in the persecution of the church, its priests or
communicants. He is therefore exonerated in that matter.
BERGER
BERGER bccp.me Ohief of the Main Office SS (SB^A) on 1
April 1940. In 1938 he established the Replacement Office of
the General SS in the S3 Main Office (3SHA). On October 1,
19?9, he bt-came Chief of tbi s Replacement Bureau. On 1
January 1940 the Replacement Office was transferred to the
Replacement Office of the Waffen SS,
Although BERGER, in his Interrogations prior to trial,
said he began with the SSHA on January 1, 1940, he claims
that this Was an error and he actually became h"ad of it on
April 1, 1940, and we accept his statement with respect
thereto.
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In July 1942 he becrme Hlminler's Liaison Officer for
the Ministry for <biastern.^Territories and, although be was
slated to become State Secretary^ for-thf.t Ministry, this
never materialized, but he became chief of its reiitipal Dir
ecting Staff, "^here is a dispute as to how long he held this'
position and he contends that he only gave it part-time
attention and signed no orders and was not responsible for
any dispositions made by that office.
On October 1, 1944 ho was appointed Chief of Prisoner
of War Affairs but not of the transient cflmps or those in
operational areas or in N^^rway. Tr-nsient camps are tv^ose in
which enemy soldiers taken prisoners are•temporarily confined
^ until they can be transferred to permanent orisoner cf war
camps in the rear. He was appointed commander of military
operations in Slovakia on 31 August 1944, stayed there for
two weeks crushing the revolt which had broken out in
g2.ovakia, was then recalled to the field, command staff of
Himmler and returned to Slovakia for five or six days, and
I ' ^
then was transferred back to Berlin.
BBRGLR'S attitude toward Jews is shown.in the agreement
^ which he made, acting for Himmler, with the Minister of the
Eastern Territories in Ms.roh 1943;
"The aim of this indoctrination is to convert
the non—'^ crman members of the Indigenous Po3J.ce
Units to convinced co-fighters against Bolshevism
and for the All-European New Order., Special atten
tion is to be paid to the following points: * *
"2, Tying up with the strong instinctive
^ anti-Semitism of the Eastern nations; the Jewish
face of Bolshevism; Jewry as motive power behind
Bolshevism as well as the capitalism of the wes
tern powers; Jewish aims for world domination
and the various ways toward it; world revolution
and capitalism; the nationalist disguises of Jewish
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•Bolshevism; Stalin s army as a power instrument
to g^in Jewish worlf' (domination with the bloo(d.
of other peoples, . .
II "7.
f The Reich's 9.nd its Fuehrer's fight
ageinst world "^ewry.
"4, Realization of the new European commun
ity of nations under the Reich as the leading,
protv-cting ancf' marshalling power; the common work
and fight of the European nations against the
Jcwish pirns for world dominatir^n; causes, meaning
anc? underlying reasons of the war; Jewry as the
instigator of the first and second world wars;
G-ermrjiy' s and Europe's allies in a common front
fight against Jewish-capitalist and the Jewish
Bolshevist powers; the hard necessities of the
War; oommcn vrork, common Sr?.criflces and coTmon
fight for the new Europe."
in
As Chief pf the S3 Main Office BEP.GER prepared and dis-
•tributed. "^Tjiidance Pamphlets" to be used by the gs organiza
tions. Some pf them discussed anti-Semitism, both specifi
cally and in connection with other problems, following
is ? sample:
"We National ^oci^^lists beUeva the Fupi^rer
when he says that the annihilation of Jewry In
Europe stands at the end of the fight instigated
Jswish World Fgrasite against us '^s his
strongest enemy. But until this annihilation is
completed, we must always remember that the Jew
is our absolute enemy, stopping at nothing, who,
has only one goal, our com-with respect to us,
plete annihilation.
"It is our task not to G-ermnnize the East
in the old sense, that is, bring the G-erman
langua.ge and G-crman laws to the people living
there, but to take care that only people of
genuine G-ermanic blood, are living in the East."
(From the SS Main Office Pamphlet,
ing ijurope.")
"Snfegup.rd-
fhe S3 also printed and published a pamphlet called
"The Sub-Huraan," from which the following is a quote:
"^he Sub-HUiiian, this apparently fully equal
creation of nature, when seen from a biological
viewpoint, with hands,
br^in, with- eyes and
feet, and
a mouth
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a sort of
w
nevertheless is quite different, p. drcp.dful orc.p-
ture, is only nn imitation of man with man-r^^som-
"bling features, "but inferior to any animal as
regards intellect ard. soul. In its interior, this
being is a cruel chaos of wild, unrestricted pas
sions, with a naiiieless will to destruction, with a
most erimitive lust, and of unmasked depravity, , ,
Now hcr^ they come again, the Huns, caricatures of
human faces, nightmares that have come true, a
blow in the face of everything good, allied with
nature and the scum of the whole world, but
the suitable tools in the hand of the Vv'andoring
Jew, that master of organized mass murder. Only
for tht.; dumb e.re they camouflaged in the dress of
the bourgeois. . .This time the Jew wanted to be
fully ccrta.in. He appointed himself as officer,
as commiesar, as decisive loader of the sub-humans
•, . .The beasts in human form, the true leaders of
the underworld, sowed by Ahasucrus, who originates
from the dark, stinking gh'ttos of -^astern Cities."
BEHGER asserts th^^t he did not like tv-is pamphlet and
that it was thrUvSt upon him by Himmler, an^^ th^t he did not
father its distribution. How^^ver, on ."^1 March 1942 he '-rote
Him.-.lcr reporting a visit to Hcioh Party Treasurer Bchwarz,
wher^' he showed him t>^is pamphlet and asked for his support,
stating that Schwarz liked it very much and said that every
German family should h^ve it and he would support its circu-
4
lation.
The following is an extract from a pamphlet prep^.red, by
* the SS Main Office at BERGER'S orders for distribution to
Wehrmacht units in the East:
"This war is the Jewish world fight against
the liberation of mankind from the spiritual and
material servility (sic.—servitude) of all Jewry
while, on O-ormany's side, it has become the fight
for the liberation and maintenance of mankind
against all attempts of Jewish world domination,
"For ue there exists only one decision:
^ fight against Bolshevism and fight ag<^.inst the
plutocracies. Our victory over both means the
annlMlatlon of Jewry and. therefore the pacifi
cation of the nations and securing a new world
order."
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Another example of the kind of material which was
found in this ideological training material is a letter
df an SS Untersturmfuehrer to his v;ife;
"Together with three other soldiers I
received an order tonight to shoot tv/o members
of the Ked Army, so that they cannot be of danger
to us any more. They were ragged and apathetic,
just like aninals. I give a spade to each of
them and they begin to dig their own graves and
I light a cigarette in order to calm down.
There is no sound -- Russians have no souls,
they are animals, they became animals during
the past years. They don''t beg for their
lives, they don^t laugh, they don't cry. Three
guns are pointed at them. All of a sudden one
of them starts to run, but he does not get far,
twenty meters, and he is dead. The other does
not move; he steps into his hole, and then he
is dead too. Two minutes later the earth covers
everything — and vve light another cigarette. ,
BEhGEH admits that this Is an extract from one of his
pamphlets.
The ^Fitness von dem Esch-Zelewski was called by the
prosecution and testified that he v/as a Higher GS and Folice
Leader assigned to Russia Center in 1941 and he held that
position up to 1942. Early in 1943 he became a Commander of
First Motorized SS Brigade and Chief of the Anti-lartisan
Units. This position he held, during the year 1943.
He testified to having heard Himmler's hinfamous
Fosen speech in 1943, and that BERGEK was there and that
Exhibit 2638 is that speech.
ViJ'ith regard to the Dirlevranger Unit he testified that
it was subordinated to him in 1942, and that a regiment of
the brigade was assigned to him in 1944 for approximately
six v\reeks; that Dirlewanger had an autL orization from Himmler
which made him ti'e competent judicial officer over his men,
and that there were special legal provisions in force for
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this one battalion, and Dirlewanger could himself pass the
death sentence which other SS officers in other SS units
could not do I that Dirlewanger had an identity card and
a Wehrmacht pass showing that he was a member of the SS
Main Office and that his competent judicial officer was
BERGER; that the Dirlewanger unit came to Russia fully
equipped v/ith equipment from the SS Main Office of BERGERj
that Dirlewanger reported to the ^vwitness whenever he went .
to see the Chief of the SS Main Office (BERGER) and shov/ed
him the correspondence between BERGER and Dirlewanger, and
also reported the results of the conferences and of tne
arrival of shipments of equipment and supplies;that Dirle
wanger was a close friend of BERGER*S who had procured his
position; that the official connections between the two
v/ere of an intimate nature. HO testifies that after th©
notorious Kaminsky v^as executed, a deputy of BERGER* S from
the SSHA came and reorganized his brigade #iich was subor
dinate to BERGER; that Dirlewanger called BERGER by his
first name, which was most unusual; that the Vv'xtness and
other SS officers looked upon BERGER as Kimmler's mouthpiece,
and that BERGER was the power behind the throne so far as
Himraler "was concerned; that the Dirlewanger unit and other
anti-partisan units were under the witness's tactical com
mand; that in 1943 continual cojjiplaints v/ere made about
Dirlewanger's behavior and that J-it. Gen. Schwarzenneger
/
made complaints that Dirlewanger had shot a large number
of people in reprisal measiares.
He states that Kube*e staff preferred more serious
complaints against Dirlewanger, vdn.ich the witness reported
-344-
to BERG-ER, He admitted that the subordination ol' Dirle-
vjanger to bEhGEh only referred to recruitine,, equij^ping,
arming, and supplying everything that the troops needed,
except munitions vjhich the*^^ p'ot from the lehrm.scht and
that so far as combat v/as concerned, BERGER never had any
thing Vihatsoever to do with it.
with regard to Himmler's Posen speech he does not
think that the v.*ord "extermination" was used with regard
to Jews. He testifies that the Kaminsky Brigade v/as sub
ordinate to the SSHA in the same manner as the Dirlev/anger
Brigade, but that BERGER v/as not responsible for the assign
ment of the Brigade to V/arsaw, out of v;hich rose the affair
^ v/hich led to his arresting Kaminsky, having him court-
martialled and shot.
Defense witness Y^alter Hemraings testified that r.EiiGEh
v/as the competent Judicial authority for oifenses against
the general penal code and against the military penal code
^ for the RFj the Waffen SS, but he was not superior to the
Higher SS and lolice Leaders, who had their own Judicial
^ authority, but in these matters their Jurisdiction overlapped;
^ • that both before and after 1943 the sSHA Chief was merely
competent as Judicial authority over the members of the
office who v/ere in that office, and not those located in
other places, such as for instance, at the front. He
admits that the uirlewanger unit was composed not only of
^ poachers, but also of purely criminal offenders, and if
Dirlewanger had committed any atrocities, it was BEPlGER'S
duty to have him investigated and conduct proceedings
against him.
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»On 10 October 1943 the KSHA issued orders that in all
matters concerning ^'mainly the hast", tne Chiel" of the SSHA,
SS Gruppenfuehrer (Lieutenant General) of the Vsaffen SS
BERGER {vfho was appointed by Fi"nmler as Liaison Officer-.to
,the Ministry for the Eastern Territories), should receive-a
draft or be Informed in an appropriate way.
On 17 July 1942 BERGER reported to Himmler that after
discussions with Gauleiter Meyer he had been promised that
he, BERGER, would receive all files of the Eastern Ministry
for the personal, confidential information of Himmler. It
thus appears that BERGER had obtained an informer in Piosen-
berg's confidential staff.
On 14 August 1943 BERGER received from Himmler, with
the request that he confidentially inform Rosenberg concern
ing the same, the report of Obersturmbannfuehrer Strauch of
20 July Goncei'ning ueich Commissar RuDe who had strongly
objected to Strauch's arrest of Jev^s employed by Kube, assert-
ing that it was a serious violation of '^^is j-^risdiction,
and that neither Himmler nor Bach-ZelevJsl-ci had authority
to interfere v/ith that jurisdiction, and vjhile Kube could
not by force prevent the SD from carrying out tie arrests,
he Y/ould, in the future, refuse to cooperate and would no
longer permit the secret Police to enter his official
building. In this conference Kube called attention to the
mistreatment of three Rhite Ruthenian women in a sadistic
^ v/ay by SS Officer Stark who, he claimed, had unlawfully taken
away a suitcase of jewels and valuables, Strauch informed
Kube that he had investigated the matter and that
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there was no reason to instigate any proceedings against
Stark who had acted on Plimmler's orders; that Kube protested
that Himmler had no right to order them to take any valuables
' avifay.
Strauch even complained that Kube had raised objecticns
because expert physicians had removed, in a proper way, the
gold teeth fillings from the mouths of the Jews who had been
designated for special treatment, and stated that this was
unworthy of a German man# of tho Germany of nant and Goethe,
and that the reputation of Germany was oeing luined in the
vrhole •'''•orld. Strauch virtuously ob.^ected that "we", in addi- '
to having to perform this nasty job, "were also the tarsets of
' mud-slinging"•
The second of these reports, dated 25 July, from Strauch
to Bach-Zelewski regarding Kube's attitude, states, namely,
that the latter had displayed an "absolutely impossible atti
tude towards the Jewish question.-and vms hostllely disposed
^ to the SS: that his Area Commissar, Hachmann, on the same
question was impossible and ho was being retained by the
^ Gauleiter despite all warning voices; that he had complained
^ about a V«achtmeister who had supposedly shot Jews as "swine".
u
Strauch proceeds to give a number of examples, and
states that Kube had gone so far as to thank a Jew \;no,
at the risk of nis lixe, had gone into Durning garage
and saved tb^ latter's car; that ^^hen an action was planned
^ against the Jewp Kinsk Ghetto (of "-bich Kube b^cn
previously informed), and vh.ich was to be occomplisheri by
telling the Council of Elders that 5,000 Jews of ^that area
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were to be resettled, Kube disclosed the nctual intention of
the Secret Police and it was an 'established fact that he had
used his 3cnowledge to attempt to rescue the Jews; that there
fore they had to be taken by force and the use of firearms, at
which point of the operation Kube appeared and overwholmod the
commander with abuse concerning the unheard-of happenings
which allegedly occurred when the Jev;s were herded together;
that the G-auloiter used very rough language which consid.er-
ably hurt the sensitive feelings of the commander; that Kube
was said to have gone so f^^r as to distribute c^.ndy to Jewish
children and that on 4 March 1942 he had threatened to accuse
SS Obersturmfuehrer Burckhardt of theft because the latter
had taken two typewriters from the ghetto without a regular
receipt; that Kube had evidently complained to Rosenberg
about mistreatment of Jews in Minsk; that,while Kube made
anti-Jewish speeches,his actions belied his words and were
only made with the intention to cover himself for later days.
Strauch stated that apparently Kube assured the G-erman
Jews,who had arrived at the ghetto before Strauch's time,
that their lives and health would be preserved; that he had
praised, the works of the Jewish poet Schmueckle, and the music
of Mendelssohn and Offenbach; that he had reprimanded a police
officer who struck a Jew in the face who was in possession of
the Iron Cross; th«'t,ln the course of a large scale action in
the ghetto, it had been learned th^t the S'"curity service of
the G-erman Jews, consisting mainly of former participants in
the war, were willing to oppose
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the action by force of arms, ancl to avoid the shedding
of Gernan blood it v/as explained to them that a fire had
broken out in the cit37" and they (the Jews) were needed
for fire fi3htin-': activity, and thus were loaded on trucks
- *
and --iven special tr-atment", and when this came to IZube's
ears he " ecame excited, saying it was brutal to annihilate
front-line soldiers and that the manner of execution was
unheard of. This was the report of Stark,.,
To a ^^erson who held the views that BERGEK now claims
to have held, and v.ho knev^ nothin.w of ^"persecutions or mass
murders, these reports by a leadinp Nazi Party man and a
Gauleiter vrould apparently have been a shock and v/ould have
brought at,out investigation and action. But on 18 Ai.iyust
BfBG.JB ?aeturnecl the files to Brandt, Hitler's Adjutant,
with the calm sta';ement that after reporting bo Rosenberg
he was assured that the la'aber v:ould, in the next fev/ da^^'s,
send Gauleiter Iteyer to I'insk and pive Kube a serious warn-
inp. The letter further stated that Bosenbery had api-proved
Jlimmlor's Proposal that in order to settle the Latvians en
bloc in Lettpallen the form r 0";ners p^'ould be evacuated.
It is to be remembered that ELaGBR testified that
he did not knov; onythiny a.bout plans for destroyrnp Jews
and that he first heard of the ''final solution" after
his arrest and ^p-b.en he ^'es in Ihirnbery and Dachau, Never
theless, as app^ears in his letter of 19 April 1943 to
Pimmle'r p.'bere l e dis ussod the formation of the ^ roposed
";Niiro-"c n Conf eclera bion'"', ie commented u^on tlie Ilunparian
sitla.a t ion and. s ta ted f
-349-
"In Hungo.rip.n G-ovornment circles there exists
a well founded fear that the accession to the con
federation will be tied .up with compulsion to
liquidate the Jews." (Italics ours).
In view of these documents it seems impossible to
believe BERG-SR'S testimony that he knew nothing sbout plans
to destroy Jews or that he never heard about the "final solu
tion" until after the war.
He makes no attempt to explain Exhibit 8375, nor why
Kube, who had taken a manly stand for the- protection of
German ^ews at least, and who had attempted to save 5,000
German /Jews in the Minsk ghetto from murder, and who had
indignantly denounced the treacherous slaughter of Jews who
had served in the front lines for Germany, should be given a
a "serious warning," and this quite evidently at BERGER'S own
suggestion. He attempts to explain the statements found in
Exhibit 2383 by saying that he w.^^s merely reporting what
\
Hungarian government circles said and not any ooinion of his
own. This explanation must be rejected as well. Undoubtedly
the Hungarians expressed fears that their entry into the
European Confederation would be followed by compulsion to
liquidate Jews, but it was BERGER the C"e.rman who was enthus
iastic for this plan of confederation which would give
Germany the hegemony of Europe and who further said that
these Hungarian fears were "well founded,"
It was his opinion a.nd it Wf>s based on his knowledge of
the plan with respect to the Jews,
BERGER reported on 14 July 1943 to Himmler regarding a
conference with Koch, Sauckel, Kube, Meyer and KOSRNER, in
which he said, among other things?
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"Ai'ter the partisan activity had a:^ain
been "broached, I rejected all accusations most
strongly and once and i'oi-' all stated I would
not tolerate any interference with the juris
diction of the KeicIisfuehi-'er-SS "by people who
don't understand* a thinp end who furthermore —
and this, I said, was the saddest thinp I
experienced — are deceived by any atrocity
tele from any sava •;e native and would put it
before the Reich Hast I-inictry with suitable
-luotations and added frill. Koch supported
r.ie and pointed out that it v.'as quite ridiculous
to s"^eal: so much of nartisens . . .
''In the follov;ln:: points I ask for s deci
sion of the Reichsfuehrer 33 ...
"3, By order of the Reichsfuehrer 33 the
Jews in liinsl: must either o resettled or turned
over to a concentration camp. ilo'", Tluhe has in
his district a larpe Danje car factory with
4000 Jews and soys that he v/ould hove to close
down this factory imme ""lately if the Jews '-'ere
taken away, I suqpeatcd to him to contact the
Reichsfuehrer 33 via the hi ;hcr 33 ond follce
Leader and perhaps to convert this factory into'
a concentration camp. Ihas would mean, however,
that he "'ould lose them but since, as he says,
only car production is concerned, this vovild not
mean a sacrifice for him.''
On 20 Auqust 1943 Rrsndt informed DERGLR of Himmler's
answer.
"Re. :.i0. 3, This decision is that by order
of the Reichsfuehrer 33 t\\e Jews are to be taken
out of I-inak and to Lublin or to another ploce.
The --resent production can be transferred to a
concentration camp."
RLROHR knew what ti'.at meant. As early as 23 July 1242
%
Ilimmler wrote hlms
"I urgently request that no ordinance
repardinq the definition of the word 'Jcvr'
be issued. V.'e are only tyinp our own hands by
©sta" llshliR these foolish cefinitlons. The
occupied territories v/ill be pu-r'-^ed of Jews.
, The Ruehrer has charpoo mo '"ith the execution
• • of tJ/iia very hard order, ho one c;-.n release
rie from this res'aonsi"'ility in any case, and
I atronply resent all interference, Lou ^ill
1 receive memorandum from 3h'J.id"!rI3 in a short
I. time."
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The Jev;3 of Germany vere hein^; deported to the .^ast
and nav the East v/as to be ''pur^GecS'' of Jev/s, nen xlimmler
sneaks of the Puehrer Order as being a very hard one, it
takes no imagination to loaow v/hatv/as intended -- tney \/ere
to be done av;ay v/ith. The v/orld laiov/s, to its horror, that
the "^rogram vas carried out and helpless men, vvomen and
children by the millions v/ere slaughtered in cold olood,
V/hile EEUGE' was not in one of the extermination camps, he
played an important part in crush5.ng the complaints of even
highly placed officials like -hube and Posenoerg so tnat bhe
ghastly scheme should proceed according to plan. Pie was
present v^en Himmler delivered his Posen speech on 4 October
1943 at a meeting of hie S3 Gruppenfuehrers. He there spoke
of the Russian PrisonerH of b'ars
"At that time we did not value the
mass of humanity as value it toda;/, as
raw material, as labor. v.hat, after all,
thinking in terms of generations, is not to
be regretted, but is now deploraole by
reason of the loos of labor, is uhat the
nrisoners died in tens and hrndrecs of
thousands of exhaustion and hunger . . .
"One basic principle must be the
absolute rule for the'33 men: must oe
honest, decent, loyal, and comradely to
members of our own blood ana to nobody
else.' bliat happens to a Russian,
Czech, does not inuerest me in tne sli^n
est. V.hat the nations can offer ^ne
way of good blood of our type we will take,
if necessary by kidnapping
and raising them here with us. hhether
nations live in prosperity or starve to
death interests me only in so
them as slaves for our Kultur; otherri ,
it is of no interest to me, bhether
Russian females fall <3own from exhaustion
while digging an anti-tank ditch interests
me only in so far as the anti-tank ditch for
Germany is finished • • •
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-Till • Wl.'ti
ri
I"The other aide docsn^t make life
easy for us. And. you must not for.^^et that
the • ^fortT-inate position in nhich v/e sr'e
placed "by occupying of Europe
carries with it also the ciisadvanta ;e tnat-
in this i-arv;e I'lave- cmon:^ ourselves, and
thus a^:ainst us, raillions of people and dozens
of forelyn nationalities. Automatically
ive have against us all those vho are con
vinced communists; v/e have apainst us ^every
Pree-r,ason, every democrat, every convinced
Christian. These'are the ideological enemies
'ivhom ^ve have a all over .^.jurcpe and
v/hom the enemy has totally for himself • . •
"I also want to talk to you, quite
frankly, 'on a very grave matter.^ Among
ourselves it should "00 mentioned luite
frankly, and yet ve will never speak of
it nubiicly. Just as we did not hesitate
on June 30th, 1934, to do the duty we
v.^ere bidden, apid stand comrades who had
lapsed, up against the wall, and shoot^them,
so \'ie have never spoken about it and will
never speak of it. It \va3 that tact v:hich
is a matter of course, and which, I am glad
to say, is inherent in us, that made us
never discuss it smon"; ourselves, never speak
of it. It appalled everyone, and yet everyone
was certain that he would do it the^next
time if such oroers are is-sued and if it
is necessary.
"I mean the evacuation of the Jews, the
extermination of the Jov/lsh race. It s one
of these things "hich is easy to talk about
'The Jewish race is being exterminated', says
one party member, 'That's quite clear, it's
in our nrogram -- elimination of tVie Je\7s, and
v;oke doing it; exterminating them. ' 'And then
they come, 8 0,000,000 worthy Cfermans, and
each one has his decent Jew. Of course the
others ore vermin, but this one is an A-1 Jew.
Not one of all those v/ho talk this way has
v/ltnessed it; not one of them has been through
it, host of 7/ou must know what it means v/hen
100 corpses are lying side by side, or 500 or
1000. To have studl; it out and fet the same time-
apart from exception cauced by human weakness
to have remained decent fellows, that is
T/hat has made us hard. This is the page of
glory in our history vhich has never been
v/ritten and is never to be ivritten. . .
DUrGk was present at this meeting, he heard this speech
but he denies that anything was said about the externu-nation
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of the Jev/S, aiid in this he is corrohorated by von hoyrsch.
The captured phonc^raphic text of the sp^^ech v;as played to
BnnG'Jn and some^vhat srudginsly he admitted that it soimded
like Ilimmler^s voice.
\t)n hoyrsch joined the 33 in 1930. H© states tnat
) after 1933 itwas considered a combat unit a-ainst Bol
shevists and Communists, Ilev/as in command of H^torized
Jv Police in the Polish Campaign, but he denies that hev.as
involved in cleaning out any Poles; denies that he encoun
tered any opposition from the Polish insurgents and from
- the Polish Army,• and .that every^vhere the public turned to-
him for help. He also denies that Himiriler said anything
about extermination of Jov/s in his Posei speech. But if
his recollection of what I-immler said in this speech is as
faulty as his" recollection of his ovm actions aid those of
I his command in the Polish c/mpaijn, li^.tle credence ccn be"
,piven to his testinjony,
In3eptemh'er 1939 Lt. Col. I^uhousen rendered a report
of an inspection trip on 20 September 193S to Poland. Regard-
iny von Tfoyrsch he stated:
•'1215-1400, Conference at Rzeazov; with G-2(IC-haj. Dehniel) ; G-2 (Idaj.
Schmidt-nichtberg.)
'I "Bxnlain situation as well as military action.
'hland D70\7 for G-2 further reports about unresus
in that Army area arising from -artly illesal
measures taken by SfoCial Purpose Group (Ein- •
^ ' satz,3;rur'^en) of Brigadier General (Oberfuehrer)
hbyrsch (mass shootings - especially of Jews).
It was annoying to the troops that youn^ men,
; ; Instead of fi^htin..; at the front", v/ere testing
•• • their courage on defenseless people.
This was an official report made contemporaneously with
the affairs vrhich it described. There is no reason to doubt
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its accuracy, and shortly arccr it v/as v:ritten von v;oyrsch
ceased to function in command of this unit. In view of
this report we are unable to ^ive any weight to his asser
tion that he and the other Grupp'enfuehrers would have
objected if Kimmler had mentioned the extermination of the
' Jews.
The transcript itself, which is a captured document,
and the phonograph records made of the speech leave little
or no doubt th^t it was rendered substantially in the form
claimed by the Prosecution.
The spontaneous corroboration of the contenoc of the
Posen speech was giv:n by the witness Ilil"" ebrandt, ^ho was
himself convicted.before one of thes.e Tribunals and wno
received a 25-year sentence. ^n cross-examii ation he w^as
asked a-)out a letter writ^'r.en by Himnler inAugust, 19di, in
^ v/hich it was proposed to make hxm the Hi'^er oS and -Police
Leader for Transylvania, and v.hich concluded witn tne com
ment s
"In casd'Ilildebrandt is not there, send
the most brutal man available to that re-^ion."
He admitted receiving the letter, but saidJ
"The letter is puite beside the point.
It has no practical background and it never
' had any practical reculte. Himmle; 's phrase-
^ ology is"^ nothing new, I didn't get excited
about it and I didn't tcke it seriously.
After tl is Posen speech nothing could surprise
m^'any moro.^'
^ The we1hit to be ,xven che ciefenoant SERGjljH''s assertion
that the persecution of Jews v/as abhorrent to him can be
gained from the following exhibits s 2o81 and 2382,
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✓on 23 July 1942 BEilGin wrote Gruppenfuehrer I.Iueller
of tiie RSI-IA, an organisation and person for vrhora he now
eiqoreasca great contempt, that recruiting in Iiungary \;as
purely a question of rroducin'; family allowances; that
negotiations wi^di the Hungarian Economic Office led to
nothing for the time being; that the Hungarians said that
if Hitler wanted anything more he must occupy the country;
that a certain Saron Collas proposed to get hold somehow
of the property situated in Hun-.ary belonging to the German
Jgws which he estimated to be -orth many million pengoa.
BHHGHR ashed to be informed as soon as possible if this
means was acticablo.
On 19 Au-^ust an order v/as issued based on a rex-^ort
of 15 August, but tbese documents vrere not amons the cap
tured d o cument s,
On 24 Hovember 1942, the Office of the Chief of security
Police and SD reportrd to Ilimmler that due to certain cir-
nnt nossihle, at least in the near future,cuniatonces, it was nou
to roeXibo pengos for g,SRG-g"H purposes from this property,
but that permits to emigrate'could be sold to Elovahian Jews,
as had been done in the case of Dutch Jews, for appro::imately
100,000 Swiss francs per heed, and thus BEHG3R could realize
the required 30,000,000 pengos for the recruitment of volun-
teers for the "Vaffen 33 in —
DUriG'.] : insists iiiat this cvmo too late rnr he obtained
the necessary fimds in another manner. Unfortunately, there
are apparently no other records available to disclose the
final history of this happy plan. But even if the siv;3ea-
tlon came too late, the corrocpondencc clearly discloses '
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♦BE?vG3?. IS thoughts, and intentions, and dissipates his
nresent claim that he-as not imbued -;ith any spirit
\
of persecution.
Gabon Vanja, a fonficr j.Iungarian hinister of tho
Interior under the Saalasi government (since executed for
his ovm part in-these matters) gave an affidavit on 28
August, 1945, He deposes that on order of Szalasi he visit
ed Hiroi-.iler at his Headquarters and discussed with Mm and
l-nriGllH, •".'horn he sssumod was to be 4^immlcr s r-eputy, uhe de
portation to Germany of tie romaininq i-unparian Jci/s.
./e have discussed the sad i.'^istory of tnese Jews in
our considerations in the case of
He further deposes that Himmler ordered that the de
tails of the evacuation bo discussed tho follovring day wii^h^
hEhGdd. and Ivaltenbrunncr in bcrlin; that this conference
took place in bcrlin on 16 beccmbor 1944, and con
firmed Himmler's request and ordered Haltenbrunnor to ne
gotiate the details and they ivcre aproed upon; that Haltcn
brunner forced the immediate and energetic delivery^ana said
that '"rinkelnionn and Hichmann, especially tho latter, would
supervise the action; that Ib-chmann wanted to deport oven
the women, children and old men froriPucapcst ano vhon
Vanja •"•rotcstcd, stated that .!-crmany v.'oulo doporb une
herself,
bhcro is no "lucstion but that the deportations .v^rc
carried out and that the majority of these unforuunate people
met their deaths in German extermination camps or in the
slave la'.'or enternrises conducted '.y the 33. .
Although the defend'^'nt, by reason of Vanja's execution,
could nob cross-examine this affiant, there is no reason to
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"believe that his affidavit is not su'^atantially correcb.
If the case against BUHGUI rested uron the affidavit alone
v/e v/ouid not feel justified in findin" him .guilty, "but it
is corrohorated "by evidence ."iven "by BERGBR himself, and
which already establishes that hev/as an active party in the
of the persecution, enslavement and muroer oj. the
lev/s.
*' Slovahian Jev/s, t'hile the v/^tness hastncr te- tifioO unat
it v;as on BERGlRiS rccomriiendction to Ilimralcr that the re-
^ maininp Jevs in Slovakia v/cre deported to exterminabion camps,
ICastner's testimony rests solely upon hearsay, The source
of this hearsay, Becher, v/ae not produced as a v;itncss, nor
any reason ^ivon for the failure to do so,
'.!q therefore hold that t^:is charge has not been proven
beyond a reasonable doubt, and v;ith re^^ard to .^Icvckian Je\\3
t . , ,
BERGb L must be and is exonerateo,
Danish Jev/s; The Prosecution relics upon a letter irom
Ilcitel to uie German >^rmy Commander in Denmark, stating, among
other thinas, that S3 Obergrup": ehfuehrcr BBRGbR, would be in^
•charge.of the deportation of the Danish Jo-s. Jhxs, however,
is the only evidence on this -'hase of ti.iC mabt.^r.
insists that Kelt el was :.n error and the operation wac in
r
> charge of someone else. There is no evidence other than
ircitol's,
•re hold that proof of girilt beyond a reasona^ae doubt
• has not been e.sta^-lished and we exonerate BERGh i of guilt
as to this particular chargo.
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special Commando - Dlrlev/anger. Dirlev/an";;er v/aa .an old
comrade of 3ERG"_fi M from the first '"orld :7ar, and v/hile a
savage and aliillful fishtor, v/aa a man of unsavory characuer
in many respects, which hEhGhP. himself admits, Dirlev/anper
had heen convicted of sexual crimes spainst a minor, hut
BERG-ER asserts that he w aa of t'\e opinion that the convic
tion v/aa the result of a personal quarrel whichDirle^/anper
had Y/ith one of the XTasi officials; that he ohtsined Dirle-
v/an^er'a release and had him sent to Spain as a memoer of the
German Condor Legion where he fought on "behalf of rranco,
^ that on his return he succeeded in having Dirlev^anper rein
stated in the 3S as Oberaturmhannfuehrer.
It was BERGSR'3 idea that for partisan fighting in
the East, a battalion of poachers be organized. ±-immler
approved this suggestion and BLPGLR'3 recommendation that
Diriewanger train and comimcnd this battalion.
It was assigned to the fast and immediately started on
a career of savagerg^, plunder and corruption, which brought
it to the unfavorable attention of German officials v.ho had
an opportunity to learn of its conduct,
fhe prosecution called T.onrad horgen, who had boen
conscripted into the and in October 1940 sent to the oS
I'ain Court as a Judge, lie v/as with the 33 Police Court VI at
Cracow; in Pay 1942 was relieved of his duties and demoted
because of an acquittal he had -ranted and sent to the front
as an ordinary soldier; he was recalled to the police
courts in June 1942 and v:a3 in charge of investigations at
concentration camps. In passing, it may be stated that it
v/as he who was originally responsible for the investigation,
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trial, and subsequent executio'^ of the rt) torious Koch who was
Coaimandant of the Buchenwald concentration camp.
As Judge, his task was to investigate and prepare crim
inal cases and,when not in charge of investigations, he acted
as Presiding Judge. His jurisdiction covereci all members of
the Waffen SS and Police Troops on active duty, but not mem
bers of the Wehrmacht.
In the beginning of 1942 he noticed that there had been
many convictions of the members of the Dlrlewanger unit for
plundering and mistreatment of the civilian population. He
discovered that all the members of this battalion had been
previously convicted of offenses. There were also complaints
against Dirlewanger. This unit was not a part of the Waffen
SS but was a supplementary police unit. AJ that time it con
sisted purely of poachers with previous convictions, but later
on inmates of concentration camps and other criminals were
transferred to the unit. It finally reached the strength of
a division.
His investigation at Lublin among German agencies and
the Security Police revealed that this unit was a pest and a
terror to the population; that Dirlewanger on repeated occa
sions plundered the ghettos in Lublin, would arrest Jews on
the charge of ritual murder, exact blackmail up to 15,000
zloty, and if the money was not forthcoming, have the victim
shot. It was charged that he arrested young Jewesses, called
in a small circle of friends, stripped the women of their
clothes, beat them, and finally geve them an injection of
strychnine and watched them die; that the testimony concern
ing these incidents was obtained by witnesses and th^ crim
inal police.
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The witness deemed it urgent to arrest Dirlev/angcr
and to investigate these frightful crimes. He reported to
Ohergruppenfuehrer Eruegor at Cracow and asked for an order
of arrest, Hrueger reported that there was nothing he could
do "because he was not competent and that the detachment was
subordinate exclusively to the orders of HSRG-jH. Hjcueger
immodictoly phoned I3HHCHR at 'dorlin and after denouncing
Dirlewanger informed HGIiC-jH that upless this bunch ox crimi
nals disappeared from the Governncnt General vntnin a v/cek
I will go myself and lock them up''. finall'^ •^•romisod
to do everything ho could and in approximately two v/ool:s the
unitwss transferred, but not as the v/itness thought to the
Reich, and Dirlewangor punished, but, to his svirprise, iu
v/as sent to Central Husslc, to llogilev. However, cne witness
sent the files with the report to the Commander and the
Supreme Judicial Authority concerned, "but nothing was done and
Dirlcwrn ;or v;as rroraoted,
V/hile BHRGER violent3yfttacks the testimony and credi
bility of the T-itness, nevertheless his ovin report to -limmlcr
of 22 Juno 1C42 corroborates it in part?
"Nov/ it is peculiar that the surprise
attacks by partisans started all of a sudden
when Dr,Dirlewangor ' s oonderkomnando v;as
removed from the district by more or less
fair moans.
"Perhaps this is also now a warning-
that a savage country cannot governed
in a 'decent manner' and that tVie Goncer--
kommando's policy 'to rather shoot two
Poles too many tlian one too few' was right,
"Considering the weakness of this
commando and referring to the follo^aing
data, I request pvormiscion to again comb
the penal institutions in close collabor
ation with 33-Gru-nponfuehrer Luoller and
after thoroughly examining them, to train
-361-
all men sentenced for poaching and to use them
for reinforcing the old Sond'erkommando, and
for forming a nev; second one."
It v/as the practj.ce of the Dirlev/snger Brigade to seize
villages, shut the inhabitants in barns, set them afire, and
shoot dovrn the living torches vhen they tried to escape, and
to clear roads of mines with serried ranks of peasants i/ho
v/ould v/alk down the roads thus exploding the mines, v/ith the
result that thousands v/ere thus blown to pieces.
On 25 June, 1943, Bach-Zelewski rendered an official
report on Operation Cottbus, in which he stated that two
to three thousand local people lost their lives in cleaning
up mines, 3,709 v/ere liquidated, and 599 v/ounded; 4,900 men
and 600 v/omen v/ere assigned for labor, with German losses of
✓
only 83 killed, and 473 wounded, and non-German auxiliary
losses of 39 killed, 152 wovinded and 14 missing.
The disproportion in losses between the partisans
and the German troops indicate n6t v/arfare but massacre.
Further corroboration as to the true nature of Dirle-
v/anger's activities can be seen from the recitation of his
merits when, in August, 1943> he ^v/as awarded the German Cross
of Gold, - that his battalion had wiped out 15,000 guerrillas
at a loss to itself of 92 dead, 218 wounded and 8 missing.
In July 1943, defense witness Bramtigan submitted to
BERG3R a series of reports of murder and outrages comraitted
against the helpless inhabitants of "^ hite Ruthenia which, as
the Reich Commissioner for tliat territory stated, "Supplies
the answer to the puzzle why even after large scale operations
the number of partisans would not decrease but actually
•362'^
increase, and why food supplies for the home front and
the front line from the embattled areas grew scantier
instead of going up. furthermore, reports show tliat any
propaganda moves after such operations have ended, opera
tions v;hich are terminated by mass shootings of the entire
population, are completely useless," and, "if the treat
ment of t he indigenous population in the Occupied fastern
Territories is continued in the same manner which has been
used up^oviT, not only by the police but also by the O.T.
(Organiv:ation Todt), then in the coming v/inter we may
expect not partisans but the revolt of the whole country.
• ••»•• The Regiment jjirlewanger is particularly promi
nent in that type of operation. It is composed almost
exclusively of previously convicted criminals of Germany."
gfRGSR'S reaction is shovm by his letter of 13 July
1-943, where he says £
"I deenly regret that reports of this sort
are being relayed unchecked, that much confusion
is being stirred up and above all things that the^
confidence in close cooperation is being destroyed.
In the case at hand it is my opinion that it would
have been the dut^^ of Commissar General Kube to^
ascertain the accuracy of the reports to his satis
faction on the spot and then to get in touch with
the competent 33 and Police Leader, SS-3rigadefuehrer
von Gottberg, or with the chief in charge of
fighting partisans, S3 Obergruppenfuehrer von dem
Bach. We can alter nothing here in any case, for you
cannot give orders to a troop v/'jthout personally
having exect insight into the situation. Lore-
over, perhaps Herr Kube's attention can still be
called to the fact thct for the most part these
'criminals' are former Party members v.ho were forra-
erly punished for poaching or for some stupid action,
are now taken out and allo^''ed to prove themselves,
and this they do wit'., an incredible percentage of
bloody losses."
On 16 July 1943 B. .aGBPi received an order from himmler
to inform the Reich Linistsr for the —ast that the campaign
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against the partisans v;as ^oing -uite according oo schedule
and "Jolhynia and Podolien vfould he the next on the lisu.
On d r.ay 1944 v/rote :1randt, head of liimniler' s
Personal otaffJ
"In the case of the Dirlewanger reginent
and the whipping scene at i-insh^ a letter^j.roni
I?eichsleiter Kosenher;;. was seiit to the Reichs-
fuehrer SS» Since t.ie j.weichsxuehrer has not^
yet ap''~rocched tue on this sujject I assume unat
•^ou have Icent this leo'cer hacli for tne time
fDein-^. i^ike other letters it did not go through
m"^ hands, or I v/ould^jiay^e^ changed it.*' (Italics ours)
' "As is """ell Imown, there are a number of
peor^le in the hast hinistry who do not want
to act as I do and are pleased when conflicts^
gpj^3g, hiudly suggest to tne Rei ens fuehrer
to address the following or a similar letter to
Jloichsleiter Rosenberg
'Dear Party Ilembcr Rosenberg?
»0n p?incr-^le I share your view, and I
am not at all pleased 'hien an incident such
as one in IlinsV: occurs, .^owever 1 am convincea
that wou can fully understand it if I cannot at
wresent involve gg-3tandartenfuehrer Dr.Dirle-
wanger in an invest! ;ation as I need him most1 badly for the safeguarding of that area,'"
T^he manner in which these operations againsu vartisans
were conducted is clearly disclosed hy Dxhihit 2370, in which
it appears that in the four months' period of August,
SepteniDer', October and ITovember, 1942, 1,337 bandits were
counted dead after engagements, 737 prisoners immediately
executed, 7,828 executed after questioning, and thac ox
> accomplices and guerrilla suspects, 14,257 were executed,
and 365,211 Jev/s were executed,
j linRGhR'o personal interest and sense of propietorship
in Dirlewanger and his -:rigadc is shown hy his communication
of 1. October 1943v wherein he stated?
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' 'This chanje of opinion is probably cue 'to
the unnualixiecl' conduct of my special unit "Dr.
birlewanper v;ho, so far as can ascertain, h.as
behaved in a most unsatisfactory manner in
everj'" respect."
'•.'hile in the field the imit vas not under his tactical
direction, it '."/as or^anii^cd by him, trained by the man vhom
he selected, the idea r'3s his, he hept it and j.ts commander
under his protection, \ig was repeatedly informed of its
aavape and uncivilized behavior, which he not only permitted
to continue, but attempted to justify; he foupht every effort
to have J.t transferred or dispersed, re'commended its commander
for promotion and covered him with the mantle of his protection.
That one of the purposes for \7hich the '"rl^ade was or33niEed
was to comTiit crimes apainst humanity and that it did so to
an e;:t3nt which horrified and shocked even IJazi Commissars,
and Ptosenberp's Linistry for the Pastern Territories, who can
hardly be justly accused of leniency tcr'ards the Jews and people
of the Jastern territories, is shown beyond a doubt. bjPiGPu'o
responsibility is quite as clear.
re is GUILTY with respect to the matters chsrpcd apainst
him re^ardinp the actions of the Dirlev.'anper Unit and 're so
find,
^ecial Trea^ent__of h'creipn nationals. The term ''special
treatment"' had a well-rcco'':niaed meaninp in Hazi Germany.
It meant execution or at beet confinement in a concentration
camp, ti/.e latter beinp, in most instances, the substitution
of a lin-jerinp death for a ^ulch one. 'Ve will consider - hst,
if any, part and the SGI!A played in the treatment of
foreipn nationals.
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tnimmler v/aa infected with the idea that German olood
must not he contam5-neted by hein.-"^, mingled v/ith that of v/hat
he termed to be inferior "peonies, and that those v;ho violated
his decree on this subject should and v;ould be subject to
"s''"'Gcial treatment" unless "it was shown that they wore of
suitable Aryan groups or outstanding individuals v/hose blood
might be valuable to German^-,
hildebrandt, one of hhhGDh^G witnesses and head of the
Gi rain Office hsce and Settlement, having engaged in one of
the usual jurisdictlonal disputes with the head of tAe Security
and Police Office, reached an agreement, under the date of 20
August, 1013, that the tasl: of negatively eliminating the un
desirables was that of the Security Police and that of aclect-
In"; those raciallp" qualified belonged to tbe Ofilce -lace and
Settloraont (T^uGrA).
The prosecution alleges that examiners of g-gfiGfh ^b SS
I'ain Office undertook to make jsacial examinations in cases
of tliis kind and that he bears criminal responsibility there
for. That these examiners made sv.ch examinations is estab
lished by the evidence, but there is serious doubt whether
SfhGhh or b.i3 ham Office are rosponsrble for their actions.
The eecaminers v/ere detaj.loc; "i^o .ignG-iP by che eo conouct
physic. 1 examinations of rccru'les for tne ''.axfen -'-ne
weight of the. evidence is, hcvevcr, that in mal-in , uie so-
called racial examinations, 'ulicso men were not subjoco to
3hRG-,gi3 control, but to that of the bureau from vhich they
were detailed, he have no doinbt that .ibnG^il'S o_j.lce Imew
of the latter activity, but there is a reasonable doubt that,
when acting in that capacity, he had jurisdiction over them.
Therefore, v.-e find him HOT 'rJILTY with respect thereto.
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necruitin^ of Ccncenl:rai:ion Camp Ouards, It is unnecessary
/
for us to elaborate v/bat has lon':^ since been established
re^arclinc; German concentration comrs, They rere conceived
in sin and born l.n ininuity, and the subsequent consequences
were the natural result of both their parentage and environ
ment ,
Although it is clainod the^'" were first used for the
imprisonment of communists and convicted criminals, it is
clear beyond question that from the be^lnniny they were
utilirad for the imprisonment of those who disagreed with
ITazl policy or became the objects of Nazi persecution.
In time their inmates included those persecuted for relig
ious beliefs, such as Catholic Priests, Protestant pastors,
as well as political opponents, Jews and foreigners who
rebelled against their lot or who transgressed against
the cruel conditions under which they were compelled to
v;ork. Peoples of ever^'" country who fell under German domina
tion and control were num".')ered among the victims of this
system. It is one of t!ie main insignia of German terrorism.
Although in this case every defendant disclaims knowledge of
what actually went on in them, each looked upon them as
places of !iorror from w'^lch he sought to protect those in
whom he hoc an interest.
^ After the outbreak of the ^-ar and during its progress
they were t!:e means of terror used to keep both German and
other populations under coriurol,
BSPiGAR does not deny that he and his agency recruited
the guards of these ccm^s at loast imtil 1942, ksny of
these guards were recruited from the SS, There are strong
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inaications that this was lihev/ise true as late as 1944,
"but it is immaterial whether his aetivities ended in
1942 or continued thereafter. His defense is ihat his re
cruits v/ere only used as exterior guards and had nothing
\
to do v/ith v/hot v/ent on in the interior of the camys .
The evidence shows tho.t amon^ the records in this
'case there are exhibits showing he furriished -uards for
luchemvala, Auschwitz and Oranienours, and for'camps hold-
# •
ing Jews v/orking as slave laborers for Organisation lodt.
BHHCrhR claims that it seems incredible that a man
' holding the high rank in the 33,that he did not know
of the atrocities committed in these camfs, "but that
nevertheless he did not l:nov7. '.''e do not "believe him. His
close official and personal relations with Himmler,.the hi.-ph
positions which he held under Ilimiuler, the fact that he v;as
j present and Vieard Ilimmler's Pcsen speech i-reclude the claim .
of ignorance v/hl'ch he now maizes.
/ iTor are v/e impressed with the defense t'jst taese
recruits were used for er.terior s^ard duty only, and
therefore were not responsible for the atrocities com
mitted v>hthin the camps. On direct examination he testi
fied'.
''1 hrw, of course, it may be possible
to SET'a iri^ihf, but still there is a possibility
that these puards tool: part in maltreatment of
Inmates which v,'ere perpetrated outs ice the con
centration camp.
ilie innumerable Dachau trials prove
that such thin~3 did actually occur. But^let ^
me continue. It was only the most insipnii ican.u
cart of these atrocities that were committed oy
members of the S3. That was done by -eople whom
I had essia;ned to that job at one time or anooaer,
but over 90 » wa-s werpetrated by tne so—calleo
members of tb.e Lsndschutcen battalions vho were
assi'^ned after 1942 by Polil from the Army, from
the Luftwaffe and t^-.c xTavy, for -uard purposes
in the camr."
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If we are to assume that his statements were true,
nevertheless he is not thereby relieved of responsibility'".
These car.ips were an intef^ral part of the Nazi program of
oppression, slave labor, terrorism and extermination. They
were the means whereby the ITazi Party maintained its power
over the CJerman people and over the peoples, of nations
occupied or controlled by it, 'To maintain and administer
them obviously required both e::terior and exterior puards.
The defendant furnished the exterior yuards and if, as we
find to be the fact, these camps were of liie character just
described and the defendant Imev" of it, wbich we also find
to be the fact, he ;^articipated in the crime.
The fact, if it be a fact, that neither he nor the
,(guards participated in shcotinps, beatinps, starvations
and other maltreatment can only be considered if at all
in miti ;auion of the o:'fen3e^, h'e find the dei'endant h.lHGPR
GUILTY of the crimes against humanity as a conscious parti
cipant in the concentration camp program.
£onscjri;ption_of_lT^^^ ,9.f pther_^^Cqunj:jrie^ 3YRGYR, in
1930, set. up the Recruitinp Office of the Waffen 33 and
on 1 July lOoC he become the' official chief of that office,
a position v.''..:.ch he- retained until 31 December 1939. Upou
the reorsanization of the 33 i;:ain Office on 1 January 1940
he became its chief and was thereafter responsible for the
recruitment of the Waffen O".' until thd close of the v:ar.
In t'le enrly part of the '-'ar there were undoubtedly
a larpe number of foreipn volunteers to the ^"affen S" .
Such recruitment is, of course, perfectly lef^al. The Prose
cution alleped, ho^^ever, that durinp the war larpe numbers
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/of fore 1311 nationals were conscripted into the V/affen 33
contrary to the principles of international law and that
these cri'.UGS constitute a crime apainst humanity. If> as
has been often held, it is a -crime to conscript foreign
nationals to slave labor, it is a crime of equal rank to
conscript them into the Army to fi^ht, "bleed ana die.
As the war progressed Germany suffered severe losses
of mannover. It adopted conscription as to its own nationals
and in many instances of foreign nationals livinp within its
borders, ^"e hold that it is not illegal to recruit prisoners
of war who volunteer to fight against their own country, but
pressure or coercion to compel such persons to enter into
the armed services obviously violates international law.
On 24 January 1945 33nG3?t, as Commander of the Reserve
Army and Chief of Prisoner of V.ar Affairs, issued an order
which, after reciting that many applications had been received
from Russian prisoners of war to join General V/lassow^s Army
of Liberation, added that as a result, negative elemencs
among the Russian "^^r is oners had become more active^ thac in
order to remove these unfavorable influences ano to insure
the success of further recruiting, it y/ as ordered *uhat pris
oners of war who v/ere known to be ring leaders for suoversive
propaganda were to be immediately removed from the laoor unit
and transferred to the 3D and those subversive elements who
were not active ring leaders v/ere to be listed for remo/al
at c moment's notice; that the isolation of these subversive
elements v/as not possible at the time because of t .le work
to be done.
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It is unnecessary to aiain explain what was uieant
h^r-'transfer to the 3D=', In most instances it meant
death. Such an order clearly violates the rules o^ v.'ar
and that its issuance had a marhed stimulation of recruila
ment of fussian prisoners of v.'ar requires no proof. j-he
safe way to avoid heinj classified as an a ctive or posicive
subversive element would oe to volunteer. prisoner of
war who endeavored to persuade his comrades not to fijhu
against his "brothers thereby violated no rule of war and
such conduct would, under no possibility, subject him oo
legal punishment, or would.justify his being turned over
to the SD.
fhat these measures were effective and tnau in many
cases the so-colled Russian ''volunteers were in fact
conscri''"^tec is clear. Pegelein reported to xiimmler,
apparently in February 1945, th.ot tne volunteers had
stated that they would on no account fight against their
compatriots". Ris report further stateds
"2, A large number had already deserted
to the other side.
"3. Several members of the lerman Leader
Personnel had already been killed by the volun
teers, and finally that the Leader Personnel
are afraid of being killed by the volunteers
in contact ""''ith the ene'.iy ond are anxious as
to liOw they can get away."
"fhile we do not overlook t'":e possibility that
Russian prisoners of war may have volunteerec. * itli the express
intention of desertin , at the earliesi: practicaole momeno,
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nevertheless when re^elein^s rc-ort is considere'in
connection with BSRGIiiR'S CRDhR ahove referred to, the
conclusion is inescapaole that more than ordinary per
suasion v/as used hy Oj-flce to induce Russian
prisoners of v/ar to enter tne llassov' Army ox Libera
tion.
On 8 September, 1044, C-reiser wrote Himnler
relative to the' conscription of sll able-bodied Germans from
Russia, Includln- those not yet nr-turaliaed, and ashed
that certain exemptions be Granted covorlny certain
or.G^nisa ' ions of hxs ov/n. lie SuS aeo uha t ^jjxRG-jR some
months nrevlously had a.Gi'eed to this reservation. fhe
persons thus to be considered v;cre not German nationals but
were people of German blood who were citizens of Russia. Ghe
action was wholly without sanction of law and in patent
violation of international law.
On 16 June, 1940, LBRGGR -wrote Brandt, Himmler^a
Adjutant, with remand to recruitment of the Rrinz ^.u^en
Division in Croatian
'*The Reichsfuehrer 33 has pro
claimed compulsory service for
the racial proup in the Serbian territory,
i.e.. Dr. Janho — Ibie Serbian territory
is under German sovereignty since^it is
occupied by Germany. Rrom the point of
nublic law there can be no objection,
leavlnp apart the puestion that really
nobody'cares what we do down there wi.h
oiiT racial iermana . • •
-t;yo ^reclaim compulsory service for
Croatia and Serbia is impossible under
public, law. And' it as not at all necessary
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either, for -when a racial group is under
moderately good leadership, everybody
volunteers, alright, and those vh o do
not volunteer get their houses broken to
pieces. (Such cases have occ\irred in the
Rumanian Banat dur Ing the last few days)."
The SS Main Legal Office, on 12 J'anuary 1943, wrote
to BERGER'S Main Office that the Division Prinz Eugen was
no longer an organization of volunteers but that on the
contrary, the Ethnic .Germans from the Serbian Banat were
drafted, to a large extent, under threat of punishment by
the local German leadership, a nd later by the nei'lacement
•Agencies (BLKGLh ' S) .
Kasche of the P'oreign Office, in his report of June
25, 1943, llV-ev;isc complained of the r uthless reomitlnp:
methods used in Croatia,
d'he defense that these measures were taken under
agreement between Germany and the sovereign state of
Croatia is v/lthout merit. Croatia v/as a puppet created
by Germany, existed under and only so long as It wa.s
backed up by Germa n arms. It was neither sovereign nor
a state. The so-callcd Internal agreements v;ere suggostod
and Imposed by Germany and accepted by Croatia because it
was without power to do anything else and Its government
existed only when backed up by German bayonets. Nor is
there any substance to the contention tl:iat those drafted
and conscripted were ethnic Germans a nd ttierefore subject
to German lav; of conscription. The German government had
no more jurisdiction over ethnic Germans in Europe than It
had over ethnic Germans in the United States. They are
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not German nationals but citi'-.cns of their respective
nations»
Under the ilimmler decree,
''persons of Germanic origin v/ho do not apply
for . . . repatristion are to be turned over
to the German State Police and if they do
not chance their minds within eij^t days
are taken into protective custody for trans
fer into concentration cam^s,''
An act of naturalisation under auch circumstances is not
voluntary.
fhe program carried out in Serbia, Croatia, and the
Protectorate was likewise carried out in Latvia, Lithuania,
Poland, llussio, Luxembourg, Alsace and Lorraine. Seyond
question, of doubt, the defendant LLnGLR is -^.uilty of a
crime apcinst humanity v;hen he and '.is agencies took part
in a program v/hic'n subjected citisens of those countries
b '^" forced ' ermanization or other ways, to be conscripted
into the German armed forces,
fhe defense has attempted to picture BERGJR as a man
of humane and kindly instincts, ^averse to persecutions of
anj kind. But this ^ictui'^e fades in the face of a letter
found in the Party files in Stuttyart, written on 4 Lay 1953
This was after tiae seizure of "701 er, and 'le said?
"dho Special Gom;-.:.issars are to be
instructed that they nov; have to discontinue
arrests and that applications for release
are to be considered favorably. A balance
has to remain on t''.c Ileubery# fverythiny
unnecessary only eabs U". our money and v/e
will afterv/ardha e nothinp left i or the
training. Lejp th£"n c\v'l a/ld^lpT they resist
^hqqt them down. A r.iu.ch simp1er so 1ution
and dn^~v^rcir""I's more favorable to us.
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It woul'^ be t'~ conceive of a more callous
brutal ~)o llcy aimef^ ?.t tb«^t time, oppp.rently, to SA
funf^s so that tbey coul'^. be use"^ for training- ourp'^ses.
BERCtSR explains that he ^lees not remember or rec^cnize t^e
letter but it came from the h''uerttenberff Party files of
Stuttgart anc' it bears the typeh. signature "Chief of Branch
G-roup Wuerttenberg, " signed, "G. 3IRGSR, Oberfuehrer. "
Wo have no loubt as to its genuineness anc^ it is
significo.nt to note that he does not deny that he wrote it.
We find, the defendant isbRGER GUXLTX under Count Five
of the Indictment.
During the concluding months of the war, the record,
shows thet the defendant BLHGER was the means of saving the
lives of American, British grid Allied Officers and men whnse
safety was gravely imperiled by orders of Hitler that thoy be
liquidated or held as hostages, 3BRGER disobeyed orders and.
intervened on their behalf, and in so doing place'^' himself
*
in a position of hazard. These are matters of extenuation
which the Tribunal will take into consideration in fixing: his
^ sentence.
/
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Berendsnt ERITo'I" "ILrijLI BOEIZi) joined the ITazi
Party on I'arch 1, 1932, received the Golden Party Badye
in 1937, and also received t'le C-olden Hitler Youth Badye.
on Ila^r G, 1933, he hccaae Chief of the Party's Auslsnds
Organization (AO) v;hlch had jurisdiction over German
nationals liviny outsi* e Germany, Jle held this la'c aer
office until 1 Hay 1945, BOIILE oecsnie the Gauleiter of
the AO in October, 1933, On 30 January 1937 fOIILt became
Chief of AO in the Foreign Office and in December of that
year he received the rank of State Secretary. He remained
in the Forei~^n Office until 14 ITovember 1941, but: kept his
title without pay until the collapse.
DOl'ILE v/as a protege of y.ess, or at least vas looked
upon as such, and v/hen tlxe latter fled to Fn-sland in 1941
BOHL:'] fell from po\''er and v/as relieved of his duty and
re3ponsibilit3'- in the Foroiyn Of;'ice.
Although a Gauleiter, he had no povernmental --owers
over any territor^^", but his organization was the sole a ;ency
competent for th^ entire activity'' of the Party abroad,
in so far as German nationals residins abroad v;ere concerned,
and he the s:me jurisdiction over them as the Gauleiters,
V
in t'n.eir territorial sovereiGioity, had over "fee populations
of their territories or Gaus,
• In October, 1940, the Voreicn Office received a
telegram fromAbetz, German Av.bessad-or to the Vichy Govern
ment, in v/hich he su-pested a collective expatriation
procedure for Jews in the occupied portions of Prance as
shown by lists made in an agreement by Abetz with the hiyh
party leaders. Ihis ^-roposed procedure included Austrian
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/Hews who had not chsn'jed their Austrian rass^orus for
German passports heforc 31 Decsnher 1933, and Heich j-ernian
jev/3 v/ho had not resistered "before 3 February 19^8.
was on the distribution list but out attention has nou oeen
directed to any document or otlier evidence indicabin^ Traether
he or any of his representatives were amonf t-ie '*hi_.h arcy
leaders''' to whom Abets made reference.
In attemptiny to conn-ect nOHLf v/ith the offenses
charged in Count five, the Prosecution relies on fOIILi'S
speech', on 7 or 8 November 1938 on the occasion of the
funeral services of von iiath, a Poreiyn Office of.Lici3l
attached to the German iilribaEsy in ^-aris, assassinabOd oy
Gruenspan, a Jev, in which f O'ilL"; opeeks of von Hatn as uhe
eirrhth victim of Jewiah-'^-olshevist murder schemes and thv t
o '
t,ie Jew wanted, accordlnf to Gruenspan's testimony,
hit C-ormany. Gut we find nothing in Unis speech sufficiently
concrete and e,xpliclt to connect OHL„. v/ith any of the
offenses charged in Gotant five.
In the early part of ISbV, and continuously at least
until I.-arch 193G, the Defondsnt. GOHhG and the AO urged the
cancellation of the Paavara Agreement by vhich Jevs cesir-
ing to emigrate to Palestine, or '^ho had emigrated to that
land, ' ere enabled to realise their ierman assObS, in irnole
f
or in part, by making purchases of German commodities for
ahipmont 'here, and 'laving the amount thereof charged
against their blocked credits in the 3eich. After much
correspondence and several conferences, and after consio-
erablo opposition from other departments or sections
in the :''oreign Office and from the i-inistry of .economy
apparently they succeeded. fhe object, ho?/ever, was not
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to prevont the emisration of Jews, "but to prevent their
ertil:Si'atin3 to Palestine ancl sottin- up a Jewish State there,
and that hy these transactions German commodities were trans
ported without Germany receivln3 forei-n exchange in return,
and third, that thereby Jev;s were being enaoled to take
their assets out of the country.
V:e are unable to see, however, that these transac
tions v.hich started in 19S7, and were concluded about Larch,
1938 were so connected with the aggressive war and crimes
against -e ace as to render it reasonably ceytain that the
measures had this in view. It is, of course, a part of the un-
holy program of oppression of the Jews by the i.asi Paroy,
but, however much such measures may shock one^s moral sense,
it is not an offense which comes vjithin the jurisdiction of
the Court unless the proof clearly'* shows that it was con
nected with crimes against peace. That link is missing.
In August 1943, the AO endeavored to compel the
discharge of Jews employed- in Rumania by German firms, but
this took place long after hOULR^S activity in public
bf-flceg.
The Prosecution asserts, that . he Foreign Office
correspondence regarding its plane to have BOHLC testify
in the Gruenspan trial indicates BOIIIE'S criminal responsi
bility under Count Five. The trial never took place, and,
of course, POKLE did not testify and such facts do,
not constitute a basis for conviction.
In support of its contention that BOHLE v/as a guilty
participant in the so-called resettlement of Germans on
lands confiscated from Poles and Jev/s in the incorporated
gastern territories and Government General, the Prosecution
cites himmler's decree viiich implemented Ritler s defree
of 7 October 1939, by vhich he was constituteo Reich
Comr.isr.ar of germandom. Ihe .-imr.iler decree charged tie
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PO and VClcn the taak of bringing in the German? a.nd
the ethnic Germans for purposes of resettlement. Various
other duties were a-signed to other departments and agencies
of the Heioh.
The defendant T^^'"L5!R a-^oointed one George Christians,
one of BOfTEVS subordinates, as a member of the Aufsichtsrat
of the DUT (German Hesettlement Trusteeship, Ltd., Liability
Comoany), ivhich nomination enproved by Rimmler.
Christif^ns thereafter acted, in that capacity. But here the
evidence stops. There ir no evidence that Christif^ns, in
this capacity, acted for BOFTE and no evidence of Christians*
activity in the DUT. The DUT was a part of the infamous plot
for depriving ^oles end Jews of their property and turning it
over for resettlement t® Reich and ethnic Germans. However,
our attention has not be-n called to, and we have been unable
to find, Pny evidence th^^t BCKIU*U organization took any part
in the so-called Germanization or resettlement ^rogr^m. He
Jnust, therefore, be ejronereted with respect to this phase
of the oa.se,
acts and those of his department in persuad
ing German business firms to discharge Jewish employees
working for them abrcad, while reprehensible from a morel
standreint, do not oom.e within the scope of either Count
Five of the Indictment or of the crimes defined by the
London Charter "^nd Control Council law No. 10. The same
is true with resr^eot to his efforts to have the Haavara
ii,greement abrogated.
••re, therefore, Ji.CQUIT him under Count Five.
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•DAHIffi, as early as August, 1930, became Iiitler's
advisor on agricultural questions. He became a member of
the Party in the same year, and of the SO in 1951, and ras-
a yoichsleiter for A irarian Policy from 1933 until hev/as
deprived of official functions in 1940. T'ewas a ncmbor of
the 3S and "became a Gturmbannfuehrer, and throu'ih inter-
mejdia"".e promotions rose to the '^rade of Cher^ruppenfuelirer
in ITovembe , 1934. He v^as elected to the Reichstay in 1932
and was Reichminister for 7oocl and Agriculture, and Heich
Peasant Leader from 1933 to 1945, but ras relieved of his
duties from 12 i:ay 1942., He v/as Ch: ef of the Race and
Settlement Office from 1931 to 1933, and received the
Golden Party badpe in 1935, He also held other offices,
all of v/nichverc connected v/ith a^Rricultural affairs* .
He had interes cd himseIf in problems of apr icu,lture and
hereditar*^'" land ovmersbi^ and -"'blood and soil", vhich
activities probably first attracted Hitler's attention and
he utilised DARRL in the Party's drive to interest farmers
and acsrictiltural norlrers in the Hazi Party,
Some of his ideas v;ere novel and sonevhat bizarre, .
but it is not a crime to evolve and advocate nerr or even
unsoimd social and economic theories. This Tribuaaal is
only interested in 1f;hat he did and what he advocated v/hich
Qorneswithin the scope of the Indictment, the. London Charter
and Control Council Lav/ Ho. 10, .
Anti-Semitism. A careful examination of DARRH'S speeches
found larr^ely in Books 102 and 103, reveals a stronp anti-
Jewish feolin;^. His statements are intolerant, "rejudiced,
and disclose a profound i^pioronce of history, economics,
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and religious philosophy. Thus, for example, is his
theor^r that the foundations of democratic government
are solely the product of Semitic philosophy, v.hich,
of course, altogether overlooks the fact that one of
the earliest forms of complete clcmocracj'- v;as the polit-
icol organization of the early Germanic trihes where
the chief v/aa elected by the members of the tribe, held •
office only so long as the tribe or council approved of
his actions, and whose- office was not hereditary, and
where the laws were enacted not by him but by the tribal
council, - all of this before the Germanic tribes had-
been converted to Christianity and in a coiontry v-here a
Jew v/as an unknown as the dodo.
/
DAKRE*S speeches attack the Jev/s and Democracy,
but he also attacked the Prussians and Prussianisnio But
this is a phenomenon laiown to all societies and nations.
Individuals and groups arc rronc to blame ills in the body
politic and economy to groups, - bankers, capitalists,
labor rnions, convervativcs and radicals, - all depending
upon the indivldvial point of vlo'-. Such criticism is
often the result of ignorance and instability, but, except
in an authoritarian state, it has not yet been auggostod,
as a matter of lav;, that to hold and express such vio^vs
is criminal.
It Is true that in one of his speeches he expressed
approval of the Burnberg Laws, but a fair reru-sal of his
speeches and written articles reveals that they seek to
glorify the peasant and agricultiare and, as window drcss-
ing, refer to Prussians, Jevrs oiid Jewish ideas. We do
not find in them any attempt to incite- or justify murder,
or exterminations, and boliovo '! they arc the expressions
of one obsessed with an idee flx^,
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utilization of Jev/iah A/^ric-ultural Property, The Prosecu
tion rely upon the Decree of 26 April 1953 requiring all
Je^73 to register their property, v;hich was signed "by
Goering as Plenipotentiary for the Pour-Year Plan, and
Prick as •'"inlster of the Interior, and. the decree of 3
Deceipbcr 1933, signed by Funk and i^'rick of the Ministries
of Dconony and the Interior, concerning the utilization of
Jewish •'"ropei'ty.
One of the provisions of the last-named Decree pro
vided that a Jew may be ordered to sell his agricultural
or forest enterprises or properties, in whole on in part,
v/ithin a definite time.
On 25 December, 1953, 'Villikens, as DARRE'S deputy,
issued a decree implementing the decree of 3 December 1958,
which provided, among other things, that the i-rice to be
paid to Jews for theiragricultural property should not
exceed the settlement utilization valixe, and even if the
property is not used for settlement, the Jew is only to
receive from the purchaser the price corresponding to
the so-called settlement utilisation value. In such a
case, in accordance with Section 15, Paragraph 1, of the
decree, the buyer v;aa required to pay over to the Reich
the difference betv;een the settlement utilisation value
and the adequate market value. It recommended that, in
administration, trustees be appolnted In all cases where
difficulties were expected to arise and that they could
be appointed as soon as the Jev; had received his notifica
tion without v/aiting for the result thereof. It further
provided tliat in all cases where sixty-five hectares or
more of land was thus to be sold, DARRE was to bo informed
prior to the sale.
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This Drc^rsm v/as carried out under DARRE'S orders
"by agencies organised and controlled by him. For instance,
on 16 February 1959 the Bavarian I.Iinistry of Econoiny,
Department of Agriculturo, issued a decree implementing
DARRE'S decree, and the report of the Bavarian Peasant
Settlement Company, Ltd., of 12 December. 1940 discloses
that in Franconla the agricultural property of 276 Jev/s,
amounting to 606,345 hectares (Approximately 1,200,000 acres)
had been thus Aryanized.
It is clear from the first of the decrees that it
was intended not only to bar Jev/s from agriculture, but
also to rob them of a large part of the value of their
property/. These decrees were enacted at about the same
time as the infamous Crystal b'Sek and the levy of a billion-
mark fine against Jev/s for alleged complicity in the assassin
ation of von Rath.
Unquestionably the proceeds of the Aryanlzatlon of
farms and other Jewish property were in aid of and utilized
in the program of rearmament and subsequent aggression.
An instance of hov/ the law was administered is
detailed by Justin Steinhausor, a Jewish cattle dealer
and farmer. On I.'arch 8, 1950, he received an order to
sell his farm buildings, inventory and livestock, at a
price 01 10,400 RI.; he v/as told, in this order, that non-
compliance would be punished, and that if he did not obey
tne order, a trustee would be appointed to bring about a
sale to the Bavarian Peasant Settlement Company, Ltd.,
pormission to. sell els eviiere was denied. 5,275 Rli of the
purchase price was deducted as his share of the billion-
mark fine, and after minor property deductions, tiio net
of 4,413.20 RI,: was placed in a blocked account to be
-383-
disposed of only with the i^ermission of the Finance Presi
dent of the Foreign Exchan3e Office, Nurnberg. He was
permitted to draw from this balance 300 FOi per taonth.
The property was, at the time of the sale, insured by the
Bavarian State Insurance Administration for 23,230 RII and
v/ithout doubt, the enforced purchase price was less than
half of what the property v/as actually v/orth.
At" the time these decrees were issued and while
/
theywere being enforced, DARRS v;as Minister of Food and
Agriculture and vhiilo he may never have origlnate-d the
plan to thus rob German Jev^s, he fully implemented and
enforced it without objection and without attempt to modify
or otherwise alleviate i'bs unjust provisions. Vie hold that
ho v/as a Imoiving and conscious participant in this plan.
This v/as only a few months* before the commencement of the
war, and was of imdoubted assistance in financing aggres
sive plans, and constitutes a violation of International
Law within the Jurisdiction of "this Tribunal.
Discrimination Against Jewsjh Pood Rationing. Between
December, 1939, and 11 March, 1940, DARRE'S department issued
several decrees depriving Jews of special rations of food
to which other German citizens were entitled.
Nevertheless, the Jews wore insured the normal
rations, the sick, invalid, pregnant women, nursing mothers
and v/omcn in child bod, and Jews employed in heavy labor
were given the same special rations allowed German citizens.
The Prosecution concedes that these decrees were
not in themselves so severe or their effects so harsh as
to cause sickness or exposuiro to sickness and death, but
asserts that they led to the more drastic cuts which
finally led to the denial of foddstuffs necessary in
life, such as wheat, fat and eggs.. However., no testimony
or.documents tending to prove this assertion have been
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cited and the Court has been able to fine) none.
While these decrees show rank discrimination between
Jews and others and evidence a cf^llous social sense, the evi
dence does not substantiate that they are acts which come
within the crimes charged'^-in Count Five and the defendant is
exonerated respecting them.
Resettlement, Several years prior to 1939 a Rn.ce and Settle
ment Office had been set up in the SS under the Jurisdiction
primarily, of Himmler, and DARRE had undertaken, in addition
to his other duties, to act as its chief. At that time and
until the beginning of the war its functions consisted of pro
curing lands for and furnishing financial support, machinery,
and other facilities, to those G'ermans, either national or
Ethnic, who were displaced either by reason of treaties, such
as that made with Italy, whereby Germanic inhabitants were
compelled to leave their homes within areas such as had
belonged to the Austro-Hungarian Empire orior to the Treaty
of Versailles, and had been ceded to Italy, or because of the
condemnation and appropriation by the Reich of agricultural
lands for airfields, drin g rounds, roads and other oublic
works. Fxcept insofar as the lands used for resettlement were
unjustly and illegally expropriated from Jews, the exercise of
these functions, of course, do not constitute any breach of
International Law and then only insofar as they are in execu
tion of or in connection with the planning, preparation, ini
tiation and waging of aggressive wa3?s,
We cannot say that it has been proven beyond a reason
able doubt that during that period acts of
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defendant as Chief of the Race and Settlement Office
were such as to constitute a crime v/ithin our jurisdic
tion.
Ono of the main purposes of the aggressive wars
v/agcd by the Nazi government against Poland and later
against Russia v/aa to gain Lcbensraum for Germany; it v/as
proposed and planned to confiscate their land and nropsrty
from Poles and Jews, and property vjhichvas statc-ov/ned,
and to utilize the same for resettlement of Reich Germans
and Rtlinic Germans from the Baltic States who might be
compelled to leave their farms in compliance vdth the
agreement of the Russian Treaty of August 23, 1939,
Later it included Ethnic Germans from other countries.
Shortly prior to 4 October 1939 Ilimmler and DARRE
fell out and the former obtained a draft decree from
Hitler by vdiich the Reichsfuehrer SS and the SS was
entrusted with the settlement of the German pe asantry
in the "nov/ly acquired (or) occupied Eastern territories",
(wording to depend on date decree issued) which at that
time included that part of Poland, This aroused DARRENS
ire and he v/rote first to LAIII.IER3, then to Kimmlcr, and
finally, on 27 October 1939, to Goering, In the first
communication he stated inter alia,
"The settling of German peasants in the
conquered Polish territories, or special
parts of these territories can, as it is
certain, only bo a question of the re-
Germanization of these territories, i.e.,
tho safeguarding of those territories by
populating them with volunteer German sett
lors or industrious peasants, I suppose I
may take it for granted that the Germaniza-
tion of the Polish population is not intended,
only the Gormanlzation of the nev/ly acquired
soil."
He referred to the fact that the requirements of the
West V/all caused much property which vrould otherwise
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have been used for resettlement, to be c^evotec? to (defense pro
jects anc industrial purposes; that boun^ up with the settle
ment of the Eastern territories was the question of the pos
sible reparation of damages occasioned by the Polish Agrarian
Reforms, and stated that dealing with this difficult problem
presupposer an extensive knowledge of the Polish Agrarian
Legislation anc^ settlement activities.
"All these are tasks for wbich the necessary
planning an^"* preliminary work were done carefully
a long time ago in my Ministry on<^ in close coop
eration with the Reich Fon^ Ssta.te^ and for which,
besides the officials of my ministry, I have at
my disposal my settlement and land economy author
ities with their trained staffs of officials,
likewise the settlement companies subordinated to
me. "
It is difficult to reconcile the statement underlined.,
namely, that these plans had been prepared a "long time ago"
✓
with DARRiii'S testimony that he had no knowledge and took no
part with any pla.ns for aggressive war, and particularly that
against Poland, for this letter was written on 4 October 19'^9,
within 35 days after the invasion of Polp.nd.. It is wholly
unlikely that a man, in writing a letter on 4 October 1939,
would speak: of plans prepared a "long time ago" if they had,-
in fact, been prepared between September 1 and October 4, 1939.
After claiming that these matters of resettlement called
for technical knowledge and. experience, he said:
"Therefore, in the interest of t^e great
settlement task, it is my urgent desire that this,
my very own task from the outset, should not be
.ha.mpered by special orders or given any other
authority. Of course, in selecting settlers,
applicants from the armed forces, the SS and the
SA will be considered, in addition to the appli
cants from the ranks of the farmers, second and
subsequent to agricultural workers, farmers dig-
placed by public projects and Rthnic German refugees.
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"The very variety of these applicants should
prohibit the transfer of the problem of settling
the Eastern territories to an organization only
in charge of one of these groups of applicants,
especially since this organization is materially
not in a position to rform this task."
In closing, he requested LAI'lISRS to pass his report to
Hitler with these additional statements of the '"competent Reich
/•
Minister (DARRE)t
» His letter of October 5, to Himmler, although addressed
to "Dear Eeini", said that it was one of the greatest disap
pointments of DARRENS life to be officially informed that
the task of tha nev/ settlement of German peasantry in
Poland was to be taken av/ay from him and handed over to
the SS; he complained that Himmler had not answered his
various communications on the subject and that he had been
kept in ignorance of Himmler's Polish plans.
On 7 October, Hitler's Decree v:as issued putting
Himmler in charge of the scheme (Paragraph III of which
defined DARRE*3 duties), and on 27 October DARPiE wrote
Goering enclosing copies of two express letters to
LAIilHlRo describing meetings at which the draft of the
7 October decree was discussed with LiUIIERS and Himmler
where he produced the draft decree and demanded to Imow
v/hether, by virtue of his rights as Food and Agriculture
Minister, he was still permitted to settle on the basis
of a "gracious decree" of Himmler's. lie stated that
Himmler finally agreed to concede the carrying out of
this settlement to the Ministry of Food and Agriculture
and that thereupon. Ministerial Director Harmoning v/ho
was jpresent at the conference, formulated this concession
which was newly incorporated in the proposed decree,
without which DAPiRE*3 department w ould never have had
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tho right to utilize the experienced machinery of the
rinistry unless DARRE earned the good ivill of Himmler
andv/as permitted to do so as a special favor,
liarmening deposes that he attended the conference
of 7 October to which DARRE had made reference in-his
letter to Gooring, and that DARRE there obtained the
insertion of Article III in the decree v/hich the
deponent formulated at t he conference, as a result of
which DARRE, for his department and settlement agencies
obtained jurisdiction over the new settlement of Gorman
peasantry in the incorporated Eastern territories.
On 24 November, 1939, Kimmler decreed that the
employment of agricultural managers for ell confiscated
land and property in the Eastern territories v/as to be
handled exclusively by DARrS and that no such persons
v/ero to be directly appointed through the office of the
Commissar for the Strengthening of Germandom (Kimmler
I
himsolf).
On 17 January, 1940, DARRE, through his d eputy
V/illikens, issued orders addressed to some 24 officials
and groups of officers, (apparently to everyone who had
any interest in the matter of resettlement), reciting the
situation arising from the decree of 7 October 1939, and •
that he had been commissioned v;ith carrying out the new
settlement of formation of German peasantry under the
general instructions of Ilimmler, - that ho would make
use of the settlement agencies and settlement companies
to be newly establishedi that the "Central Land Office,
Inc.", in the future, v/ould get hold of and assess the
entire f'olish and Jewish agricultural property at the dis
posal of the Reich Commissar, and later issue transfers.
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etc.; that the SS Race and Settlement Office would partici
pate in the selection of settlers and work with the Reich"
Food Estate,
On 12 February, 1940, Goerins decreed that all agri
cultural and forest enterprises and property in the incor
porated Eastern territories which on I.September, 1939, v/ere
not in the possession of Ethnic Germans would be placed
under public management, v;hich also applied to such enter
prises and rroperties which v/ere requisitioned by the
Reich Commissar for the Strengthening of Germandom, - that
for carrying out thu.s public management the Eefenoant
DARRE, as Minister of Food and Agriculture, v;ould appoint
an Administrator General v;ho would be buund by DARRENS
directives, - that all administrative authorities and
courts were ordered to supply official help to the Ministry
of Food and Agriculture and his agencies, and that the
defendant, in accord with Himmler, would issue directives
to carry out the provisions of Goering s decree, and
DARRE could decide, by administrative measures, any ques
tions of doubt in individual cases.
On 28 February> 1940, DARRE, through his a epuoy
Backe, set up the Bast Geriuan band I-anagement Company,
Ltd,, and appointed an Administrator General for aigrioul--
tural and forest enterprises which were to be placed under _
public management in accordance with the provisions of
Goering's decree.
On May 9, 1940, DARRE announced the location of the-
head and branch offices of this company.
On 10 November, 1940, the Minister of Pood and
Agriculture promulgated regulations for the selection
of. Polish farms for purposes of resettlement by Ethnic
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German farm owners and German owners of farms in the
Reich; thct when these applications had been approved,
the Polish property was to be taken out of the hands of
the Public Administrator and, if necessary, out of tiiG
hands of its then owners and the applicant could move in.
Such was the organizational form of the so-called re
settlement of Polish farms.
In the .latter part cf November, 1940, Himmler
prepared a memorandum entitled, "Reflections on the Treat
ment of People of Alien Races in the East". He proposed
that they be split up into as many individual Ethnic groups
as possible; that Germany was not interested in unifying,
but in breaking them up into as many parts and fragments
as possible; that only by dissolving the fifteen millions
•of people in the Government General and the eight millions
of people in the Eastern provinces, could Germany carry
out the racial sifting necessary to select individual and
racially valuable elements and bring them into Germany and
there assimilate them; that no schools higher than
elementary fourth grade v;ould be permitted and that they
must be taught that it is a divine law to obey the Germans
and to be honest and industrious, - that reading should ,
not be required; that if a i^arent desired his children to
receive better schooling, and they were considered racially
perfect, they should be sent to school in Germany and
remain there permanently; that cruel and tragic as this
might be it was still the best method if one accepted as
un-Gorman and impossible the Bolshevist method of physical
e:ctermination of the people.
Himmler said that this practice might discourage
people of good blood from producing any more children.
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which, however, would bo advantageous; that there would
be an annual sifting of children, of four to ten years,
of whom the racially valuable v/ould be sent permanently
to G-erraany; that the remaining population v/ould be used as
people of labor without leaders and would be at Germany*s
disposal and fUrnish it annually v/ith migrant v/orkers, and
those fitted for heavy v/ork would bo called upon to help
work on the everlasting cultural tasks of the German
people.
On 28 March, 1940, Himmler made a file note or
memorandum that on the 25th he had handed in his report on
the Treatment of Peoples of -lien Races in the East to
Hitler, who considered it "very good and correct", but
ordered "fchat only a very fev/ copies should be issued and
that it should be treated v/ith the utmost secrecy and
be regarded as a Hitler directive. Among those to whom
Hitler directed it should be distributed was DARrS.
The defense denies tfaAt Exhibit 1314 is the
report mentioned in Exhibit 1313 and further denies that
DARRI] ever received it. The proof is not conclusive on
this subject but v/e believe that c ven if the report sub
mitted to Hitler v/as not precisdly identical v/ith Exhibit
1314, it no doubt followed the same line.
On 7 June, 1940, Director Hugo Berger, Ministerial-
rat in the Ministry of Pood and Agriculture and who,
incidentally, had been appointed by DARRE as Deputy Minis
ter of the East G©rman Land Company, published an article
in the ITatienai Socialist Landpost describing what had taken
place in PoTahd and how, immediately behind the advancing
Army, the entire occupied area became dotted with farmers
from the Reich after their applications and qualifications
hr.c3 "been approved and d etorniinod in Berlin; that in the
'"'arthc^au and the district of ICattov;itz and the area
constituting the Government General, they were directly
supplied with agricultural workers from the Reich "by the
Reich Pood Kinistry; that thoy v/ero furnished v/i th tractors,
steam plows, threshing implements, etc.; that these thou
sands of German farmers were settled in the incorporated
Eastern .territcrio3 on the lands of nearly 5000 large
Polish farms and hundreds of thousands of small Polish
farms covering an area of nearly one-fifth of the agricul
tural area of Germany as it v/as up to DGcemoGr, 1957»
DARRE'S dofonso is that hisd cpartmcnt and agencies
had nothing to do with the matter other than to furnish
agricultural machinery, supplies ond equipmont; that ho had
no Imowlodge of the criminal nature of Hitler's plans and
actions, and finally that the East German Land Company,
Inc., acted as a trustee for the c::propriatcd polish lands
for "tho benefit of future ov/ners, and that it was merely
an agency of economic supervision.
/ ^ 1 •C It is further urged that DARRENS settlement conipanios
did not themselves confiscate land, but that this was done
by the Lain Trustee Office East,, and they only administered
the lands so confiscated; • that whatever DARRfl did was only
as tho ercecutive organ of Hitler.
y *
This defense overlooks, hov/evor, the fact that all
of these organizations v;ere integral parts of the common
"* plan to unlawfully deprive Jews and Poles of their land
and reduce them to serfdom, and to settle them v;ith
Germans and f inally, to btirn tho title thereto over to
those new settlers. DARRS and his agencies played an
essential part in this unlawful and crue1 scheme.
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while it is true that Himmler wag the chief of the
so-callod nesettlement and v/as BARRELS superior, in most
particulars, the fact remains that DARRE strongly endeav
ored to get complete authority for himself and that he
fought for and kept as much power as hevns alole, while,
on the other hand, Himmler sought for and kept all the
power he could and surrendered as little to DARRE as he
✓
was compelled to. Under these circumstances DARRE cannot
be considered a mere avitomaton.
Notwithstanding the assertions of the defense,
trusteeships were not for the benefit of t he Polish and
L
Jewish landowners. Their function was to insure an order
ly administration and division of expropriated land for the
benefit of Germany and Germans, and not of Poles or Jews.
DARRE knew vAiat the plan was, |jnd in his letters to LAI.!I,'IERS
he speaks of having "long ago" prepared it; his objections
0 %
. were not to the scheme itself, but to the fact that himmler
and not DARfffi! was to be put in charge of it. ^^Dcien he
^ failed to get complete control, nevertheless by repeated
Objectionsand remonstrances he succeeded in having the
proposed decree changed, giving him a large measure of
authority, although Himmler was the over-all head; DARRE
¥
selected those who wore to become settlers, subject, of
course, to the right of Himmler and the SS to pass upon
the political and racial acceptability of the applicant;
his administration furnished a largo percentage of the
new settlers.
The struggle between himself and Himmler was one
for pov/er and authority, and not one of difference in
ideology or plan. This particular contest w as sympto
matic of the Nazi government, ^ach little Hitler was
Jealous of his proro^otives and ooOh, to the best of his
ability and influence, attcmptc-d.to increase his Juris
diction, generally at the expense of one or another of his
associates. That, in this instance, Himmler succeeded and
I
DARRH] in part failed, does not redound to the latter's
credit, but merely demonstrates that Klmmler was closer
to the source of pov/er and v;as best able to assert his
claims. Those expropriations and resettlements took
place while Poland and her allies were still valiantly
fighting in the field to regain her occupied territories.
The acts here outlined violated the provisions of
The Hague Convention (Article 45) and were a plain and
outrageous breach of International Law,
✓
DARRH was a conscious and willing' participant in
robbing hundreds of thousandc of Polish and Jewish
farmers of their property v/hlch subjected them to serf
dom and finally consigned thorn to slave labor either in
Poland or cormany.
) /•
^ '.70 do not believe the Defendant DARRR to 'have boon
•4
an unimaginable monster like Himmler, but his own letters
show him to have been cruelly callous of the rights of
others and utterly indifrerc3at to the human suffering which
the measures in which he willingly participated inflicted
upon the unfortunate people of Poland.
Bach-Selewski, called for the defense, testified'
among other things, that DARRL was one of the loading
anti-,Semites in Cormany, but not comparable v;ith
Strcicher and his associates; that hevas responsible
for the anti-3emltism in agriculture, and, as a result
of his methods, all Jews wore removed from the Reich
Food .estate and as handlers of food and of food cnter-
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prises; that agriculture t;as the first section in
v/hich the elimination of 'llio Jew v«is attempted; that it
was DArJl5h3 theory that Jews v/ere never to own landed
property, and as head of the Race and Settlement Main
Office until 1938, he carried out this concept by pro
hibiting ovaiership of property by Jews; that in the newly
annexed territories, resettlement took place by forco and
racial matters, although-.later on the execution of these
plans was not placed in his hands'.
In the pr.rticulars heretofore stated, DA.^3 must be .
and is found GUILTY under Count Five.
DIETRICE
DISTRICH hold various important positions in the
Party and in the Third Reich. On August 1, 1931, Hitler
appointed him Director of the Press Office of the Party.
On 28 February, 1934, ho appointed DIETRICH Reich
Press Chiof of the ITSDilP with the following pov/erss
"He directs in my name (in meincm Auftragc)
the guiding principles for the entire editorial
v;ork of the'Party press. In addition, as my
press chief, ho is the highest authority for
all the press publications of ohc Party and
of all its agencies."
The defendant insists that the proper translation
of hie term "in meinem Auftrago" is "by my order" rather
than "in my name". Apparently, however, either transla
tion is proper. In view of tho facts shown by the evidence
it makes no substantial difference v/hich translation is
. adopted.
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In 1933 ho v/as appointed one of the Reichsleitors
(Reich Leaders),a small ^roup which constituted the. lead
ers of the Party ranking next to Hitler himself.
In ITovemher, 1937, he v; as appointed Press Chief of
the Reich Government, taking office at the beginning of
1938 as State Secretary of the Ministry of Public Enlight
enment and Propaganda under Goebbols, and remained in this
position until 30 llarch, 194-5, a fcv; weeks before the
final collapse. He was a "convinced Nazi" and was one of
Hitler^s trusted lieutenants in the fight for powcrj his
own witnesses describe him as being "moderately" anti-
Semitic. No offort was made to satisfactorily define what
was meant by this t erm other than that he^as not a
'Radical" anti-Semite. The degree of his moderation is
shovaa by his speeches and by his. press directives which
will bo hereafter alluded to.
As Reich Press Chief ho had at least the ostensible
control over the press so far a s to what it should afid
should not publish. There was a continual rivalry and
contest betweenGocbbeIs and himself. The former attempted
to seize and exert power v^hiTe DIETRICH strenuously re
sisted those attempts. The contest did not end
until 30 Harch 1945 when Goobbels succeeded in having
DIETRICH dismissed from office, DIETRICH was, during all
the Important jcara of the Nazi regime, a member of
Hitler s personal entourage and snent most of his time
at the Euohrer Headquarters, lie supervised and deter
mined what material of foreign and political neivs should
be submitted to Hitler and used his position and presence
in Hitler's entourage to maintain his position and pov/ers,
"^/hile liGTOS unsuccessful in his efforts to separate the
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Reich Press Office from the Ilinistry of Propaganda, never-
\
theless Goebbels v/as unsuccessful until the very end in
seriously disturbing DISTRICPI*s status and control over the
Press,
In view of the attempts made by the defense to
minimize his influence and his power and authority, we
quote from the diary of Goebbels' personal referent,
Semmler, where, under date of ijovcmbor 30, 1943, the
fo11owing is found;
"The endless quarrel between Goebbels and
the Reich Press Chief has boon dormant for
a while, only to flare up again and rage the
fiercer. Their struggle to dictate the tone of
the press has begun again. It v/as a trifle
K that started it, but Goebbels is raging, as
much because of his poworlessncss to control
Dietrich as because of the issue at stake.
"Although Dietrich is State Secretary in
the Propaganda I-^inistry ho refuses to take
orders ot< advice from Goebbels. He shelters
himself safely behind liitler, vhose chief
press officer he is,
"The press section in the Ministry, which
' took over the functions of the former press
department of the Reich Government, is formal
ly not under Goebbels at all, but under Die
trich as Press Director of the Reich Govern-
ment. The headquarters of this department is
^ the famous Room 24, v/hich is staffed day and
night. Prom here are issued all political
directives to the GermCn press, all requests
passed down from above, from Hitler, from
Goebbels, from the Foreign Office and from
the Chancellory have to go through his office,
"I myself pass to Room 24, the press, in
structions which I receive, dictated by Goebbels,
so that they can be pssscd from there to the news
papers.
"How if there is some'important nev/s material,
% like a speech by Churchill, it can happen, - or
^ rather it is the rule, - that at least three or
four different pages of polic^^ directives are
produced. They are supposed to assist our editors
in their v/ork. But it is obvious to me that they
deprive writers of the last vestiges of intellec
tual independence. These directives often contra
dict one another sometimes only on a few points,
but more often completely and utterly.In such
cases there are only tv/o courses of a ction open to
the vn?etchcd official in Ro»om 24, who is almost
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continually talking on two telephones at
once. Either he can forbid any mention or
discussion of the Churchill speech for 24
hours, - in which case the British newspapers
say the speech has .pivcn the Cermans such a
shock that they don't know whot to say, - or
he v; ill take directive points from the ilitlcr-
Dietrich document and ignore the suggestions
of Goebbels a nd Iiibbentrop.
"Then on the next day Goobbcls is furious
when he roads the nowspapor and f inds that no
attention has been paid to his instructions.
Often I am suspected of having not passed them
on, and lean only save myself by producing
the original copy of the directives,
'"'Oddl:/ enough, Dietrich's authority ex
tends only to the press, while Goebbcls has
exclusive control over the radio and over its
news services." (Emphasis supplied).
Entry of ITovember 30, 1945: ^
"One result of the latest quarrel with
Dietrich is that Goebbols has decided to
intensify the political use of the radio.
He is going to give special attention to
the developments of its news services."
Again on IJarch 15, 1945, Sommlor noted:
"Of course ho (GoGbbels) controls public
opinion with his powers over radio, films,
' and to a certain extent over the press. I
soy to a certain extent because he has to
share at least half the work vdth the Reich
Press Director (as spoliosnian of the Fuehrer's
i Ileadquartors), with the Foreign Office and
u v/ith the High Command. Hrny of the directives
^ which I pass to the press in Gocbbels' name arc
useless because at the same moment the Fuehrer's
Headquarters (that is to say Dietrich) is putting
out the opposite diroctlvc on the same theme.
And in cases of doubt anything that comes from
the Fuc-hror's Headquarters has Hitler's 'personal
authority and takes priority, however trivial
the matter ..."
Gocbbels told Fritschc in Hovcmbcr, 1942:
"I shall never be able to take the press from
L Or.Dietrich and Hitler will never permit mo that
the press will bo completely eliminated from the
Ministry of Propaganda."
These statements agree with the oral testimony
of the witness Karl Paul Schmidt of the Foreign Office
, and of 'VernGr Stephen, Hoinz Lorcnz and Fritscho.
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We believe that the statements made in these affidavits
lie closer to the facts than the attempts made in the
oral testimony of the affiants to minimize DIETFJOH*S
power and authority,
DIETRICH established the so-called "Tagesparole"
which were daily instructions to the press. This step
was to prevent either Goebbels or other IVIinisters or
agencies from exercising control over the press releases,
DIETRICH appointed his ov/n subordinates, v/ho had immediate
charge of these releases, and his personal ^proval was
required for each release, including the directives and
statements of policy desired to be issued by other agen-
V
cies, including Goeboels himself, the foreign Office,
the OCT.
It is true th^^t the viev/s and opinions and desires
of many of the ministers were quite generally included in
the releases, but the final authority lay in DIETRICH.
* Each morning before the Tagesparole was issued to the
press conference, the Foreign Office and other ministries
and agencies, including the Ministry of Propaganda, fur-
b
^ nished material for the press releases. Here again Goebbels
interfered and to some degree was successful, until the
advent of Sundermann, Prom that time on DIETRICH regained
c ontrol,
The press department also issued weekly directives
and various kinds of material for periodicals and maga-
^ zines. The defense has offered testimony that DIETRICH
had no control over this material; that Bade, who was
chief of the periodical division, was Goebbels* man and
not DIETRICHES. This, however, is denied by the witness
Gensert who was employed in a responsible position in
that division and who was a member of opposition
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to the Nazi Party and was himself finally arrested by the
Gestapo; also by the affidavit of Lcrenz^
Lorenz there deposes that betv/een DIETKIGH and Bade,
chief of the periodical press department, there was a
close personal relationship; that DIEThlCH protected
Bade strongly and brought about his promotion to Minis
terial Dirigent; that Bade deputized for Stephan in his
capacity as personal expert (personal referent) and that
DIETRICH asked Bade frequently to visit him in the Fuehrer*s
Headquarters, where the latter assisted him in drafting his
speeches and articles; that upon DiETRlGii'S suggestion bade
had been appointed to the department as chief where pre
viously he had only been in charge of one main section of
the department.
In vie?; of DIETf.ICH'S determination to have and main-,
tain power and authority, in view of the powers conferred
upon him as press chief of the Nazi Party and press chief
of the Reich Government, and the fact that when any member
of his department followed Goebbels' wishes rather than those
of DIETRICH, he was disciplined or removed, we have no doubt
that whenever Goebbels' desires, or those of any other
Minister, differed from the press policy v/hich DIETRICH
wished, DIETRICH'S policy prevailed.
Press propaganda was one of the bases of Hitler's
rise to power and one of the supports to his continuation
in power, he so states in Meln Kampfs
"The v^bole art consists in doing this
so skillfully that everyone ^r-lll be convinced
that tbe fact is real, the process necessary,
the necessity correct, etc. But since propa
ganda is not and cannot be the necessity in
itself, since its function, like the poster,
consists in attracting the attention of the
crov/d, and not in educating those v/ho are
already educated or \^ho are striving after
education and knov/ledge, Its effect for the
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Imost part must be aimed at the emotions and
only to a very limited degree at the so-
called intellect. . •
. .But if, as in propaganda for
sticking out a -war, the aim is to influence
a whole people, we must avoid excessive in
tellectual demands on our public, and too
much caution cannot be exerted in this di
rection.
, .The receptivity of the great
masses is very limited,'their intelligence
is small, but their pov\fer of forgetting is
enormous. In consequence or these facts,
all effective propaganda must be limited to
a very fev/ points and must harp on these
in slogans until the last member of the
public understands what you want him to
understand by your slogan."
". • .Its task is not' to make an
objective study of the truth, insofar as it
favors the enemy, and then set it before the
masses vdth academic fairness; its task is
to serve our ov/n right, always and unflinch
ingly."
"The purpose of propaganda is not to
provide interesting distraction for blase
young gentlemen, but to convince, and what
I mean is to convince the masses. But the
masses are slov;-moving, and they always
require a certain time before theyaxe ready
even to notice a thing, and only after the
simplefet ideas are repeated thousands of
times v/ill the masses finally remember them."
loint 25 of the Party program states:
"a) All writers and employees of the
newspapers appearing in the German language
be members of the race.
"b) Non-German newspapers be required
tb have the express permission of the State
to be published. They may not be printed in
the German language•
Vc) Non-Germans are forbidden by law,
any financial interest in German publications,
or any influence on them, and as punishment
for such violations the closing of such a pub
lication as well as the immediate expulsion
from the Reich of the non-'^erman concerned.
-402-
